lying, or passing off the coast" of any part of the dominions. of the Crown (ss. 684 to 712).

This modern disciplinary policy of coercion is a complete reversal of the hitherto well established policy guiding the Imperial relations with the self-governing Colonies of the Empire. In 1857, the legislature of Newfoundland declined to approve of the Anglo-French Treaty of that year, although it contained the following regal pledge to France: "Her Majesty hereby engaging to use her best endeavours to procure the passing of such laws by the legislature of Newfoundland as are required to carry the treaty into effect." The constitutional right of Newfoundland to reject the treaty was admitted by the Colonial Secretary in these words: "The consent of the Legislature of Newfoundland is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as the essential preliminary to any modification of their territorial and maritime rights." And in 1863, in commenting on a draft colonial bill for regulating the coast-fisheries of Newfoundland, another Colonial Secretary said: "I apprehend that it is not your expectation that I should express an opinion on the modes of conducting these fisheries; it being plain that the inhabitants of Newfoundland are, or ought to be, the best capable of judging what regulations are calculated to increase the productiveness of their own seas. And with respect to Imperial interests it is not desirable to anticipate by a close inquiry that it does not infringe upon rights guaranteed to foreigners, or run counter to Imperial policy."

A somewhat similar modus vivendi between the British Government and the French Republic was held to be ultra vires as a Regal Act of State by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Walker v. Baird (1892), A. C. 491. And last year the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, without considering the modus vivendi, although cited in the case, imposed fines of $500 and costs on each of two Newfoundland fishermen for selling bait to an American fishing vessel without having a license to sell as required by the Bait Act of 1888. The British Government paid the fines and costs so imposed.

It may be reasonably conceded as a recognized doctrine of Colonial government that the self-governing Colonies of the British Empire,-in respect of such local laws as relate principally to the control and management of their local

territorial interests,-will not regard with patience, or without protest, any exercise of Imperial disciplinary authority within their Colonial territory which claims to control or be subversive of their own local and responsible system of government or may degrade their governments before foreign nations.

Toronto.

THOMAS HODGINS.

EDITORIAL COMMENT.

SOLICITORS' CONTRACTS. Recently a case was tried in the City of London Court wherein a firm of advertising contractors sued a solicitor for the price of advertisements relating to the winding-up of a company which it was stated 'the solicitor had ordered to be inserted. It was urged on behalf of the defendant that a solicitor under such circumstances was not personally liable, that he was merely an agent for the creditors against whom the advertisers should have proceeded. The Judge found in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that the order instructing the insertion of the advertisements contained no words inconsistent with the personal liability of the defendant. The position of a solicitor is certainly a peculiar one in this respect. Often in litigation it is perfectly clear that he is only acting as agent and does not undertake any personal liability. There does not appear to be any way in which this can be entirely obviated. It seems to be a risk peculiar to the profession.

JUDGES AND DICTIONARIES.-The principle upon which dictionaries are referred to by Judges with a view to obtain assistance in the interpretation of technical words and expressions cannot always be easily defined. Courts refer freely to dictionaries for the meaning of words even where the scope of that meaning is one of the disputed issues. in the case, thereby accepting testimony from the compilers of these dictionaries. The construction of a written document is a question of law for the Court to decide, and as at no 'very remote period juries were unable to read that which was in writing, the convenience of such a rule is obvious. According to Viner's Abridgment a Judge is better able to put a meaning upon words than either a grammarian or logician. Why, therefore, should a Judge in construing terms of art in a document accept the authority of a lexicographer who very probably was not a lawyer. An answer is that the definition in the dictionary is exposed to severe criticism and in the course of time is recognized as accurate by the public generally. From time to time it is necessary for a Judge to refresh his memory relating to different meanings of the same word. The dictionary, therefore, is an aid, not an authority.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS.-An interesting point was raised regarding the law of implied contracts upon which there is little authority in a recent Irish case, Dublin Steam Packet Company v. The King. The plaintiffs contended that in every contract there is an implied obligation that neither party shall do anything which will render the performance of the contract more difficult or more onerous, citing in support a passage from the judgment of Lord Blackburn in Mackay v. Dick, 6 A. C. 263, where he says. "I think I may safely say as a general rule that where both parties have agreed that something shall be done which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect." This principle, easy of enunciation, is difficult of application. How far does the principle extend? No doubt there is an obligation not to wholly defeat the contract. In the Court of Appeal, the Master of the Rolls held that there is an implied contract not to do anything which will substantially prevent the other party from performing his obligations under the contract, and he also held that an increase of expense is an element which cannot be disregarded in considering whether there is a substantial prevention. Lord Justice Farwell said there was an implied contract not to do anything which would substantially impede the due performance of the contract, but such impediment to be actionable need not amount to absolute physical prevention or exclusion. It is not every alteration that would be a breach, even although it might lead to some inconvenience or expense; it is a question of degree and the Court must judge in each case whether interference is of such a nature, duration, character and substance as to have been within the bargain according to the true intention of both parties on the date of the contract. What is a substantial interference? It would seem that no general rule can be laid down, but that the Court must in each case decide what is substantial." It is as elusive as the mythical pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.

REMOVAL OF A JUDGE.-In New York State there is a law prohibiting members of the judiciary from engaging in any business during their term of office. It was alleged that Justice J. M. Deuell was interested in "Town Topics;"

that he read the proofs of this paper in order to guard it against civil or criminal proceedings. An application was made to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York for his removal. These proceedings have been dismissed, the Court holding that the justice did not appear to have any pecuniary interest in the corporation beyond that of a stock holder. Had there been a persistent violation of the statute there would have been sufficient cause for removal, although Justice Deuell was vice-president of the corporation publishing "Town Topics," but was not charged with any specific duties in relation to it. There does not seem to be any law preventing English Judges from engaging in business, and occasionally some have been directors of joint stock companies. Here, the Dominion Parliament has passed legislation preventing anything of the kind, and we believe all the Judges with probably one exception have conformed to the wishes of the Legislature.

LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR WRONGS COMMITTED BY SERVANT. In a late English case, Malcolm v. Waterhouse, the case of a master's liability for his servant's wrongful act committed in the course of his employment was considered. The plaintiffs, who were dealers in cotton cake, employed the defendants to act as their selling brokers. The plaintiffs had accepted from an Egyptian company an offer of cotton cake at a fixed price. The representative of the defendants' firm endeavoured to dispose of the cake, but could get no higher offer, and was instructed not to let the Egyptian offer slip, but to get a better one if possible. According to the custom of the trade, if the representative tried to get a better price out of the intending purchasers they were entitled to declare their bid off. Before he could close any offer the market price dropped and ultimately the cotton cake had to be sold at a loss. Thinking that he might better his position he concealed the facts from the plaintiffs, leading them to believe that the Egyptian offer was still open. The plaintiffs then brought an action to recover the loss from the defendants and succeeded. The conduct of the representative was wrongful, yet he acted throughout in the course of his employment in the belief that what he was doing was in the interest of the defendants. It was not a case of merely trying to serve his own private ends. The general rule, said Willes, J., in Barwick v. English, L. R. 2 Ex. 259, “is that the master is answer