Principles of Cognition, Language and Action: Essays on the Foundations for a Science of PsychologyThis book addresses a growing concern as to why Psychology, now more than a hundred years after becoming an independent research area, does not yet meet the basic requirements of a scientific discipline on a par with other sciences such as physics and biology. These requirements include: agree ment on definition and delimitation of the range of features and properties of the phenomena or subject matter to be investigated; secondly, the development of concepts and methods which unambiguously specify the phenomena and systematic investigation of their features and properties. A third equally important requirement, implicit in the first two, is exclusion from enquiry of all other mattes with which the discipline is not concerned. To these requirements must then be added the development of basic assumptions about the nature of what is under investigation, and of principles to account for its properties and to serve as a guide as to what are relevant questions to ask and theories to develop about them. |
Contents
INTRODUCTION TO ASSUMPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS | 3 |
11 Basic assumptions of Naturalism and Constructivism | 7 |
12 Implications of Constructivist and Naturalist assumptions | 9 |
13 Consequences for Psychology of Perception | 18 |
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS AND PRINCIPLES | 27 |
22 Basic assumptions for a science of Psychology | 35 |
23 Principles of Cognition Language and Action | 40 |
PROBLEMS OF EXPLANATIONS AND THEORIES OF VISUAL PERCEPTION | 45 |
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT REAL AS OPPOSED TO FICTITIOUS THINGS | 235 |
112 Brentanos thesis of intentionality reconsidered | 239 |
113 Beliefs about real and fictitious things | 242 |
1131 Conclusion | 247 |
WHY THERE STILL CANNOT BE A CAUSAL THEORY OF CONTENT | 249 |
122 Naturalizing intentionality and the content of beliefs | 252 |
123 Errors in the Crude Causal Theory | 260 |
124 The CCTs psychophysical explanation of content | 267 |
32 MindBody dualism | 48 |
33 Gibsons theory of perception | 50 |
34 Marrs computational model of vision | 59 |
341 The Primal Sketch | 61 |
342 The 2½D Sketch | 62 |
343 The 3D Model | 65 |
CONSEQUENCES FOR PERCEPTION PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY | 69 |
42 Conditions for carrying out investigations in perception psychology | 72 |
43 General epistemological consequences and implications | 81 |
44 Assumptions and aims for a psychological science of perception | 84 |
THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE COGNITION AND REALITY | 89 |
THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND REALITY | 91 |
52 Basic assumptions | 92 |
521 The reflexivity of natural language | 95 |
522 The concept of truth of natural language | 96 |
523 Consequences for Subjective Idealism | 97 |
53 The principle of the general correctness of language | 104 |
531 Consequences for Correspondence Theories of truth | 107 |
532 Consequences for LanguageReality Relativism | 115 |
533 The logical space of descriptions | 119 |
LANGUAGE CONCEPTS AND REALITY | 123 |
62 Saussures delimitation of the language form as an independent object of linguistic research | 127 |
621 The Principle of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign | 130 |
622 The differential identity and relational value of the linguistic sign | 132 |
623 Problems and consequences of the twinprinciples of the arbitrary and relational nature of the sign | 133 |
624 The nomenclatureview of language reconsidered and revised | 140 |
63 The logical relation between a systematic and a speech act description of linguistic occurrences | 143 |
examples of consequences for theories of language | 148 |
an example from linguistics | 150 |
an example from psychology | 152 |
SITUATIONS ACTION AND KNOWLEDGE | 155 |
72 Situations | 157 |
73 Actions | 159 |
SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER DESCRIPTIONS OF REALITY | 165 |
82 The limits of scientific theories and descriptions | 178 |
83 Conclusion | 191 |
PHYSICALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY | 195 |
92 Anomalous monism or Psychology as Physics | 197 |
CONTEXT CONTENT AND REFERENCETHE CASE FOR BELIEFS AND INTENTIONALITY | 205 |
102 Against Stichs case against beliefs | 207 |
103 The problem of generalizing across radically different cognitive states | 216 |
104 The dependency of scientific beliefs and propositions on contexts and interests | 219 |
105 Some differences between ascribing beliefs to people and properties to objects | 225 |
125 Why a causal theory of the intentionality and content of beliefs does not work | 270 |
126 Conclusion | 279 |
THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE COGNITION AND REALITY I | 283 |
132 Arguments for the necessity of ontological Mind Matter dualism | 288 |
THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE COGNITION AND REALITY II | 295 |
142 Putnams Internal Realism | 300 |
knowledge and description for computational functionalism | 308 |
THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE COGNITION AND REALITY III | 311 |
152 Some difficulties in accounting for the transition from organism to person | 315 |
153 Arguments against the assumption of an innate language or linguistic structures | 318 |
Conclusion | 323 |
IDENTITY | 327 |
IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATIONSAME AND DIFFERENT | 329 |
162 Recent positions on the problem of identity and reference | 331 |
an alternative view | 339 |
164 Problems in traditional views on the identity of things | 343 |
165 Identification reference and truth | 345 |
Conclusion | 349 |
PERSONS | 353 |
INTRODUCTION | 355 |
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL IDEALISM | 363 |
172 Constructivism and the disappearance of reality and persons | 366 |
WITTGENSTEINS THEORIES OF LANGUAGE | 383 |
182 Wittgensteins language games | 386 |
183 Tractatus | 389 |
184 Investigations | 397 |
THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND THE INTERNAL | 405 |
192 Wittgensteins private language arguments | 409 |
193 Sensation of the internal as opposed to observation of the external | 420 |
194 Internal states and sensations of the internal | 426 |
195 The internal and external of a person | 430 |
196 The status of descriptions of internal states | 432 |
197 Conclusion | 436 |
THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE | 439 |
202 Personal versus public knowledge and experiences | 440 |
203 The principle of the interdependency of the notions of truth and others | 443 |
204 Social Constructionism and the relativism of Wittgensteins later works | 452 |
THE CONDITIONS FOR PEOPLE TO BE AND FUNCTION AS PERSONS SUMMARY AND CONSEQUENCES | 467 |
211 The necessary relation between the personal and the public knowledge of persons | 475 |
212 Equality as a necessary condition for communication and cooperation between persons | 478 |
| 483 | |
| 489 | |
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Principles of Cognition, Language and Action: Essays on the Foundations of a ... N. Praetorius No preview available - 2000 |
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apply argued arguments assume assumptions behaviour beliefs Chapter computational concepts Constructivism correct defined Descartes describe description of reality determine discussion elementary particles epistemological example exist in reality exist independently experience expressions fact Fodor folk psychology function Gibson's guage horse ibid identified implies intentionality internal investigations knowledge and description language to talk language users language-game linguistic linguistic relativism logical logical conditions material reality matter mayonnaise meaning mental mind nature notion of truth objects ourselves pain particular perceive persons phenomena philosophical physical things presupposing presupposition principle problems processes properties of things propositional attitudes propositions psychophysical publicly observable put forward quantum physical question reality and things rely representations Saussure scientific sensations sensory system situations Social Constructionism speech act statements stimulus structure talk correctly Theory of Mind things existing things in reality tions tokenings true or false versions visual perception Wittgenstein