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Correfpondents hath alfo hinted, that this doctrine hath been univerfally received by all mankind, and is neceffary to the fupport of its attendant doctrine, a future state of rewards and punishments. But I would beg leave to refer both those writers to what Dr. Leland hath faid on this fubject, in his tract on the Advantage and Neceffity of the Chriftian Revelation.

"If men, fays that learned and candid divine, were left merely to their own unaffifted reason, they would be apt to labour under great doubts and difficulties, about the immortality of the foul and a future ftate of rewards and punishments. Some notions of a future ftate, fays he, did obtain among mankind, from the earliest ages; not the effect of human reafon and philofophy; nor yet the invention of legiflators for political purpofes; but derived by tradition, and probably a part of the primitive religion communicated to mankind. Thefe traditions, however, became gradually obfcured and corrupted; and were, in a great measure, infufficient to the purposes of Many of the philofophers abfolutely denied the doctrine of a future ftate, rejecting it as a vulgar error: others represented it as wholly uncertain: nay, even their fentiments concerning the nature of the human foul, were various and contradictory. The peripatetics feem to have denied the fubfiftence of the foul after death: the Stoics had no settled confiftent scheme on this head; nor was the immortality of the foul a doctrine of their school. Neither was a future ftate acknowledged by Confucius, or those who profeffed to be his difciples.

"Of thofe philofophers who profefs to believe and teach the immortality of the foul, Pythagoras is generally esteemed the most eminent: but to fay nothing of the uncertainty we are under as to his real fentiments, when we confider that he afferted the immortality of the foul from this argument, that the foul was part of the divinity, and after it departed out of the body, went to the foul of the universe, to that which is congenial to itself; when we confider that he afferted its pre-existence, and that after death it tranfmigrated from one body to another, even to the bodies of beafts as well as men, we may prefume, that the doctrine, thus taught, could be of no great advantage to mankind, and was hardly confiftent with a future state of rewards and punishments,

"Socrates, and after him Plato, feems to have believed the immortality of the foul, and a future state, and to have argued for it. They affert many excellent things concerning the happiness to be enjoyed in a future life; they fpeak of going to good men; to the gods who are abfolutely good; and of obtaining the beft of good things after their departure out of this life. But all this feems to have been reprefented as the fpecial privilege of thofe, who having an earnest thirst after knowledge, addicted themselves to the study of philofophy; that as for the common fort of good men, who had exercifed juftice and temperance, that they went into the bodies of animals of a gentle nature, or returned into human bodies, fuch as they had before. They both of them feem to have believed in general, that there would be a difference made in a future ftate, between good and bad men,

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and that the one fhould be in a greater or lefs degree punished, and the other rewarded: but it must be acknowledged, that they greatly obfcured and weakened the doctrine in point of moral influence, by fometimes fixing other fictions with it, and at other times talking very uncertainly about it.

"From the fentiments of Cicero and Plutarch the doctor is also of opinion, That the doctrine of eternal life and happiness, provided for all good men without exception, whether in a high or low condition, learned or unlearned, who lived foberly, righteoutly, and godly in the world, was not taught by the moft eminent of thofe philofophers, who profeffed to believe the immortality of the foul and a future ftate! To this he adds, "That the most ftrenuous advocates for the immortality of the foul, did not pretend to any certainty about it; their uncertainty on the contrary appeared upon many ferious and important occafions; not only in their philofophical debates, but especially in their confolatory difcourfes on the death of their friends; and from hence they were led to affert the felf-fufficiency of virtue for compleat happinefs, without a future recompence: and that a short happinefs is as good as an eternal one."

"And is man nothing more than a relative and merely-formal being? A being that confifts only of properties, derived from merely the conftruction of its parts?"-This may be asked, and it may be again faid that modification and relation are not real or pofitive beings, that where there are real qualities there must exift fomething poffefling thefe qualities. But nothing is more certain that all we know of the existence of external objects, is deduced from our fenfe of their properties, and all the materialifts in the world may be boldly defied to give one phyfical proof, or bring one folid argument, in favour of the exiftence of any fubftratum or abftract fubftance that poffeffes no fuch properties.

What then, it may be faid, will become of individuality and perfonal identity of man? And yet, fhould I ask a man what he means by his individuality and perfonal identity, though he might refer to his own confcioufnefs for the reality of such exiftence, he muft define it, if he were to define it properly, by the feveral relations in which he ftands to other beings, and by which he is diftinguished from them. Mr. Locke has referred the criterion of perfonal identity wholly to confcioufnefs; but the critics abovementioned have put a cafe, in which that argument appears defective. Suppofe, fay they, that a man fhould be fo much altered in fize, make, features, voice and fentiment, as not to be known by his former acquaintance; which, by time and circumftance might poffibly happen. Suppofe farther, as might alfo happen, that by ficknefs or accident, his memory fhould be fo hurt or impaired as to make him entirely forget his former fituation, relations and connections, how is the identity of fuch a perton to be afcertained, and in what doth it confift?

"It is on all hands allowed that, from the change effected by the accretion of chyle, and excretion of the humours, there may not remain any part of his former corporeal fubftance. His external form and interior conftitution are so altered that he is not known to be the fame perfon, either by himself or other. And yet, it is faid, he is the fame identical perion, from fome unchangeable individuality the mind, or felf. But the real reafon is, that had the change been gradually effected in the prefence of others, they would still call him by the fame name, and would act in regard to him in every respect as before. So that we fee, if all the fubitance of a man's body were changed, and its form and difpofition only transferred to other fubfiftance; the perfon might remain ftill the fame; whereas if the form and difpofition were changed, though the corporeal fubftance fhould be fill the fame, the perfon might not. Again, the identity of the perfon feems to depend on the circumstance of the change being obferved by others, or remembered by himself. The man, altered as above fuppofed, is the fame man, if he be ftill called by the fame name, live in the fame neighbourhood, and poffefs the fame family eltate: but had this change happened to him alone in a diftant uninhabited island, who would admit him to be the fame perfon? And yet can it be faid that man's identity is merely circumflantial? According to the teftimony of others, it appears that our identity confifts in the fameness of our form; and, according to our own teftimony, it confifts in the fameness of our reflection. That fuch a perfon would be the fame is, if by being the fame we mean as one numerically diftin&t from all others; but is perfonal identity merely negative, confifting only in not being any thing elfe? Seems to lay a great firefs on the certainty of our exiflence, from our confcioufnefs of it; but this consciousness is but very imperfect. If a man did not himself remember that he had before borne a fimilar relation to the objects about him; he would never know himself to be the fame man; and, if ignorant of his perfonal identity, how imperfect muft his knowledge of his own existence be? But be this as it may, it appears pretty evident that per fonal identity confits not in the famenefs of any particular being, independent of other beings; but in the famenefs of the relations which If you continue ftill to afk, whatfuch being bears to all others. then is the being, abstracted from its qualities and relations? We anfwer, we do not pretend to define, or even affert, the existence of, things without properties, qualities and relations. The leaft exceptionable idea we can form of the firft elements of things, is, that they are durable actions, or powers, productive, by their combinaThe internal fenfitive tion, of the various phenomena of nature.

powers, exciting in organized bodies a fenfe of pleasure and pain, or caufing them to be affected by the action of external objects, doubtlefs exift, as well as thofe powers impreffing the fenfe of fuch objects; but whether they are all homogeneous; whether they are fixed or fluctuating ftate; whether they have any existence as feparate agents, diftinct, and, in that fente, independent of the Deity; or whether they are to be conceived as feveral diftinct and confiant exertions of that fupreme and felf-exiftent power; thefe points are, in our opinion, not to be determined by the ftrongest efforts of the hu

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man understanding. We refer, therefore, all thofe who are juftly folicitous about the welfare of the human foul in a future ftate, to the comfortable affurances of that gofpel, which Mr. Search hath thought proper to lay afide; being fully perfuaded, that if they do not find fatisfaction in the fcriptures, they may long feek it in vain, amidst the perplexity of metaphyfical difquifitions."

Mr. Seton feems anxious to know what is to become of Natural Religion, if the natural immortality of the Soul is not fupportable on the principles of philofophy. For my own part, I think natural religion, as it is called, of fo little use in a Chriftian country, that I am very little folicitous what becomes of it. The queftions he afks Dr. Prieftly are yet pertinent enough if put to him as a divine, the author of the Inftitutes, and editor of the Theological Repository. For as to the use of natural religion in elucidation of revealed, I look upon it in the light of an ideot holding a farthing candle to the meridian fun. Where life and immortality is brought to light by the gospel, I regard the propensity of people to grope about by the light of nature, as an indication that they love darkness better than light; though, not to be uncharitable, I do not always suppose it to be, because their deeds are evil.

One word more in apology, or rather juftification of promulgating every important truth, as foon as difcovered. Mr. Seton fays there is not a more certain and falutary truth in all philofophy than the common proverb, "Truth is not to be spoken at all times." A proof that it is fuch, adds he, is that the gradual difcovery of truth hath been the object both of the difpenfation of Providence and economy of grace ever fince the world began. The promulgation of truths, whose discovery may affect the mo rals or peace of mankind, he fays, fhould be managed. But by whom managed?-By the purblind difcoverers! who are frequently led by accident to the discovery? Surely not! May we not reafonably suppose that, a pre-difpofing and all-wife providence will not bring about the discovery of any truth to individuals before the time proper for its general promulgation? I am, therefore, ftill of Mr. Baxter's opinion, that honefty is the best policy, and that we should never diffemble any truth, for fear of its confequences."

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The fame author exprefsly declares alfo, that "No truth by being known can have a bad effect on the minds and lives of men." See Baxter's Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Sou.. Vol. I. page 195.

ART.

ART. II. Notes and various Readings to Shakespeare Part I. Continued from Vol. I.. Page 368, and concluded.

Having given our readers an account of our author's plan, in his own words, in a preceding Review, we come now to the performance of our promife of making fome remarks and giving fome fpecimen of its execution. In matter for remark, indeed, we are forry to say we are almost altogether disappointed; having met with nothing very worthy either of our or the reader's notice, in wading, with the utmoft patience and perfeverance, through upwards of two hundred pages in quarto; all of them as entertaining and important as the annexed quotations: which we infert in mere deference to the numerous admirers of Shakespeare, and the reputation which Mr. Capel has formerly acquired, with fome of them, as a commentator on that poet.

SPECIMEN OF THE GLOSSARY.

Abieds (R. 3. 6, 31.) Castaways, Perfons abjected. Lat. abjecti. to able one (k. L. 94, 5.) undertake for him, anfwer for one's Ability.

to abode (3. H. 6. 100, 7 & H. 8. 6, 28.) bode, forebode. to abrook (2. H. 6. 39. 21.) brook, endure, fuffer.

to aby (m. n. d. 46, 28.) abide, feel the Effect of a Thing. Academe (1. 1. 1. 3. 13 & 56, 1.) Academy. Lat. Academia.

to accite (2. H. 4. 31, 17. T. A. 4, 13.) incite: also,—to summon; Lat. accire.

accomplished (m. of V. 60, 16. t. of the f. 7, 11.) furnish'd; alfo,perform'd: Fre. accompli.

Accord (a. y. l. i. 5, 13.) Agreement, Union. to accord (R& J. 12, 27.) to agree. accordant (m. a. a. n. 13, 30.) agreeable.

Accuse (2. H. 6. 48, 10.) Accusation.

Aches (T. of A. 81, 1.) Akes.

to acquittance (R. 3. So, 11.) acquit, be as an acquittance to. adoptious (a. w. t. e. w. 9, 1.) adoptive, adoptitious.

to advantage (H. 5. 71. 12. 2. g. of V. 50, 27.) improve, turn to Advantage: alfo.-profit, be of Advantage to. advantageable (H. 5. 101, 7.) advantageous.

adverfly (C. 34, 8.) wrongly. Lat. ex adverfo.

to advertise (m. f. m. 4, 28 & 93, 13.) observe, attend to; animum advertere.

adulterate (H. 28, 2 & R. 3. 93, 7.) adulterizing, or adulterating; Part. act. of-to adulterate (k. J. 34, 9.) commit Adultery. Advocation (O. 75, 26.) Office and Act of an Advocate.

afeard (M. 61, 12 & t. 50, 31.) posseff'd of Fear, frighted. Attets (1. 1. 1. 8, 7 & R, 2. 23, 29.) Affections.

affection'd (t. n. 30, 22.) affected, full of Affectation.

Affiance (H. 5. 27, 24.) Reliance, Truft. Fre.

affin'o (T&C. 17, 24. Q. 4, 23 and 46, 13.) join'd in Affinity:

alío, bound, obligated, ty'd as by Affinity.

affition (k. L. 59, 11 and M. 39, 31.) Dashing, Battery; vide licit, of a ftorm: the proper and primitive Senfe of the Latin-

Aflictio

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