"The affections have the pleasures and pains for their objects; a the understanding has the mere fenfations and ideas. By the affections we are excited to purfue happiness, and all its means, fly from mifery, and all its apparent caufes. "The will is that state of mind, which is immediately previous to, and causes, thofe exprefs acts of memory, fancy, and bodily motion, which are termed voluntary, "The motions of the body are of two kinds, automatic and voluntary. The automatic motions are thofe which arife from the mechanifm of the body in an evident manner. They are called automatic, from their refemblance to the motions of automata, or machines, whose principle of motion is within themselves. Of this kind are the motion of the heart, and peristaltic motion of the bowels. The voluntary motions are thofe which arife from ideas and affections, and which therefore are referred to the mind; the immediately preceding ftate of the mind, or of the ideas and affections, being termed will, as noted in the last article. Such are the actions of walking, handling, fpeaking, &c. when attended to, and performed with an exprefs defign. This may ferve as afhort account of the chief fubjects confidered in the first part of thefe obfervations. Thefe fubjects are fo much involved in each other, that it is difficult, or even impoffible, to begin any-where upon clear ground, or fo as to proceed intirely from the dala to the quæfita, from things known to fuch as are unknown. I wil endeavour it as much as I can, and for that purpose shall observe the following order. First, fhall lay down the general laws, according to which the fenfations and motions are performed, and our ideas generated. "Secondly, I fhall confider each of the fenfations and motions in particular, and inquire how far the phenomena of each illuftrate, and are illuftrated by, the foregoing general laws. "Thirdly, I fhall proceed in like manner to the particular phæno mena of ideas, or of understanding, affection, memory, and imaginaion; applying to them what has been before delivered. "Laftly, I fhall endeavour to give a particular history and analyfis of the fix claffes of intellectual pleafures and pains; viz. thofe of imagination, ambition, felf-intereft, fympathy, theopathy, and the moral fenfe." This diftribution of the Author's fubject into four general leads, is profecuted in four diftin&t chapters, properly fubdivided into several sections in conformity to the natural divifions of his fubject. To thefe is added, in a fifth chapter, as a fecond part of the work, a View of the Doctrine of Philofophical Neceflity; in which the Author confiders the mechanism of the human mind, and the incompatibility of free-will, in the philofophical senfe of the word, with the dictates of religion, and the natural attributes of the Deity; concluding with obfervations on the prac tical application of the doctrine of neceflity. "The doctrine of philofophical free-will is the caufe and fupport of much pride and felf-conceit; and this fo much the more, as it is a doctrine not only allowed, but even infifled upon and required, and made } made effential to the diftinction between virtue and vice. Hence men are commanded, as it were, to fet a value upon their own actions, by efteeming them their own in the highest fenfe of the words, and taking the merit of them to themfelves. For philofophical free-will fuppofes, that God has given to each man a fphere of action, in which he does not interpofe; but leaves man to act intirely from himself, independently of his creator; and as, upon this foundation, the affertors of philofophical free-will afcribe all the demerit of actions to men, fo they are obliged to allow men to take the merit of good actions to themfelves, ie. to be proud and felf-conceited. This is the plain confequence of the doctrine of philofophical free-will. How far this objection against it overbalances the objections brought against the oppofite doctrine of mechanifm, I do not here confider. But it was neceffary, in treating of the methods of attaining true humility, to thew in what relation the doctrine of free-will stood to this fubject. "But we are not to suppose, that every man, who maintains philo fophical free-will, does alfo claim the merit of his good actions to himself. The fcriptures are fo full and explicit in afcribing all that is good to God, and the heart of a good man concurs fo readily with them, that he will rather expofe himself to any perplexity of underftanding, than to the charge of fo great an impiety. Hence it is, that we fee, in the writings of many good men, philofophical freewill afferted, on one hand; and merit difclaimed, on the other; in both cafes, with a view to avoid confequences apparently impious; though it be impoffible to reconcile thefe doctrines to each other. However, this fubjection of the understanding to the moral principle is a noble instance of humility, and rectitude of heart." But, having given a general sketch of the nature and design of this ingenious work, we muft defer entering into farther particulars, as well as on the confideration of the Editor's Introductory Elays, till more time and fewer publications afford an opportunity. ART. IX. The Scheme of Chriftian and Philofophical Neceffity Simmons. We have perufed this performance of Mr. Toplady's with alternate delight and difguft: with delight, at seeing fome of the most important truths, in religion and morals, defended with fpirit, and displayed in a ftriking point of view; with difguft, at feeing the moft ferious and facred fubjects treated with an unbecoming and unpardonable levity. We would by no means recommend an affectation or falfe delicacy of stile and manner in treating religious fubjects; but modus eft in rebus, there is certainly fome difference and a proper mean be E 2 twixt twixt the mincing dialect of the court-chaplain at St. James's, Who fcorns to mention hell to ears polite, and the lingo of Billingfgate and St. Giles's, made ufe of at the tabernacles of Tottenham-court, Moorfields, and the Lockhofpital. In the prefent cafe, too, we cannot help thinking Mr. Toplady's zeal carries with it too much the appearance of perfonal pique against Mr. Wefley; a circumftance that may prove injurious to his character, if not to his caufe; as it may feem, to fome people, to arife from a jealoufy of the fuccefs of a rival. Let our readers judge from the exordium of Mr. Toplady's preface. "Yesterday's poft brought me a packet from London, including among other papers, a fmail tract, recently published by Mr. John Welley, entitled, Thoughts upon Neceffity. I had no fooner perufed Thoughts,' than I refolved to bring them to the test: and am now fetting about it. 7 "During fome years paft, I have, for the most part, food patiently on the defenfive, againft this gentleman. "Tis high time, that I take my turn to invade; and carry the arms of truth into the enemy's own territory. "Mr. Wefley's tract, above-mentioned, was fent to me, by a well known, and very deferving, London clergyman. So much of whofe letter, as relates to the faid tract, fhall, for the amusement of my readers, be fubmitted to their view. * I went, laft night, to the Foundry; expecting to hear pope John: but was difappointed. After hearing a Welshman, for an hour and twenty minutes, on Pfalm lxxxiv. 11. preach up all the herefays of the place; a man, who fat in the pulpit, told him, to "give over:" for he seemed to bid fair for another half hour, at leaft. But he came to a conclufion, as defired. Then this man, who feemed to be a local preacher, ftood up, with a pamphlet in his hand, and addreffed the auditory in the following manner: "I am defired, to publish a pamphlet upon Neceffity and Freewill; the best extant, that I know of, in the + English tongue; by Mr. John Wefley, price three-pence.-I had purposed to have "faid a good deal upon it: but the time is elapfed.-But, in this "three-penny pamphlet, you have all the difputes that have been "bandy'd about fo lately. And you will get your minds more esta blished, by this three-penny pamphlet, than by reading ALL the "books that have been written for and againft. It is to be had, at "both doors, as you go out.' I beg leave, (adds my reverend friend), to tranfmit you this here faid fame three-penny wonder.' "Upon the whole, this must have been a droll fort of mountebank fcene. Attended, however, with one moít melancholy and deplorable circumflance, arifing from the unreafonable and unfeafon Mr. Wefley's principal meeting-house in London. + Query does the faid lay preacher, whoever he may be, know aught of any other tonguet able able prolixity of the long-winded holder-forth: which cruelly, injudiciously, and despitefully, prevented poor Zany from puffing off, with the amplitude he fully intended, the multiplex virtues of the doctor's three-penny free-will powder. "Never do that by delegation, fays an old proverb, which you can as well do in propria perfona. Had doctor John himself got upon the flage, and fung, Come, buy my fine powders; come buy dem of me; 'Hare be de belt powders dat ever you fee.' Who knows, but the three-penny dofes might have gone off, at both doors,' as rapidly as peas from a pop-gun?" We are really forry to fee a reverend and orthodox * divine make use of fo ludicrous a ftile, in treating fo momentous a concern as are the inpofitions of puritanical hypocrify. We look with horrour on the havock daily made on the bodies of the ignorant and credulous by medical empirics; and thall a pious Divine fport and divert himself with the quackeries of theological charlatans, who daily administer their mortal poisons to immortal fouls? It is a wanton digreffion, alfo,' that Mr. Toplady makes from his fubject, in turning his antagonist into ridicule about his phyfical recipe for the gout. For the general frankness of his ftile and manner he makes, indeed, the following apology. "If, in the fucceeding Effay, any reader fhould imagine I exprefs my meaning with too much plainnefs; it may fufice, to obferve, that there is no end to the capricious refinements of affected and exceffive delicacy. "Quod VERUM, atque DECENS, curo, & rogo, & omnis in boc fum. "Language, like animal bodys, may be phyficked, 'till it has no ftrength left. We may whet its edge, as the fool fharpened his knife, and as fome are now for reforming the church, 'till we have whetted the whole blade away." There is certainly fome truth in this obfervation; but it is also true, that ftrength is not incompatible with elegance, or even delicacy. We applaud our author's attachment to the VERUM, and could wish he were equally attached to the DECENS. Indeed, we cannot help thinking that the low and ludicrous titles, given to fome well-meant religious tracts by zealots during the interregnum, greatly contributed to the contempt thrown on religion itielf by the licentious profligates of the fucceeding reign t From the abuse of this word, by rival reviewers, who generally use it as a term of ridicule and contempt, it may not be improper to obferve, that whenever we apply it, we mean it ferioutly as the highest encomium we can beflow on a minifter of the gofel. + The Lift to Heamen, the Shove to the beary-a--'d Chriftian, and many others of the fame amp, have, doubtless, afforded mirth and encouragement to libertines on their carrier down the declivity of the broad path, leading to defìruction. Mr TopLady's neglect of decorum of Řile is fill the more reprehenfible, as he himself repre hends Mr. Welley, for writing" with as little ceremony, and with as much, feurriiny, as an enraged fifh-woman would be din the ears of a 'prentice wench." E 3 Setting Setting afide the objections we have to the ftile of this tract, we cordially recommend the matter of it to the attention of the reader; who will find in it a number of important points difcuffed in a lively, fpirited and convincing manner. As our Author advances, however, little that is quite new, we shall take leave of the first part of his work, with quoting the conclufion of his remarks on the doctrine of necessity, in answer to Mr. Wesley. I had the following remarkable conversation, says he, in June 21, 1774, with a free-will gentleman, in the neighbourhood of London, and in the prefence of my friend, the Rev. Mr. Ryland. "God does all he poffibly can,' faid the Arminian philofopher,. to hinder moral and natural evil. But He cannot prevail. Men ⚫ will not permit God to have his wish.' Then the Deity,' anfwered I, must certainly be a very unhappy being. Not unhapy in the leaft.' -What! meet with a conftant feries of crolies thwarted in his daily endeavors; difappointed of his wishes; difconcerted in his plan of operations; defeated of his intentions; ◄ embarrassed in his views; and actually overpowered, every moment ⚫ of every day, by numberlefs of the creatures He has made; and yet be happy under all this inceffant feries of perplexing and mortifying circumstances? Yes: for he knows, that, in confequence of the Free-will, with which He has endued his rational creatures, He himself must be disappointed of his wishes; and defeated of his ends; and that there is no help for it, unless He had made us mere machines. He therefore fubmits to neceffity: and does not ⚫ make himself uneafy about it.' "Can any thing be more fhockingly execrable, than fuch a degrading and blafphemous idea of the ever bleffed God? And, confequently, is not the doctrine of human felf-determinability the moft daring, the most inconfiftent, the most falfe, the moft contemptible, and the most atheistical tenet, that was ever spawned by pride and ignorance in conjunction? A doctrine, which, in running away from the true neceflity, coins an impoffible neceffity of its own inventing; and, while it reprefents men as gods, finks God far below the level of the meanest man! "Is not the adorable Creator of the world, the governor of it too? Or has He only built a ftage, for fortune to dance upon? Does Almighty providence do no more than hold the diftaff, while contingency (i. e. while nothing) fpins the threads, and wreathes them into a line, for the first caufe (very falfely fo called, if this be the cafe!) to wind upon his reel, and turn to the best account He can? Arminians may affirm it. But God forbid, that I fhould ever believe it. "For my own part, I folemnly profefs, before God, angels, and men, that I am not confcious of my being endued with that felfdetermining power, which Arminianifm afcribes to me as an individual of the human fpecies. Nay, I am clearly certain, that I have it not. I am alfo equally certain, that I do not wish to have it: and that, was it poffible for my Creator to make me an offer of transferring the determination of any one event, from his own will to |