There are many reasons for this. Idleness breeds mischief any

where, and particularly in prison. Ask the convicts, and nearly all of them would prefer to work. Thus the morale of the institution is raised. Compensation fosters ambition and induces courage and determination to live a better life upon discharge. Compensation also provides the fund from which the dependent. who usually suffers most, can be helped. This will tend to hold the family together during the period of confinement and reduce desertion, divorce and laxness of morals, which so often follows the incarceration of the head of a family. Then again, employment provides the means of a decent livelihood for a convict upon release. He is taught how to do something, has earned honest money in that manner, and with the securing of a position for him and with money to his credit, he will on discharge more readily establish himself on an honest plane. Men who refuse to support their families outside of jail could be made to do so in this manner and there would be less need of mothers' pensions and charitable assistance for dependents if men were subjected to this course of treatment with an incentive to find themselves. The proper place for the development of such a system is on state farms. The county jail or workhouse is not suited for such work. The unit is too small for successful management and too costly to the taxpayer. Besides, the county jail has been in bad repute for so long, owing to graft in the manner of its conduct in the years gone by.

We must secure proper farms with the necessary equipment for farm work; add suitable buildings for manufacturing of goods and wares that the state institutions can use, compel the state and its units, its hospitals, asylums and schools securing state aid, to use the goods and products made or raised, and you have a system that will reduce taxation and reduce crime, utilize discarded material, and, above all, rehabilitate a class of citizens into decent law-abiding men and women. This will prove an

advance in every way. Family ties will be preserved, the downs will be never out, dependents will be sustained, ambition engendered, and the result will be beneficial to the prisoners, their families, the tax payer and the state.

One other subject requires consideration at this time. This is the honor system, which has become recognized almost uni

versally as the greatest help in reclaiming convicts. Of course, all prisoners cannot be trusted. They must be carefully studied before afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that they can be relied upon. But when once a man secures the privilege of proving he can be trusted, there are very few who break faith. The marvel of this plan has been the few attempts to escape. Nothing is so important in strengthening a prisoner morally as the honor system. He finds some one who believes in him and relies upon him and this becomes a habit. He works faithfully, has an honest income, and soon becomes ready for discharge upon parole. When that day arrives he goes forth a new man, determined to live a law-abiding life. He realizes that as a unit in this system he must make good, and he usually does. Modern penology has proven its worth. Men everywhere should realize their responsibility and help in this great cause.

INTERSTATE EXTRADITION FOR EXTRA

TERRITORIAL CRIMES.

BY

JUDGE A. H. REID,

OF WISCONSIN.

The purpose of this paper is to lay before you as plainly as I can the existence of a hiatus in the law governing the extradition between states, of persons charged with crime, which hiatus has become more and more troublesome in the administration of justice and now frequently completely prevents prosecution of persons guilty of crime.

The cases in which such prosecution is prevented are cases of extra-territorial crime. The federal Constitution has always provided that "The trial of all crimes . . . . shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed: Section 2, Art. III, U. S. Constitution.

Under this provision the venue of an offence has often been the subject of controversy and discussion, and has resulted in much refinement of reasoning. Where the acts and events which culminate in a crime occur partly in one state and partly in another, the question always arises, in which state the crime was "committed." That question must be determined before jurisdiction is established, because the courts of that state only in which the crime was "committed" have any jurisdiction of the offence.

To illustrate the course of reasoning, I quote from the opinion of the court in State v. Hall (N. C.), 19 S. E. 602, where it is said:

"It seems to have been a matter of doubt in ancient times whether, if a blow were struck in one county and death ensued in another, the offender could be prosecuted in either, though, according to Lord Hale, the more common opinion was that he might be indicted where the stroke was given.' This difficulty, as stated by Mr. Starkie, was sought to be avoided by the legal device of carrying the dead body back into the county where the blow was struck; and the jury might there inquire both of the stroke and the death.' (Citing.) But to remove all doubt in

respect to a matter of such grave importance, it was enacted by the Statute 2 and 3, Edw. VI, that the murderer might be tried in the county where the death occurred. This statute, either as a part of the common law or by re-enactment, is in force in many of the states of the Union, and, as applicable to counties within the same state, its validity has never been questioned. But where its provisions have been extended so as to affect the jurisdiction of the different states, its constitutionality has been vigorously assailed. Such legislation, however, has been very generally, if not, indeed, uniformly, sustained."

Cases of greater frequency are those in which all of the acts done by the offender were done in one state, but the agency set in motion by him took effect and culminated in a crime in another state in which he was never corporeally present. The simplest and plainest illustration is that of the offender shooting across a state line, he standing upon one side of the line and his victim upon the other, and the wound being delivered, and the death or injury occurring, wholly within the state in which the criminal was not present. Similarly, the offender may set in course of transportation an infernal machine or poison, or some other destructive agency or substance, in such a manner that the same is directed to his victim in another state, and there effects the death or injury of the victim. So, likewise, one may by mail, while he is in one state, effectually consummate a fraud in another state, or he may omit to perform a duty toward dependents, which duty he owes in another state, and the omission to perform which constitutes a crime in such other state.

It is not necessary to the purpose of this paper to go into the refinements of reasoning by which courts reached conclusions as to the venue of such crimes, or, in other words, determined in which state the crime was "committed." It is sufficient to say here that the universal course of decision is to the effect that the state in which the acts of the accused take effect and produce the results which consummate the crime is the state in which the crime is "committed." Merely to illustrate the course of reasoning which has in one class of cases lead to such conclusion, I quote from Simpson v. State (Ga.), 17 S. E. 984, the following: "Of course, the presence of the accused within this state is essential to make his act one which is done in this state. But the presence need not be actual: it may be constructive. The well established theory of the law is that where one puts in force an

agency for the commission of crime, he, in legal contemplation, accompanies the same to the point where it becomes effectual. So, if a man in the State of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it up to the point where it strikes. If an unlawful shooting occurred while both the parties were in this state, the mere fact of missing would not render the person who shot any the less guilty. Consequently, if one shooting from another states goes, in a legal sense, where his bullet goes, the fact of his missing the object at which he aims cannot alter the legal principle."

In like manner it is held that in a case of criminal abandonment of dependents, the duty of support existed at the place where the dependents lawfully and properly were, and the omission to provide such support was an omission at the point where the duty was due; and the crime, therefore, was committed in the state wherein the dependents resided. (Adams v. State, 164 Wis. 223.)

There are, therefore, constantly being committed crimes of a large number of classes by persons who are corporeally only in one state and who effectuate or consummate the crimes wholly in another. These crimes are what I have chosen to denominate extra-territorial crimes.

As the law now stands, and has always stood since the foundation of our government, it is impossible to secure by requisition the extradition or rendition, from one state to another, of persons accused of such crimes, provided they resist. The difficulty lies with the provision of the federal Constitution on the subject of extradition, and with the Acts of Congress pursuant thereto, and the omission of states to provide by uniform legislation any supplementary power of rendition. The federal Constitution provides that,

"A person charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime: Section 2, Art. IV, U. S. Con

stitution.

This provision has often been denominated as a compact between the states obligatory upon the executive authority of every state. It was held, however, to be not self-executing, inasmuch