II. I. СНАР. Х. The Difference of true Miracles from false. I. The Unreasonableness of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, because of Impostors. That there are certain Rules of distinguishing true Miracles from false, and divine from diabolical, proved from God's Intention in giving a Power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World. II. The Inconvenience of taking away the rational Grounds of Faith, and placing it on Self-evidence. Of the Self-evidence of the Scriptures, and the Insufficiency of that for resolving the Question about the Authority of the Scriptures. III. Of the pretended Miracles of Impostors and false Christs; as Barchochebas, David el-David, and others. IV. The Rules whereby to judge true Miracles from false. 1. True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Testimony. V. No Miracles necessary for the certain Conveyance of a Divine Testimony: proved from the Evidences that the Scriptures could not be corrupted. VI. 2. No Miracles divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popish Miracles. VII. 3. Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on those who believe them. Of the Miracles of Simon Magus. VIII. 4. Divine Miracles tend to the Overthrow of the Devil's Power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Christ to the Devil's Design in the World. IX. 5. The Distinction of true Miracles from others, from the Circumstances and Manner of their Operation. The Miracles of Christ compared with those of the Heathen Gods. X. 6. God makes it evident to all impartial Judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed created Power. This manifested from the unparalleled Miracles of Moses and our Saviour. From all which the rational Evidence of Divine Revelation is manifested, as to the Persons whom God employs to teach the World. BOOK HAVING thus far stated the cases wherein miracles may justly be expected as a rational evidence of Divine authority in the persons whom God employs by way of peculiar message to the world, and in the prosecution of this discourse manifested the evidences of Divine authority in Moses and the prophets, and in our Saviour and his Apostles; the only remaining question concerning this subject, is, How we may certainly distinguish true and real miracles from such as are only pretended and counterfeit? For it being as evident that there have been impos X. tures and delusions in the world as real miracles, the CHAP. minds of men will be wholly to seek when to rely upon the evidence of miracles as an argument of Divine authority in those persons who do them, unless a way be found out to distinguish them from each other. But if we can make it appear, that, unless men through weakness of judgment or incogitancy deceive themselves, they may have certain evidence of the truth of miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the establishment of their minds in the truth of that doctrine which is confirmed by them. There hath been nothing which hath made men of better affections than understandings, so ready to suspect the strength of the evidence from miracles concerning Divine testimony, as the multitude of impostures in the world under the name of miracles, and that the Scripture itself tells us we must not hearken to such as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore safely rely on such miracles, which we have certain evidence could not be wrought but by Divine power, because forsooth the Devil may sometimes abuse the ignorance and credulity of unwary men? Or is it because the Scripture forbids us to believe such as should come with a pretence of miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the miracles of Christ himself? Which is as much as to say, because the Scripture tells us that we must not believe every spirit, therefore we must believe none at all; or because we must not entertain any other doctrine beside the Gospel, therefore we have no reason to believe that. For the ground whereby we are assured by the Scriptures that the testimony of Christ was divine, and therefore his doctrine true, is because it was confirmed by such miracles as he did; now if that argument were insufficient, which the Scriptures tell us was the great evidence of Christ's being sent from God, we cannot give ourselves a sufficient account in point of evidence, on which we believe the doctrine of the Gospel to be true and divine. But the only rational pretence of any scruple in this case, must be a supposed uncertainty in our rules of judging concerning the nature of miracles; for if there be no certain xpipia, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine miracles from delusions of senses and the impostures of the Devil, I must confess, that there is an apparent insufficiency in the evidence from miracles: but if there be any certain rules of proceeding in this case, we are to blame nothing but our incredulity, if we be not satisfied by them. For the full clearing of this, I shall first make II. BOOK it appear that there may be certain evidence found out whereby we may know true miracles from false, and divine from diabolical; and, secondly, enquire into those things which are the main notes of difference between them. First, That there may be certain evidence whereby to know the truth of miracles. I speak not of the difference, ex parte rei, between miracles and those called wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the enquirer as far to seek for satisfaction as ever; for granting that a Divine power is seen in one, and not in the other, he must needs be still dissatisfied, unless it can be made evident to him, that such things are from Divine power, and others cannot be, Now the main distinction being placed here in the natures of the things abstractedly considered, and not as they bear any evidence to our understandings, instead of resolving doubts, it increaseth more; for, as for instance, in the case of the magicians' rods turning into serpents as well as Moses's, what satisfaction could this yield to any spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine power, and not in the other, unless it were made appear by some evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere imposture, and the other a real alteration in the thing itself? I take it then for granted, that no general discourses, concerning the formal difference of miracles and wonders considered in themselves, can afford any rational satisfaction to an inquisitive mind; that which alone is able to give it, must be something which may be discerned by any judicious and considerative person, And that God never gives to any a power of miracles, but he gives some such ground of satisfaction concerning them, will appear upon these two considerations. 1. From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing miracles. We have largely made it manifest that the end of true miracles is to be a confirmation to the world of the Divine commission of the persons who have it, and that the testimony is Divine which is confirmed by it. Now if there be no way to know when miracles are true or false, this power is to no purpose at all; for men are as much to seek for satisfaction, as if there had been no such things at all. Therefore if men are bound to believe a Divine testimony, and to rely on the miracles wrought by the persons bringing it, as an evidence of it they must have some assurance that these miracles could not come from any but a Divine power. 2. From the providence of God in the world; which if X. we own, we cannot imagine that God should permit the CHAP. Devil, whose only design is to ruin mankind, to abuse the credulity of the world so far, as to have his lying wonders pass uncontrolled; which they must do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between such things a are only of diabolical, and such as are of Divine power. Ir then it may be discovered that there is a malignant spirit which acts in the world, and doth produce strange things, either we must impute all strange things to him, which must be to attribute to him an infinite power, or else that there is a Being infinitely perfect, which crosseth this malignant spirit in his designs; and if so, we cannot imagine he should suffer him to usurp so much tyranny over the minds of men, as to make those things pass in the more sober and inquisitive part of the world for Divine miracles, which were only counterfeits and impostures. If then the providence of God be so deeply engaged in the discovering the designs of Satan, there must be some means of this discovery; and that means can be supposed to be no other in this case, but some rational and satisfactory evidence, whereby we may know when strange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive men, and when by a Divine power to confirm a Divine testimony. II. But how is it possible, say some, that miracles should be any ground on which to believe a testimony Divine, when Christ himself hath told us, that there shall arise Matt. xxiv. false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs 24. and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they should deceive the very elect? And the Apostle tells us, that the coming of Antichrist will be with all power, and 2 Thess. ii. signs, and lying wonders. How then can we fix on mi-9. racles as an evidence of Divine testimony, when we see they are common to good and bad men, and may seal indifferently either truth or falsehood? To this I reply, 1. Men are guilty of doing no small disservice to the doctrine of Christ, when upon such weak and frivolous pretences they give so great an advantage to infidelity, as to call in question the validity of that which yielded so ample a testimony to the truth of Christian religion. For if once the rational grounds, on which we believe the doctrine of Christ to be true and divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the truth of it be laid on things not only derided by men of atheistical spirits, but in themselves such as cannot be discerned or judged of by any but themselves, upon what grounds can we proceed to BOOK convince an unbeliever that the doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, that as light and fire manifest themselves, so doth the doctrine of the Scripture to those who believe it; it will be soon replied, that self-evidence in a matter of faith can imply nothing but either a firm persuasion of the mind concerning the thing propounded, or else that there are such clear evidences in the thing itself, that none who freely use their reason can deny it. The first can be no argument to any other person, any further than the authority of the person, who declares it to have such self-evidence to him, doth extend itself over the mind of the other; and to one's self it seems a strange way of arguing, I believe the Scriptures because they are true, and they are true because I believe them; for self-evidence implies so much, if by it be meant the persuasion of the mind that the thing is true: but if by self-evidence be further meant such clear evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do consider it must believe it, I then further enquire, whether this evidence doth lie in the naked proposal of the things to the understanding; and if so, then every one who assents to this proposition, that the whole is greater than the part, must likewise assent to this, that the Scripture is the word of God; or whether doth the evidence lie, not in the naked proposal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God on the minds of those to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The self-evidence is taken off from the written word, which was the object, and removed to a quite different thing, which is the efficient cause. 2. Whether then any persons, who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scripture to be God's word? If they are bound, the duty must be propounded in such a way as may be sufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the evidence of the truth of the Scripture lie on this testimony of the Spirit, then such as want this can have none at all. But if, lastly, by this self-evidence be meant such an impress of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who consider them as they ought, cannot but discern, I still further enquire, whether this impress lies in the positive assertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be, unless it be made appear to be impossible that any writing should pretend to be from God when it is not; or else in the written books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one, merely by the evidence of the writings themselves, without any further arguments, can |