the revivor under the Common Law Procedure Act, and held that the procedure therein prescribed "stood in the place of the old scire facias; and the judgment in the proceeding must have the effect that a judgment in scire facias would have had before the Act, for the intention of the statute does not appear to have been to introduce any new legal right or to interfere with any legal right, but to provide a plain and simple method of practice for effecting that which had heretofore been effected by the rather clumsy old proceeding by scire facias, and as no intention is apparent to alter the effect of the revival when accomplished, the result when arrived at must be just the same, whether it be on a Judge's order or on a writ of revivor, or in the old way, by scire facias. In either of the ways it is a judgment of the Court."

This decision would have been quite satisfactory, were it not for the serious doubt thrown upon it by the judgment of Mr. Justice Rose on an appeal from the Master, and on which appeal the appellant was represented by the present Chief Justice of Ontario. At page 344 of the above report, Mr. Justice Rose says: "I have much considered the argument advanced by Mr. Moss in favour of his appeal, especially the report of the Commissioners upon which the Common Law Procedure Act was brought into force. Had I not been much influenced by the argument in the very carefully prepared judgment of the learned Master, I might have yielded to the appellant's contention, that a suggestion entered pursuant to leave given by a Judge, did not give a new right, as a judgment upon scire facias has been held to give, especially having in view the language of the C. L. P. Act, ss. 323, et seq., where we find that the leave is to issue execution upon the judgment. I cannot say my mind is free from doubt; on the contrary, I doubt much, but gravely to doubt, is to affirm,' and I cannot therefore grant the appellant's motion." The learned Judge also refused to direct an issue so as to enable the defendant to carry the case to the Supreme Court, because there was no evidence before him to lead him to think that there were any merits in the defendant's favour. Apparently, no further proceedings were taken in the matter, and one has therefore to speculate as to whether a higher tribunal would have felt the learned Judge's "grave doubts" sufficiently strong to have reversed the Master's judgment.

In a later case of Allison v. Breen, 19 P. R. 119, an application was made to set aside an ex parte order made in 1900, for leave to issue execution on a judgment which had been previously revived by an ex parte order directing the entry of a suggestion on the roll under the Common Law Procedure Act. The only objection urged, apart from the question as to whether a judgment came under the 10 year or the 20 year Statute of Limitations, was that the several orders were made without notice to the defendant. The application was thereupon treated as a substantive motion on notice, to revive the judgment, and the previous order was confirmed. No reference was apparently made to the particular question dealt with as above in McCullough v. Sykes. The Master in Chambers, however, referring to the above mentioned procedure under the Common Law Procedure Act, said at page 122: "The entering of the suggestion is such a proceeding as to renew the time from which the statute begins to run." This dictum was not dissented from in the judgment of Mr. Justice Street on appeal, nor in the subsequent judgment of the Divisional Court at page 143, but neither was it specifically affirmed.

Assuming, however, that the decision of Mr. Dalton in McCullough v. Sykes is confirmed by Allison v. Breen, and would be followed in case the question should be squarely presented again to an appellate Court, there still does not appear to have been any decision as yet either in England or in our own Courts as to whether an order under Consolidated Rule 864 has the like effect, as to creating a new starting point for the Statute of Limitations. Meredith, C.J., in Re Woodall, 8 O. L. R. at pp. 292-3 said: "It is true that a judgment in scire facias that the execution creditor is entitled to execution, gives a new starting point for the reckoning of the statutory period; and it may be that, where an order for leave to issue execution is made, the same result will follow." Even this latter statement however was only obiter dictum, as the point did not arise, and did not therefore require to be decided in that case. If the Legislature delegated to the Judges, by s. 124 of the Judicature Act, the power to substitute for the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, an equally effective method for the revivor of judgments, and if it was the intention to give the new Rule the same legal effect as the procedure which it superseded, it must at least be admitted that the wording of the Rule is not particularly happy.

There is, of course, another method by which a judgment can be kept alive, namely, by an ordinary action brought upon the judgment itself. Under s.-s. 1 (b) of s. 1 of c. 72 of R. S. O. 1897, actions upon a bond or other specialty may be brought within twenty years after the cause of action arose; and the decisions of our Courts in Boice v. O'Loane, 3 A. R. 167, Chard v. Rae, 18 O. R. 371, and Butler v. McMickin, 32 O. R. 422, are clear authorities for the bringing of such an action on a judgment, under the last mentioned statute. Some cautious solicitors adopt this method for the revivor of judgments, rather than that provided by the Rule; and this course is a prudent one where the judgment is large, until at least there is an absolutely clear decision of an appellate Court as to the sufficiency of the procedure prescribed by the Rule to establish a new starting point for the Statute of Limitations, or until the wording of the Rule itself is so changed as to leave no room for doubt as to its meaning and effect.

Ottawa.

M. J. GORMAN.

RANDOM RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS

(Continued from May Number.)

Times improved with us: a few good harvests put things right. Experience teaches us that good soils and good climates are better than any gold mines. And we, fortunately, had some useful changes in the 'aw. Of these we owe two excellent measures to Chancellor Vankoughnet: one was the abolition of the registration of judgments, which freed great numbers of titles, to the relief of many landpoor people. The other was the first Act enabling men to insure their lives for the benefit of their wives and children. 1864 marked the emergence of the country from the cloud of debt by the coming into force of the Insolvent Act. In its early years this measure freed many worthy men from the burdens of old incumbrances, but as time went on, the classes benefited by it changed, and it was allowed to expire; too many wives of bankrupts were becoming wealthy.

But to return to earlier days. The questions arising in practice and pleading obtained great importance in Toronto as they came there for decision from all over the province, and needless to say, young fellows came too. There was no scarcity of students of three or more years' standing, and they learnt and taught each other a good deal. One of the Judges sat for a week in Common Law Chambers, being relieved on the following Monday by a brother Judge. There was the glorious uncertainty of the length of the Judge's foot. The motions to shew cause were works of art, setting out in detail at least half a dozen grounds followed by "and on other grounds on affidavits and papers filed." These paper weapons were often fiercer in appearance than in reality, and an experienced Judge got through Chambers with little trouble. But it required experience. One afternoon I met a recently appointed Judge who was unfamiliar with Chamber work; he was very tired, he had been in Chambers all day, there seemed to him to be some men who slept on the front benches all night in order to have the first attacks in the morning and he didn't like it.

At first, practice seems a settled matter, but it continually changes almost as rapidly as fashionable novels.

The change to having regular practice masters is a great improvement-prevents violent or crude alterations. But I miss libraries which were in constant use in my day; they have disappeared. One of the ornaments of our Bench had in his younger days been an authority in Chambers. Some time after he had been raised to the Bench he came into Chambers to relieve Mr. Dalton, and in doing so made a little speech to the profession, saying that he was out of touch with modern practice and wished them to recognize it and not to ask for anything Mr. Dalton would not have granted. It seemed a strange request from such an authority, but a little reflection shewed how reasonable it was.

Chambers, both Common Law and Chancery, were great schools for students, teaching them to think while standing and acquire other accomplishments to astonish the natives with on returning home. The three Chancery Judges held Chambers week about in the west wing, but were obliged to get relief by the appointment of Rt. Hon. Si T. W. Taylor, and his successors. The change was so successful that in time Mr. Dalton was appointed Master in Common Law Chambers and eventually the sole practice Master, but that was to carry out the new Procedure Act. And the province is indebted to Sir William Meredith in his parliamentary years for his persistent, and in the end, successful decentralizing policy by which Chamber matters are disposed of in each county.

Before the changes brought about by the Judicature Act pleading was a science, counsel often settled pleadings just as Mr. Leith often settled conveyances. The aim of Common Law declarations was to state accurately the legal points in difference and to exclude all extraneous matters. Although in Chancery the Bill of Complaint covered apparently more ground by setting out the facts in detail, the same end was kept in view. Nutford on pleading was a wonderfully intellectual exercise of human ingenuity, and yet it was swept away like similar learning. Before the Judicature Act the first Ontario Parliament enacted a very useful measure of law reform. Useless things were swept away and the general practice greatly simplified, and at that time having seen a little of the way things were upset in England, I thought we would be better without a Judicature Act. But it came. I admit it was prudent to have the practice and names of pleadings as nearly as possible the same as in