ing in the prosperity of the country, expatiating on the victory of the Nile, and echoing back encomiums on the emperor of Russia and the Ottoman Porte. The address concluded with assuring his majesty of the zeal and loyalty of his parliament, and the cheerfulness with which that house would support the crown and constitution. Lord Craven seconded the motion: nothing, he said, could afford more pleasure than the description of the present state of the country. After being deserted by the allies, whose cause we had come forward to espouse, it was gratifying to see the noble stand we had made, and the success we had obtained over the common enemy of mankind. By our single exertions the navy of the French republic was annihilated; her boasted army of England had lost its title; not only our coasts at home, but our most valuable possessions abroad, were secured. Through the vigilance of our marine, but one of all the squadrons the French had sent out to assist the rebellion of Ireland had reached the place of its destination; and even that had been unable to withstand our well-directed force. There was only one branch of commerce which we did not before almost exclusively possess, namely, that of the Levant; and of that trade France would be now totally deprived, and we should reap all those advantages which had heretofore maintained her navy. The situation of Buonaparté was also in our favour; cut off from all means of retreat, and beset on every side with obstacles. These successes had given spirit and alacrity to several of the foreign powers, who had unequivocally determined to join against the common enemy. Russia and the Ottoman Porte had declared themselves; and Austria, though unwilling, would find it her interest to unite in the exertions which our example had recommended to all Europe, and without which it would be vain to look either for security or peace. The marquis of Lansdown expressed the greatest pleasure in paying his tribute of gratitude and applause to those commanders who had performed their duty so gloriously, and achieved as much as men could achieve for the honour of their country; but he said there remained a duty also for us to perform at home, a duty which rested upon the king's ministers and their lordships-it was, to draw from those victories the advantages they were calculated to secure, and to make a right application of those memorable events which had been extolled with so much rapture. The greatest conquests were but fleeting objects, unless well used; and however fascinating with their splendor, would pass away without solid cause of joy, unless made the means of attaining the most desirable good, so often recommended by himself in that house-a safe and honourable peace. The real patriot would think his service best repaid by knowing it had tended to procure the cessation of arms, and the return of tranquillity. He had no doubt but that lord Nelson would highly prefer this satisfaction to any personal compliment which could be paid him; and the marquis acknowledged his regret in observing that the victory of the Nile, which might have led to peace, was employed as a reason for new exertions, and a continuance of the war and in what manner? by again combining with the European powers, by every one of whom we had already been abandoned. Not only that great man lord Nelson, but every distinguished officer in the service, would feel disappoint : ment ment if their triumphs produced none of those advantages to GreatBritain, which, with wise management, they were calculated to conHe wished to be rightly understood-He was satisfied it was of the utmost consequence to check the progress of the French revolu. tion. It was not necessary, nor was it sound policy, to load with opprobrium even the enemy: but to speak of the conduct of the French without using the language of the most unequivocal reprobation, was impossible; their course of havock and devastation, their detestable tyranny and baseness, must excite a steady resolution to check their career, and save the world from the calamity to which they would doom it in every bosom which cherished liberty as the supreme good. But how its progress was to be checked, what were the means most likely to be efficacious, was the object of most serious importance, and to which he particularly called the attention of their lordships. Had we not the experience of five years to prove to us, that we had undertaken the task in a manner not calculated to obtain the end? What probability appeared that we should be more prosperous in future than we hitherto had been. His majesty's speech afforded but little hopes of it: instead of a great and well organised plan, going directly to the object in which the powers of Europe had concurred-instead of improving the victory of the Nile to this purpose, and restoring tranquillity to Europe, the continuance of war was announced! It never could be denied, but that if a sense of general danger had brought our allies to a league upon honest principles, in which, instead of disgracing themselves by looking to this country for subsidies, they would resume the dignity which became them ;-if their union had not been distracted by mercenary views, by plans of rapine and aggrandisement, by the intervention of despicable intrigue, and distrustful jealousies, it never could be denied but that, at every period of the revolution, the powers of Europe would have been able to have ended their career and mischief. We now were told of the vigour manifested by Russia and the Porte; a monstrous alliance between Turks and Russians! We all knew that their mutual distrusts exceeded those of other nations: it was hereditary; it was implanted in their nature, and strengthened by their education. The family upon the throne of the Russians had uniformly cherished the notion that Constantinople was to be a part of their inheritance. It was with this view they named the second son of the present emperor, Constantine II. And was it from a coalition of this sort that we were to derive hopes of vigorous operations against France? If Russia were in earnest, why did we not hear of the other northern powers coming forward and joining in the league? As to the Grand Seignior, what was the Ottoman Porte? Turkey was the most helpless of all the countries upon earth; incapable not only of external operations, but of domestic defence, and in a state of universal insubordination. Defeated in more than thirty attacks upon one rebellious pacha-unable to resist the rebellion of a subject-was it from such a country that we were to expect a vigorous co-operation? upon such a league that we could place our confidence? Experience ought to teach us caution; and impress upon our minds the conviction of the hollow principle upon A 4 which which combinations of this kind were formed. When a court was so little actuate by motives of honour and justice, as to forfeit its obligations, could we afterwards rely on its fidelity? If we should advance to a man in necessity a sum of money to enable him to carry on a just claim to estates which were withheld from him, and by such succour he had succeeded in his law suit, should we not say that his first duty was to repay those persons who had saved him from ruin? What was true of an individual was true of a court. We had assisted the great powers of the continent: one of them had contracted large engagements with us, and was enabled by our succour to make valuable acquisitions. It did not appear, by his majesty's speech, that this great power had come forward to discharge its obligations: it had not given any assurance that it would discharge them. The loan was raised under the guarantee of the British government; and, if a new combination should be made with courts that had hitherto looked to their own distinct and individual interests only, and deserted the common cause the instant they had obtained some miserable acquisition to themselves, we could have no prospect of advantage from a league with such nations. Nay, if the jealousies of these powers should be stifled for a moment, something more was necessary to the combined movement of Europe against France: the powers of the Baltic should join the confederacy. But no exertion from this quarter was to be seen, and we were told that the war must be prolonged upon the ground of disjointed combination, a combination nei. ther general nor disinterested. Were they less sensible of their danger than we? Were they less liable to feel the atrocity of the French system-It could not be said that they were. The protection which we derived from our marine, from our insular situation, and from public opinion, made us more secure. than any other kingdom on the continent: and when it was evident that we were employed only for their own ends; that, however solemn their engagements, they deserted us without a struggle of conscience, and made their peace with our enemies whenever they had made an acquisition; could we again entangle ourselves with such confederates? The marquis said, that he anticipated the reply to all this. How could we make peace? It was impossible to negotiate with the directory. Whether our ministers were sincere in their attempts he would not pretend to say; but if they were, their measures were ill imagined, and worse conducted. If they were not, this country was involved in disgrace, and laid open to the reproaches of all Europe. It was an open, an unequivocal mode of conduct which he had always recommended; and it particularly behoved their lordships to testify that they would support the government which would act upon this upright principle. It would be giving dignity to England to make this declaration at a moment of conquest. He did not mean that this country should humiliate itself, nor was he acquainted with the present dispositions of the French directory; but it could not be attended with bad consequences to make the avowal of a liberal system, and the moment of victory would ascertain our sincerity. After such declaration, our course (should they refuse it) was safe and clear. But it would be wise to lay aside all idle plans of conquest and acquisition which we could not maintain; maintain; as Corsica and St. Domingo, which we had captured, and found it expedient to give up. It would be wise to refuse our assent to all continental intrigues, in which it was likely that the French would out-manœuvre us, as they hitherto had done, and gained as much by intrigue as by arms. To all such intrigues this country should be a stranger; for all combinations which had duplicity for their origin were as much against the interests of Great Britain as of humanity. A spirit of disinterestedness, a system of moderation, was the policy, as it ought to be the pride of our country. At home the crown had 'gained every thing; it could not, and it ought not, to look for any further accession of power. The present was a favourable moment for securing the unanimity which now prevailed. The attachment of the people was stronger and more valuable than a hundred treaties. By retrenching expences, by introducing order and economy into every department of the state, party would soon be no more, and we might reap the advantages of our present situation. A union with Ireland had been rumoured; to which he should certainly give his support, if founded on a principle, which he could approve. Two bodies brought together, and acting as one, might certainly effect more than separately could be effected. Every thing beneficial might be expected from such a junction, if it were built upon public opinion; but if it were to be a government of influence, corruption, and all its consequences, would ensue, -consequences which Ireland had already felt but too severely. We were now arrived at that point in our history, when we must resume the good sense of our an cestors, and govern by patriotic principles, not by bribery or påtronage. Instead of looking to great families, we must look to the people; and instead of the grasp and range of influence, trust to the economy with which every branch of our administration was conducted. So much for our home affairs; and as to our external position, there remained but one good and practicable course; to pursue an honourable system as the only means of attaining a permanent peace. Lord Romney rose to remark, that it was essential the people should think the ministers sincere in their late negotiation: whether it was ill imagined, however, he did not pretend to say, but he would contend that it was well conducted, and, he hoped, had had the effect of convincing the people both of its sincerity and the abilities of administration. Of Turkey, and our aliance with it, he formed better expectations than the noble marquis had expressed. The Turks had seen their errors with respect to France; and it would have been well if they had opposed them long ago with vigour. They were now determined to do this, encouraged by the fidelity of this country towards all with whom they entered into engagements. The Emperor Pant was remarkable for his moderation and his virtues; there was reason then to believe he would be honour able in his conduct where he had pledged his faith. It had been said, that Denmark and Sweden were preparing arms, and, with the other powers, combining in one common cause. If Europe had undertaken this before, there was no doubt but the great nation would have given way. It was not yet too late, and our prospects brightened. In our finances finances there was nothing to alarm us; the funds were higher than they had been for a considerable time. We possessed great advantages at this moment, and the greatest was the unanimity of the peo. ple. But we ought to abandon the further pursuit of conquest, as we could not retain them when acquired; of which the striking in stances were Corsica and St. Domingo. It was true we had resigned these; but St. Lucia, Martinique, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spice Islands, were yet in our possession, and there was no appearance of any intention to give them up; but he did not pretend to judge of the policy of surrender-' ing some places, and retaining others. His majesty's ministers could best decide which were tenable, as they had the best means of forming right estimates. Lord Holland differed from the marquis of Lansdown, who, he said, had so well described the impracticability of any junction between Prussia and Austria; although he recommended another combination upon more honest principles. So far was he himself from recommending any further continental connections, that he thought our infuence hitherto operating upon the German courts had been the cause of all the mischief which had taken place, and of the mortifying situation in which the continental states in alliance with the French republic found themselves at this moment. Promises had been from time to time held forth, and uniformly broken. He meant not to depreciate from the victories we had gained: they were additions to the national credit and honour; but if the only advantage we were to gain by them was to be a revival of the horrors of war, England had little cause to rejoice. The speech from the throne held forth the probable success of a powerful confederacy against France. We had heard such language before, but we had only seen, in consequence of these confederacies, devastation extended over the surface of the globe, with less and less prospect of procuring tranquillity. The former confederacy of princes was the chief cause of the calamities produced by the French revolution. Experience might teach us that it was impossible to derive any advantage to this country from them. We might recollect that we never had an alliance with any of them, who had not deserted us. Austria, the most considerable,, was only a drain upon us, and a temptation for the conquest of the enemy. The late glorious victory ought to induce us to show a disposition for peace. It would not be humiliation, but magnanimity; nor would the people of this country fancy it was a degradation, if his majesty's ministers, in their name, would evince a pacific spirit. The people of England had no wishes inconsistent with the glory of their country, and he heartily regretted that they had not their due weight and power in the government. Of the diminution of expence, he saw but little probability; having observed, that in the years when we had the strongest assurances of retrenchment, our expenditure had increased the more. He felt, he said, the difficulty of succeeding in the hour of victory in any attempt to moderate desire. It was an unwelcome task even to address their lordships on the subject of peace; but he so far coincided with his noble friend (the marquis of Lansdown) as to think that the greatest victories were useless, |