HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF, New Orleans, La., May 13, 1866. GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, from April 6, 1864, to August 4, 1864 :

On March 27, 1864, I was relieved from the command of the Second Division, Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland, to take command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of April, in General Orders, No. 144, current series, War Department, I was assigned to that corps, then lying in the vicinity of Brandy Station, Va. The corps consisted of three divisions and twelve batteries of horse artillery, and in a few days after I joined was adjusted as follows: Brig. Gen. A. T. A. Torbert to command the First Division; Brig. Gen. D. McM. Gregg, the Second Division; and Brig. Gen. J. H. Wilson, the Third Division; the artillery_being under the command of Captain Robertson, U. S. Army. The officers and men were in pretty good condition, so far as health and equipment were concerned, but their horses were thin and very much worn out by excessive, and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty, the picket-line almost completely encircling the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly 60 miles. The enemy, more wise, had been husbanding the strength and efficiency of his horses by sending them to the rear, in order to bring them out in the spring in good condition for the impending campaign; however, shortly after my taking command, much of the picketing was done away with, and we had about two weeks of leisure time to nurse the horses, on which so much depended; consequently, on the 4th of May, when the campaign opened, I found myself with about 10,000 effective men, and the same number of horses in passable trim. After carefully studying the topography of the country from the Rapidan to Richmond, which is of a thickly wooded character, its numerous and almost parallel streams nearly all uniting, forming the York River, I took up the idea that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry. I was strengthened in this impression still more by the consciousness of a want of appreciation on the part of infantry commanders as to the power of a large and well-managed body of horse, but as it was difficult to overcome the established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a sleeping infantry force, we had to bide our time.

On May 4 the army moved; Gregg's division taking the advance to Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan; Wilson's the advance to Germanna Ford, on the same stream; Torbert's covering the trains of the army in rear, holding from Mitchell's Station to Culpeper, and around to Stevensburg, and strongly picketing the fords from Germanna Ford to Rapidan Station. As soon as the Second Corps reached Ely's Ford, Gregg moved to Chancellorsville, and, upon the Fifth Corps reaching Germanna Ford, Wilson made the crossing of the Rapidan, moved through Old Wilderness, and advanced to Parker's Store. On the 5th Torbert joined me at Chancellorsville, and General Meade ordered Wilson in the direction of Craig's MeetingHouse, where he was attacked, and, after a sharp engagement, driven back, via Shady Grove Church, to Todd's Tavern. It was necessary for him to take this route, as the enemy's infantry had advanced from the direction of Orange Court-House, and had occu

pied Parker's Store and the direct road back to our army. When General Meade discovered that Wilson was cut off, he sent word to me, near Chancellorsville, to go to his relief, and I immediately dispatched General Gregg's division in the direction of Todd's Tavern, where he met Wilson, who was still being followed up. The enemy's pursuing force was attacked by Gregg at this place, defeated, and driven to Shady Grove Church, a distance of 3 or 4 miles. It was now well understood that the enemy's cavalry at Hamilton's Crossing had joined General Lee's forces, and the necessity for my moving to that poin, as ordered, was obviated.

As I was held responsible for the left flank of our army and the trains, I made such disposition of the troops under my command as to hold the line of the Brock road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's Tavern and Piney Branch Church, but General Meade, on false report, became alarmed about his left, and notified me in the following note that Hancock's left had been turned, and directed me to draw in my forces to protect the trains :

Major-General SHERIDAN,

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Commanding Cavalry Corps:

May 6, 1864-1 p. m.

Your dispatch of 11.45 a. m. received. General Hancock has been heavily pressed, and his left turned. The major-general commanding thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry so as to secure the protection of the trains. The order requiring an escort for the wagons to-night has been rescinded. A. A. HUMPHREYS, Major-General and Chief of Staff.

I obeyed this order, and the enemy took possession of the Furnaces, Todd's Tavern, and Piney Branch Church, the regaining which cost much fighting on the 6th and 7th, and very many gallant officers and

men.

On the 6th Custer fought at the Furnaces and defeated the enemy, who left his dead and wounded in our hands. On the 7th the trains of the army, under directions from headquarters Army of the Potomac, were put in motion to go into park at Piney Branch Church. As this point was held by the enemy, I was confident that the order must have been given without fully understanding the condition of affairs, and therefore thought the best way to remedy the trouble was to halt the trains in the vicinity of Alrich's, attack the enemy, and regain the ground. This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, in which the enemy was defeated. Gregg attacked with one of his brigades on the Catharpin road, and drove the enemy over Corbin's Bridge; Merritt, who was in command of the First Division during the temporary absence of Torbert, attacked with his division, on the Spotsylvania road, driving him toward Spotsylvania, and Davies' brigade, of Gregg's division, made a handsome attack on the Piney Branch Church road, uniting with Merritt on the Spotsylvania road. The pursuit was kept up until dark. Gregg's and Merritt's divisions encamped in open fields, in the vicinity of Todd's Tavern, with orders to move in the morning, at daylight, for the purpose of gaining possession of Snell's Bridge, over the Po River. To accomplish this, Wilson, who was at Alsop's house, was directed to take possession of Spotsylvania early on the morning of the 8th, and thence move into position at Snell's Bridge. Gregg and Merritt were ordered to proceed to the same point, the former via the crossing at

Had these move

Corbin's Bridge, the latter by the Block house. ments been carried out successfully, it would probably have sufficiently delayed the march of the enemy to Spotsylvania CourtHouse as to enable our infantry to reach that point first, and the battles fought there would have probably occurred elsewhere; but upon the arrival of General Meade at Todd's Tavern the orders were changed, and Gregg was simply directed by him to hold Corbin's Bridge, and Merritt's division ordered in front of the infantry column, marching on the road to Spotsylvania in the darkness of the night, the cavalry and infantry becoming entangled in the advance, causing much confusion and delay. I was not duly advised of these changes, and for a time had fears for the safety of General Wilson's command, which had proceeded, in accordance with my instructions, to Spotsylvania Court-House, capturing and holding it until driven out by the advance of Longstreet's corps.

The time had now come to leave the Wilderness, where we had successfully held the left of the army, and defeated the enemy's cavalry on the 5th at Todd's Tavern and at the Furnaces; again on the 6th at the Furnaces, and on the 7th at Todd's Tavern. During the 8th I received orders to go out and engage the rebel cavalry, and when out of forage, of which we had half rations for one day, I was to proceed to the James River, and replenish from the stores which General Butler had at Bermuda Hundred. Pursuant to this order the three divisions of cavalry, on the evening of this day, were concentrated in the vicinity of Alrich's, on the plank road to Fredericksburg, and on the morning of the 9th commenced the march. It will be seen, upon examination of the map of Virginia, that there was but very little space for a large cavalry force to operate on the left of our army, from Spotsylvania to the Rappahannock, and that we were liable to be shut in. I therefore concluded to march around the right of Lee's army, and put my command, before fighting, south of the North Anna, where I expected to procure grain; where I was confident that while engaging the enemy's cavalry no timely assistance from his infantry could be procured, and whence, if not successful, I could proceed west and rejoin our army, swinging around toward Gordonsville and Orange Court-House. With this view we started, marching out on the plank road to Tabernacle Church; thench to the Telegraph road; thence down through Chilesburg to Anderson's Crossing of the North Anna. This movement was made at a walk, with three divisions on the same road-making a column of about 13 miles in length-marching by the flank of the enemy. I preferred this, however, to the combinations arising from separate roads, combinations rarely working as expected, and generally failing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully understand the situation; besides, an engagement was imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well together. As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta Rivers, each giving an excellent defensive line to the enemy, were passed, all cause for anxiety was removed, and our ability to cross the North Anna unquestionable.

After passing the Ta River the enemy's cavalry came against the rear of my column, and General Davies, who had the rear brigade, was directed to fight as rear guard, following up the main column. It is with pleasure I say that he and his command performed this responsible and trying duty with courage and good judgment. About dark Merritt crossed the North Anna at Anderson's Ford; Gregg and Wilson encamped on the north side, engaging the enemy

up to a late hour at night. After Merritt's division crossed, Custer's brigade was ordered to Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, where he recaptured 375 Union prisoners, taken by the enemy in the Wilderness; destroyed the station, 2 locomotives, 3 trains, 100 cars, 90 wagons, from 8 to 10 miles telegraph wire and railroad, 200,000 pounds bacon, and other supplies, amounting in all to about 1,500,000 rations, and nearly all the medical stores of General Lee's army. These stores had been moved from Orange Court-House to this point, either because General Lee wished to have them directly in his rear-the road used for hauling from Orange Court-House to Spotsylvania being on a parallel line to his line of battle-or because he contemplated falling back, or being driven back, to the North Anna. On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson were again attacked, but their crossing was covered by the division on the south side of the North Anna, and was effected without much loss.

An important point of the expedition had now been gained, and we had also obtained forage for our almost famished animals; our next object was to husband their strength and prepare to fight. It now became apparent that the enemy, in following up our rear, had made a great mistake, and he began to see it, for, when we leisurely took the Negro Foot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his mind as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he immediately hauled off from the rear, and urged his horses to the death so as to get in between Richmond and our column. This he effected, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, 6 miles from the city, on the Brook turnpike; consequently the march on the 10th was without much incident, and we quietly encamped on the south bank of the South Anna, where we procured all necessary forage, marching from 15 to 18 miles. On the night of the 10th and 11th of May Davies' brigade, of Gregg's division, was ordered to Ashland, and arriving before the head of the enemy's column, which had to make a wide detour to reach Yellow Tavern, drove out a force occupying the town; burnt a locomotive with train of cars attached; destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined the main column at Allen's Station, on the Fredericksburg_railroad. From Allen's the entire command moved on Yellow Tavern, Merritt in advance, Wilson next, and Gregg in rear. The enemy here again made an error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to throw all my strength on that which opposed my front, and fight this force with a small rear guard.

Merritt gallantly attacked the enemy at Yellow Tavern, and got possession of the Brook turnpike. The enemy, still confident, formed his line a few hundred yards to the east of this pike, enfilading it with his artillery fire, and making Yellow Tavern a hot place; but Gibbs and Devin held fast with their brigades, supported by artillery, and Custer charged the enemy's battery and line, supported by Chapman's brigade, of Wilson's division-in fact, by the whole of Wilson's division, Gregg having one brigade available to support. Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank, was brilliantly executed; first at a walk, then at a trot, then dashing at the enemy's line and battery, capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the line, which was simple enough to receive the charge in a stationary position. In this assault General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the ene my's cavalry, was mortally wounded.

Gregg about the same time charged the force in rear with equal success, and ended the engagement. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe. After Custer's charge and the enemy's line was broken-one portion of which was driven toward Ashland, the other toward Richmond-a reconnaissance was sent up the Brook turnpike, toward the city, dashed across the south fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the exterior line of the works, and went inside of them. I followed up this party, and found between the two lines of works a road leading to that from Mechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around on this across the Mechanicsville pike, south of the Chickahominy, and encamp next night (12th) at Fair Oaks, and determined to make the movement, being influenced to some extent in doing so by the reports from colored people, during the afternoon, that General Butler's force had reached a small stream about 4 miles south of Richmond, on the south side, and that I possibly could help him by a demonstration. Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we commenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, and massed the command on the plateau south of Meadow Bridge at about daylight; torpedoes planted in the road-many of which exploded, killing several horses-being the only difficulty encountered.

At daylight on the morning of the 12th Wilson encountered the enemy's batteries on, or near, the Mechanicsville pike, and could not pass them. As soon as I was notified of this condition, Custer's brigade was ordered to make the crossing to the north side of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, but as the bridge was found to have been destroyed, and the enemy's cavalry posted on the north side, I ordered Merritt's entire division to repair it, and to make the crossing at all hazards. During the time thus occupied, the enemy gave the working party great annoyance by sweeping the bridge with a section of artillery; and Merritt, to drive away this section and the force supporting it, crossed a small force of two or three regiments, attacked dismounted, and was repulsed: still the work on the bridge continued, and when it was finished, Merritt crossed nearly all his division, dismounted, attacked the enemy, carried his line of temporary breast-works, and continued the pursuit to Gaines' Mill. Mean time the enemy advanced from behind his works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg. Wilson was driven back in some confusion, but Gregg was ready, having concealed a heavy line of skirmishers in a bushy ravine, in his front, and when the enemy marched to attack, with more display than grit, this unexpected and concealed line opened a destructive fire with repeating carbines, and some of Wilson's men at the same time turning in on their flank, the line broke in disorder, and went into security behind the breast-works defending the city. The six batteries of regular artillery were used by Captain Robertson, chief of artillery, with great effect, and contributed much to our success. The enemy considered us completely cornered, but such was not the case, for while we were engaged, scouting parties were sent along the Chickahominy, and several fords found by them. This attack and repulse ended the battle; for the balance of the day we collected our wounded, buried our dead, grazed our horses, and read the Richmond papers, two small newsboys having, with commendable enterprise, entered our lines and sold to the officers and men. Between 3 and 4