Leadership, Management and Command: Rethinking D-DayThe author argues that the successes and failures of D-Day, on both sides, cannot be explained by comparing the competing strategies of each side. Instead he provides an account of the battle through the overarching nature of the relationship between the leaders and their followers. |
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Page 8
... soldiers of the 101st had assembled . In short , whatever the significance of the weather , it did not determine future events any more than it ensured the defeat of the Germans and the victory of the Allies : there is , therefore , no ...
... soldiers of the 101st had assembled . In short , whatever the significance of the weather , it did not determine future events any more than it ensured the defeat of the Germans and the victory of the Allies : there is , therefore , no ...
Page 9
... soldiers and their troop commanders were the better practitioners . The German front - line soldier was brave , determined and skilful . At times he was fanatical , occasionally brutal , but he was always and everywhere a formidable ...
... soldiers and their troop commanders were the better practitioners . The German front - line soldier was brave , determined and skilful . At times he was fanatical , occasionally brutal , but he was always and everywhere a formidable ...
Page 28
... soldiers is to slam them with everything we've got ' . ' Where the British saw calculated attrition , suggests Overy , ' American soldiers saw action that was piecemeal and indecisive'.23 The US view prevailed , not because it was a ...
... soldiers is to slam them with everything we've got ' . ' Where the British saw calculated attrition , suggests Overy , ' American soldiers saw action that was piecemeal and indecisive'.23 The US view prevailed , not because it was a ...
Page 32
... soldiers ' vomit blocked up the bilge pumps as because of any inherent design problem in the vehicle itself that subse- quently proved invaluable in the absence of port facilities for unloading . 39 ― The gradual realization that the ...
... soldiers ' vomit blocked up the bilge pumps as because of any inherent design problem in the vehicle itself that subse- quently proved invaluable in the absence of port facilities for unloading . 39 ― The gradual realization that the ...
Page 56
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Contents
19 | |
Part Three Managing Tame Problems | 151 |
Part Four Commanding in Crises | 305 |
Part Five Retrospective | 416 |
Notes | 429 |
Bibliography | 484 |
Index | 493 |
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Common terms and phrases
12th SS 29th Division Airborne Division aircraft Allied American amphibious Anglo-Canadian Armoured Division artillery attack Badsey Balkoski Battalion battery battle bombardment bombers bombing Bradley Britain British Army Caen Calais Canadian captured casualties cent Chandler and Collins Cherbourg Churchill coast combat commanders Company Corps counter-attack D-Day DD tanks defenders Delaforce destroyed destroyers DUKWs E-boats Eisenhower enemy fighter fighting fire France French German army glider Gold Beach Hitler Infantry Division invasion June Juno Juno Beach killed Kilvert-Jones landing craft LCTs LCVPs leaders leadership Linderman Luftwaffe machine guns managed miles military million Montgomery move naval Navy Neillands Normandy Normann officers Omaha Beach Operation Overlord Panzer Division paratroopers Pitcairn-Jones Pointe du Hoc Ramsey Regiment rifle Rommel Royal Rundstedt Sergeant shells Sherman ships shot soldiers Soviet squadrons St Lô strategy success suggested Sword Beach target troops units Utah Utah Beach vehicles weapons Wehrmacht Wicked Problem