of it, particularly of thofe parts, wherein the author treats of the immateriality and immortality of the foul of man? His reafoning hath hitherto been thought to carry with it the force of demonftration; yet, as be himself declares," his business was only to fhew, what a hea then philofopher, without any other help, and almost autodidanros, may be fuppofed to think." He even dares affert that he has brought his argument to this undeniable iffue; that," if the foul of man is not immortal, either there is no God, upon whom we depend; or he is an unreasonable being; or there never has been any man, whofe fuffering in this world have exceeded his enjoyments, without his being the cause it himself. But furely no one of these three things can be faid." Such were the fentiments of this great man. If however you are ftill inclined to think favourably of the doctrine you have advanced, it will now become you either to reply explicitly to my difficulties, and refute Mr. Wollafton's reafoning, or elfe offer fome further arguments in fupport of yourselves and Dr. Priestley. I am, gentlemen, your, &c. J. BN.

For the reafons alledged in our account of Dr. Prieftley's Effays, we beg to be excused for the prefent, from entering into this interesting difpute; and that fill the more earnestly, as we have had fent us a long and laboured defence of the paffage that appeared fo exceptionable to Mr. Seton, intended to have been printed, in a pamphlet, by itself, had not the author [either the Doctor himself or fome able friend] juftly conceived fo good an opinion of our candour, as to think we should afford a place for it in our Review; which we purpose to do in our next number,

SIR,

To Dr. K ENRIC K

In your Review of Mr. Toplady's Scheme of Chriftian Neceffity, you characterize that gentleman as an orthodox divine. And here, left your intention fhould be mistaken, once for all, you give us, in a note, your idea and definition of the appellation of orthodox ;though notwithstanding this precaution, much is left for conjecture. A fpell at rival Reviewers must be paffed over, and each be confidered as lawful game to the other, though a London Reviewer feems herein to copy the manners of a London porter, who does not roar aloud his "by your leave," until he has firft jostled the beaut paffenger into the kennel.

"When we apply it, (orthodox) fay you, we mean it seriously as "the highest encomium we can bestow on a minister of the gospel."

So vague then is the meaning of the word, as to be indifcriminately ufed either in jeft or earnest; either as a term of ridicule and contempt; or as the bigheft encomium. And all this at the pleasure of the writer, and thus it becomes a word of exceeding good command.

But of this curious note, it must be further noted, that there is no declaration, on the part of the Reviewers, which difcovers or refpects the reft of their orthodoxy;-the Gofpel of Chrift and words of human device are fometimes raised to an equal authority, and that too, in focieties which call themfelves Chriftians ;-fometimes, pudet bet opprobria, the traditions and explications of men are elevated above the written word of the infallible God.

Befides this confusion in respect to the teft or criterion of orthodoxy, much remains in reference to the place where fuch flattering dif

tinction

tinction is used or given. What is orthodoxy in England is innovaa tion and herefy in Scotland, and if in Great Britatin, one definition of orthodoxy will not pafs current, much more diftant and difcordant are the conftituent parts of orthodoxy with the Proteftants at large, and the Papifts;-with the Jews and the Chriftians, and all of them with the followers of Mahomet, and the Gentoo Indians.

Since then you have made a voluntary declaration of your orthodoxy, do not stop fhort of giving ample fatisfaction to fome of your readers, who nevertheless entertain fome doubts in regard to the touchstone by which you would wish to have your future attachment to orthodoxy tried.

And if the London Reviewers would take a hint from one who is in no wife inclined to be their enemy, but who at the fame time en tertains fome fufpicions of their being grappled by prejudice or interest to an established fyftem of faith and doctrine, he would earneftly exhort them not to trample on that liberty wherewith Chrift hath left all men free, but to remember that the Christian Dispensation was preached to rational creatures,-to the unlearned as well as learned, without craft or fubtility; and to remember alfo the characteristic of a true and confiftent Proteftant is to protest against every corruption of, or addition to the Gofpel of Chrift, and the Lording it over God's heritage; and further, like the Bereaus of old, to enquire whether things are fo or no.

Newark, Aug. 4. 1775.

I am, Sir,

Your's, &c.

A Chriftian and a Proteftant.

In reply to this correfpondent, the Editor anfwers: First, that it is unfait to addrefs him as the author of any particular article in the Review, on the mere prefumption of his writing it: Secondly, to fhew that the Reviewers mean no evasion, they answer, that the touchstone, by which they would have their future attachment to orthodoxy tried, is neither the Alcoran nor the Whedam; but the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Teftament; profeffing, at the fame time, that they are not fo felf-conceited as to think, with fome of our new-fangled reformers, that nobody can interpret the fcriptures but themselves, or that former reformers were not as well qualified to judge of the authenticity, as well as the meaning, of the written word of God as any of the prefent. This correfpondent ftyles himself a protefiant ; but his taking upon him the office of a father confetior, looks a little like a papift.

Lucinda Lively is fo liable to vary her opinions, that we are induced to give her another month's time to recollect herself, and favour us with the laft alterations and corrections of her letter; which fhall then find room.

If our correfpondent, Rufticus non Rudis, would make the proper. allowance for the expedition with which this work is neceffarily prepared for, and paffes through, the prefs, he would be as ready to forgive the little inaccuracies he mentions, as he is obliging to point them out to us. He will be pleafed to address his future favours to the Editor; to be left at the Publisher's.

THE

LONDON REVIEW,

FOR SEPTEMBER, 1775.

ART. I. A Letter to the London Reviewers: occafioned by their Infertion of Mr. Seton's Letter to Dr. Priestley, on the Mortality of the Soul, in their Review for June laft.

GENTLEMEN,

As the expediency, of accommodating yourselves as much as poffible to all parties, is attached to the nature of your publication, I can eafily account for your aukward attempt to foften the terms of that approbation, you fo frankly bestowed on Dr. Priestley's very juft and philofophical infinuation respecting the homogeneous nature of the human compofition, and, of courfe, his inference refpecting, what is called, the mortality of the foul. I cannot help thinking, nevertheless, that this inftance of your caution was as unneceffary as it was deficient in point of retrospection; you yourfelves having countenanced the fame doctrine in the very article in which you have introduced the infinuation in question. For; as to your studied diftinction between the existence of man as a physical being and as a moral agent, it is, in this cafe, a diftinction without a difference. Phyfical beings may exift that are no moral agents; but, if man exists as a moral agent, he must exist as a phyfical being. But I mean not to justify Dr. Prieftley's infinuation on merely moral or metaphyfical principles. The changes have been so often rung with the unmeaning founds of mind, fpirit, and other unintelligible terms, that, what is called metaphyfics and even the theory of. morals, is almoft reduced to a mere jargon. In the investigation of the natural mortality of the foul, I confider man as an animal and enquire into his form, compofition and duration, as a naturalift. For the prefent, therefore, I lay afide moral and religious confiderations, and enter on the enquiry folely on the grounds of phyfical experiment and obfervation; the most certain founda

VOL. II.

tion

tion of all human knowledge. To proceed regularly in the fup. port of Dr. Prieftley's fuppofition; let us afk the candid experimentalift, why he entertains a notion that man is composed of two substances, fo effentially different and diftinct as body and fpirit are commonly conceived to be? Will he not anfwer, it is becaufe he perceives him capable of acting in a manner, which he calls voluntary; of which mode of action inanimate bodies are evidently incapable? That the apparent action of inanimated bodies is a mere mechanic motion; of which they are not in themselves capable of determining the direction? But whence this animation? This power of volition? Is it derived from the mere organization of inanimate matter? Or is it effential to any adjunct or annexed fubftance, of a nature totally different?-The difficulty, of conceiving how fuch a power of volition can be con ferred by mere appofition to matter, evidently incapable of it while unorganized, makes us have recourfe to an imperceptible adjunct; on whom we bestow accordingly that power, as an ef fential quality, without having any other proof of its existence. But would it not be more philofophical to enquire whether inanimate and unorganized matter, be fo totally inert and involuntary as it appears? That the voluntary motion of animals is not altogether capricious, but is the refult of motives which operate as phyfiological caufes in the regular productions of their effects, is not to be doubted. May it not then be reasonably asked, whether the most inanimate and unorganized bodies are altogether fo inert and paffive as that, by proper organization, they are incapable of acquiring the power of volition, i. e. the power of being affected by motives not merely mechanical? Before the invention of clocks, watches, and other machines of the like curious conftruction, it was just as natural to infer that bits of brafs and fteel could never, by any mode of combination, be endued with the faculty of aftronomical indication and the other properties, fuch machines are poffeffed of, as it is to infer that the morfels of aliment which fuftain and compofe the human frame are incapable, by proper organization to acquire the power of voluntary motion. I ufe the term, and abide by the faculty, of voluntary motion, rather than by that of feeling, thinking, &c. because there may be bodies that both feel and think, and yet appear to be incapable of doing either; whereas the appearance of voluntary motion is the indifputable teft and criterion of animality. Indeed both fenfation and refle&ion are rather the means and motives of animal life than the effence of it.

The exiftence of an inert, pafive, fubftance, poffeffed of nothing but length, breadth, and thicknefs, is merely ideal; nor is it poffible, even did fuch a fubftance really exift, that its exiftence could be determined by phyfical experiment. The inacti

vity of matter, therefore, on which the fuppofed neceffity of its being influenced by fpirit or an active fubftance effentially different, is itself a mere fuppofition, founded purely on human ignorance. Let us take another route, therefore; and, instead of building up an ideal hypothefis on the vifionary foundation of mere fuppofitions founded on ignorance, endeavour to raife the fabrick of a real theory on the fubftantial foundation of phyfical experiment. To fuppofe nothing, on the credit of either ancient or modern philofophers; can it be truly faid that we find any body or substance in nature so inert, paflive, and infenfible as matter is generally supposed to be? There is no body, on which we can make experiment, that is not in fome degree elaftic, viz. capable of compreffion and dilatation; a quality which, though mechanical in its effects, does not appear fo in its caufe. Even the most folid and incompreffible of bodies are poffeffed of a capacity of reciprocal refiftance; they cannot exift at the fame time in the fame place; they oppofe each other's motion, when meeting in oppofite directions: an oppofition that may not be improperly called a mechanical fpecies of perception. Is there any impropriety in faying, two inanimate or unorganised bodies, in collifion, perceive the prefence or force of each other, becaufe they are incapable of fenfation, or perceiving external objects? For want of a nervous fyftem, in their conftru&tion, they are incapable of irritability, of feeling pain or pleasure. For want of organs of fenfe, they neither fee, hear, fmell, nor tafte each other; but can it be faid they are infenfible of the prefence or do not feel the preffure of that percuffion, which fometimes diverfifies their whole form?---We are perfuaded that if an animal were divested of every fenfe but that of the touch, it would have much fuch a kind of feeling of external objects as we may fafely impute to infenfible matter. This at least is certain that, when the organs are divefted of their powers by fleep or paroxifms, and the faculties of reflection lie dormant, the animal is infenfible not only to external objects, but even to pain or pleasure from the touch. This has been proved by a number of incontrovertible experiments. The mere animation, therefore, of the matter, compofing a living body, does not give it the power of feeling, in that fenfe of the word, in which we deny a capacity of it to inanimate bodies. The animal body, in fuch cafes, is ftill living, though as incapable of feeling as if it were dead. The corporeal functions are continued; the blood flows through the veins and arteries, and the animal lives, though as infenfible of pain and inconfcious of its own exiftence as a clock, watch, or any other mechanical automaton.

It will, perhaps, be thought this laft circumftance makes against my argument; as it seems to fhew that a principle, still fuperior to that of mere animal life, is neceffary even to confer

the