see a change made in this respect. But on the other hand one must admit that this is the 20th century, and that we find many indications in our profession, as well as in other matters the old order changeth, giving place to new."

There is, it seems to some of us, more or less of the spirit of commercialism creeping into the profession, and in the train of this may well come the suggested right to bargain. The time has come for it," said an eminent counsel to me recently. The views of the United States Courts and Judges are seen in the following extract taken from Law Notes (June, 1907, p. 46), where the subject is very fully considered:

The right to take the amount in controversy into consideration has been upheld so repeatedly by the American Courts that its existence cannot be doubted. Indeed we do not understand that Mr. Choate and our English brethren question the legality of the practice. The only question is as to its propriety; and on this point our Courts have spoken so unmistakably and convincingly that no lawyer on this side of the water need feel the slightest hesitancy on any ground in charging more where a large sum is involved than he would charge for the same services where the amount at stake was smaller. There are good reasons for the American view-reasons so good that it is difficult to see the justice or propriety of any other view. Where the amount in controversy is large, the responsibility of the lawyer is greater than where the amount is small. Measured by the actual time he devotes to his client's interests, his labours may be no greater and no more severe in the one case than in the other; and he may devote the same carnest and conscientious attention to the one case as to the other case. But the strain upon him is bound to increase in the same ratio that the interests intrusted to him increase in financial importance; and he is justly entitled to compensation for the increased strain. Then, too, the benefit to the client should be taken into consideration. In all fairness, a business man should pay more for services that gain or save him a hundred thousand dollars than for services that concern only a tenth of that amount, irrespective of the amount of labour his lawyer performs."

Mr. E. Douglas Armour, K.C.-I feel that I ought to apologize for addressing you to-day, because I was not aware

that I was expected to speak until I received the circular in which I discovered not only that was I to address a meeting of the Bar Association, but I found a subject provided for me. It is true that I was asked some time ago to address the meeting, but I supposed that I should have selected some subject and have given it some consideration, and not having the time at my disposal to do that to my own satisfaction, I declined. However, my declination was not accepted and hence this infliction upon you.

Now this subject of Law Reform is a very vast oneone which has been the sport of politicians and the bane of disappointed litigants for many years. The first question is, how are you going to approach it? There is no experimental school of law in which new discoveries can be made which is devoted to research, and the results of which can be put into operation. In the medical profession immense strides have been made within a very few years, solely from the fact that men devoted to their profession have made wonderful discoveries in the laboratory, and a physician can immediately put into operation his new discovery. Of course, the result is a profound secret and no consequences are visited upon a man if it is not a success. With regard to surgery the same may be said. If an engineer makes a new discovery or a new application of an old theory, he can put it into operation, and these men benefit not only themselves but the whole world. If a lawyer makes a new discovery, or discovers some principle that has been known for centuries but secreted for a while in the Reports, can he put it into operation? That is a question he may struggle with in appeal after appeal before he can convince anyone that he is right, because the Courts and lawyers are eminently conservative with respect to a new idea. If he cannot produce some authority or precedent for it, he cannot make use of it simply because it is not the law. That is the difficulty we are presented with in the first place and at the very threshold. How are we going to approach the subject of Law Reform?

In my humble estimation, the only way in which you can approach the subject is to look back over the history of the formation of the law to see how it got into its present position. No one dare operate on such a system as that without knowing its constitution pretty well. There are two ways of looking at it. Are we going to proceed

against or operate upon the system as a whole or are we going to follow the ordinary method of the Anglo-Saxon and simply redress grievances as they arise? Now before we can make our choice between those two methods, as I say, we must look back to see how our law was formed.

In the first place, the commercial law had no existence, if I may use the expression, in England or in the common law, except the maxim upon which British law is based, that every wrong has got some remedy; but it was built up by wise decisions, and by the consensus of opinion of the public with the wise decisions of the Judges who had to deal with that law. Theoretically it was always the law, practically it was made, and it has a natural growth arising from the decisions of the Judges, amongst whom the most eminent probably was Lord Mansfield.

Now take the criminal law. It was first an instrument of vengeance; to-day it is a reformatory process as well as intended for the protection of society. How did that arise? Simply from the change in the mode of thinking of the people of England. There is no statute, which is the only possible way of changing our law, which declares that vengeance shall no longer be the mainspring of the criminal law and that an endeavour shall be made to`reform the criminal as well as protect society.

Now look at the growth of equity. Probably the first Judge who sat in equity had no jurisdiction at all, but he had the means of putting his decrees into operation. The system of equity grew up because the Courts had the means of enforcing their decrees. That system was a natural growth in the sense in which I have been speaking of the growth of mercantile law. There was one decision after another until finally the maxims and theories of the equity doctrine became a fixed system of law, and the ultimate triumph of that appears in the Judicature Act where it is declared that when the rules of equity conflict with those of law, the rules of equity shall prevail.

Now going from those to property law, we have a reverse process, although the actual process of making the law is the same. We started out with a system, that is the Feudal System, a tyrannous and exacting one as far as the unfortunate man was concerned who tried to make something out of the land. The struggle began almost immediately

after the introduction of that system to release the property and land from the oppression of the Feudal System. The result was, that in the reign of Edward I. a reactionary statute had to be passed to prevent people from dealing freely with land, the statute which we all know as the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus which prevented the alienation of land to such an extent that for about 200 years afterwards creditors were defeated and the whole state of property law was in a confused condition or rather a wretched condition, and the public, therefore, were suffering. That was got over by what Williams calls a quiet decision of the Courts, which was called Taltarum's case. But down to the reign of William IV. I think fines and recoveries were the method of getting rid of that statute, which is still in force and printed in our third volume of the Revised Statutes, but completely repealed by the decisions of the Courts and the consensus of public opinion. In the reign of Edward I. land was first made alienable; and from the reign of William the Conqueror to the reign of Edward I. it was the law that no man could sell his land. Then we have a compromise

statute also in the third volume of our statutes called the Statute of Quia Emptores, and I would call attention to the fact that it has never been amended yet and will not be amended.

Reform is naturally slow, and that is the reason why today one man can sell his land to another. Now what is the lesson to be derived from this? It is that our law has been, as it should be, a natural growth, one principle at a time shaping the needs of society and one which is elastic enough when based upon the single maxim that for every wrong there is a remedy to adapt itself to every complex form of society; in other words, there is no possible wrong that cannot be remedied at the present day-that is the theory of our law. Now when we come to consider that that is a natural growth, the lesson to be derived from it is this, not only have we a strictly elastic system and one that can be adapted to every form of society, every new invention, but one that has a very strong and important educative influence by reaction on the very people who made it. That is something that cannot be lost sight of when we are dealing with our law as a whole. I think I have said enough to shew that the point which I wish to make is this, that the law has been changed by an educative process through the people

themselves and that it reacts on the people by educating them up again to a higher standard. It is utterly impossible, therefore, to approach that system of law with the design of reforming it, and when I say reforming it, I do not mean to cure it of its defects, but to put it in any other form than it is now. There was a great wave which went over the United States a few years ago in favour of codification. Does not that merely express what has been the law all the time? And when the Code is made, does it forever settle questions? If it does let us have a Code to-morrow and go at some other occupation. But it does not. Every new statute that is passed, we know, brings with it an immense amount of litigation, and a Code would do no more than bring with it a number of new decisions as to what the Code itself meant, with the inevitable looking to the law before it to see what the law was then.

Now the process of codification is also a natural growth. We have had the law of partnership in England so thoroughly canvassed from time to time by decisions until finally it was possible for one man to codify the partnership law, which resulted in a statutory codification. We have had the law of bills and notes so canvassed in the same way by decisions that it has been reduced to the form of a Code. We have had the criminal law so thoroughly canvassed that it has been codified. And that process goes on, that is the natural process of reformation of our law, and it will be done without any effort originating with the design of reforming the whole law. Then we are cast back upon the original point, that the only method of approaching it is to allow that process to go on and redress grievances as they arise.

I think it is wrong to say that lawyers are not in sympathy with Law Reform, although they get the credit of being opposed to any change. But I think that everyone must understand who thinks on the subject for a moment, that no system can ever be devised by which litigation can be made inexpensive and rapid-that is impossible. The very simplest form of settling disputes between parties, that of arbitration, costs about two to three times as much as a lawsuit would cost with its appeals. That has been my experience, and I know it has been the experience of men in the United Kingdom, which was the occasion of the establishment of the Commercial Court which has been spoken of.