draft a law as it is for a committee of artists to paint a picture," and continued:-" There must be unity so far as possible; and when our statutes go through committees it is important that they should pass into the hands of a competent draftsman so as to be put into proper shape before finally becoming law."

I quote from Lord Thring the following:-" Ludicrous instances of confused expression occasionally enliven the pages of the statute book. Thus among the things which might have been expressed differently, an instance is to be found in the fifty-second of Geo. III., c. 146. Penalties under this Act were to be given half to the informer and half to the poor of the parish; but the only penalty imposed by the statute was transportation for fourteen years.

In a later instance the art of the draftsman cannot be commended who gave the following as a definition in the Darlington Improvement Act of 1872-"The term new building means any building pulled or burned down to or within ten feet from the surface of the adjoining ground."

Amendments proposed to Bills have not infrequently erred in vagueness; here is an amendment proposed by a Queen's Counsel in 1865:-"Every dog found trespassing on enclosed land unaccompanied by the registered owner of such dog or other person who shall on being asked give his true name and address, may be then and there destroyed by such occupier or by his orders."

During the committee stage in the House of Lords of an Agricultural Holdings Bill, the following notice was put down by a noble Lord:-" To ask the Government whether they will consider the practicability of introducing into the Bill some provision for alleviating the great hardship now suffered by the family of any clergyman if he dies while occupying his glebe, as many clergymen have latterly found themselves reluctantly compelled to do." (Thring's Practical Legislation, p. 3.)

These instances go to prove that neither high rank nor eminence at the bar are guarantees of a clear and accurate mode of draftsmanship.

Since writing the above I have come across a startling suggestion in a legal periodical to the effect that even Judges are not very successful draftsmen. "The Judges of the High Court," says the writer, "should also be deprived of the

power to legislate as they have done by rules and orders of the High Court now extending to between 1,200 and 1,300 rules of procedure or practice, many of the rules requiring a large expense to ascertain their meaning. Conditions at present prevailing in this province seem to prove the correctness of the opinion of the Emperor Napoleon that it requires a man of common sense as well as the lawyers and Judges to formulate a code of procedure.'"

4. Practice Judge.-A Judge should be appointed solely for the purpose of deciding questions of practice. In this way only can certainty be attained in such cases, and what is known as the "personal equation" be got rid of.

In regard to practice the most important point is to have it settled and uniform. This cannot well be secured where numerous Judges sit in turn, each sitting only (about) 3 or 4 times a year.

The proposed Judge should be of equal status with the other Judges of the High Court, both in regard to precedence by seniority and salary. There should be no appeal from his decisions except by special leave granted by him or by a Divisional Court. He should have the fullest power of consultation with his brother Judges. He might also dispose of much of the business usually coming up in weekly court.

An English writer says:-" The defects of our present system of Divisional Court have been pointed out by an eminent Judge' in a letter to the Times, as follows: "Instead of a permanent tribunal of four sitting together in each court in banc, Divisional Courts of two, or at most three, Judges have been constituted by a haphazard 'rota' system, to do the corresponding work. The result has been that appeals on points of chamber practice may now be heard by Judges who with all their ability and learning are wholly unfamiliar with such matters; while appeals in the Crown paper may be decided by men whose accomplishments and experience have lain in other directions. The result of the 'rota' system has naturally been to disparage the authority of the Divisional Courts."

These remarks are germane to the reform which I advocate which will have the great advantage of securing uniformity of decision in practice matters. In regard to these, it is usually not of so much importance what practice is

adopted as to have a uniform system applied in all cases, with certainty and precision.

As to all of the suggestions so far made, you will probably say to me as Virgil said to Dante on entering into the first compartment of the Inferno:-Non ragionam di lor, ma guarda e passa. (Dante, Inf. 3, 51.) "Speak not. of them,

but look and pass them by."

APPEALS.

I take up next the subject of appeals, a somewhat burning one at the present day The delay and expense of appeals, both much exaggerated, are the frequent subject of complaint when the question of Law Reform is discussed. Sir John Hollams in "The Jottings of an Old Solicitor," dwells with much force upon the evils of an unrestricted right of appeal. (See Canadian Law Review, Vol. VI., 347.) "Prolonged time," he says, "is in my experience, even more objectionable to mercantile men than expense. In the present day it is impossible to give any reasonable estimate as to the time in which litigation must end, or as to the expense which it may involve. The practical mischief from this unrestricted right of appeal arises from the modern system introduced by the courts, without express legislative authority, of allowing the successful appellant the costs of the appeal and of the decision appealed from. Formerly this was unheard of. Now what the Times some time back aptly described as the gambling element' has been introduced into litigation, the stake constantly increases with successive appeals, and encouragement is given by one final effort to throw the whole costs on the hitherto successful party. But the right of appeal is sometimes defended on the ground that it is desirable that principles of law should be accurately decided for the benefit of the public. It seems however somewhat hard that the suitor of to-day should be fettered by the interests of posterity which has done nothing for him. Again it is said that obviously the right view should prevail, but this assumes that the ultimate decision adopts the right view. The decision of the House of Lords is undoubtedly the final view of the question, but it by no means follows that it is admittedly the right one."

"I believe the majority of suitors would prefer a system without appeal. In commercial cases, at all events, a

prompt and final decision is desired, and one which can be obtained without the risk of having to pay costs wholly out of proportion to the amount involved in the particular case."

But while it seems to be demanded and is perhaps desirable in the public interest, that appeals should be limited "interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium"-the difficulty arises as to drawing the line; this can only be done arbitrarily, if at all.

The following suggestions are put forward tentatively and with profound diffidence.

1. There should always be an appeal to a Divisional Court allowed to the unsuccessful suitor from the Judge of first instance. This is necessary, to use Lord Blackburn's words, in order to prevent the Judge being a despot. I would except from this commercial cases if brought before a special court.

2. If the appeal is dismissed, two Judges at least concurring with the trial Judge, there should be no further appeal except by special leave in important cases. Where there is a concurrence of four Judges, or even where three concur, it is perhaps reasonable, in ordinary cases, that the action should go no further.

3. If the appeal is successful the defeated party should be allowed to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The decision of this court should be final, except, perhaps, in (a) cases involving $5,000 and upwards, or (b) cases involving constitutional points of importance-the Court of Appeal to be asked for leave to appeal in such cases. Every appeal from a Divisional Court should go to the Court of Appeal.

4. There should be no appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, except in (a) cases involving constitutional questions between the Provinces and the Dominion, or (b) cases in which owing to their peculiar importance, leave may be granted by the Privy Council, or the Court of Appeal.

5. In all cases where an appeal becomes necessary in litigation between private individuals in order to settle constitutional questions, the costs of such appeal or appeals to be in all cases borne by the Province, unless the Court otherwise orders.

6. I would continue the present practice by which in proper cases an appeal can, by leave, be had directly to the

Court of Appeal without going to a Divisional Court on the

way.

7. It will be noticed that I do not suggest the abolition of Divisional Courts; the comparative cheapness of appeals to them and the greater speed with which these can be heard by such Courts makes it desirable to retain them.

In practice very many, appeals end, with the Divisional Court; either the cases are not important enough. to go further, or suitors are satisfied with the more careful consideration and discussion of their rights which can be had in any appellate Court, as compared with the decisions of a Judge of first instance.

These Divisional Courts act as a sieve to strain out many cases which would otherwise go to the Court of Appeal and unduly overburden that tribunal. It is of vital importance that a final appellate tribunal should be able to give both a patient hearing to counsel and also a somewhat leisurely consideration to the rights of the parties which would not be the case were it overtaxed by too numerous cases on the list.

8. I would retain the Court of Appeal as at present constituted, that is to say as a separate Court, unchanging in its members, composed always of the same Judges. In my opinion this system conduces much more to efficiency than having a Court made up haphazard from time to time of different Judges. Our system of Divisional Courts has suffered somewhat from this cause; there is not the same continuity of policy, the same sense of corporate responsibility in Courts kaleidoscopic in character, as there is in Courts whose personnel is constant; there is an absence of the esprit de corps which is as useful a sentiment in Courts as in other bodies. There is a tradition in a stable Court of Appeal as to the courtesy and patience due to counsel appearing before them on behalf of clients that might be marred by the intrusion of outsiders.

COMMERCIAL COURT.

The references by Sir John Hollams to the needs and wishes of commercial men, make it, perhaps, worth considering whether a commercial Court might not be formed with advantage. It may be that commercial matters are not at present numerous enough to require this, and further it may