GUINEY'S STATION, May 22, 1864-8.30 a. m. We now occupy Milford Station and south of the Mattapony on that line. I will now transfer our depot to Port Royal at once. Please direct the transfer of everything there. U. S. GRANT, BETHEL CHURCH, VA., May 22, 1864-8 p. m. (Received 8 a. m., 23d.) The enemy have evidently fallen behind North Anna. Prisoners have been captured to-day from Pickett's division, and there is evidence of other troops having been sent from Richmond also. Besides these, Breckinridge is said to have arrived. The force under Butler is not detaining 10,000 men in Richmond, and is not even keeping the roads south of the city cut. Under these circumstances I think it advisable to have all of it here except enough to keep a foothold at City Point. If they could all be brought at once to Tappahannock or West Point by water, that would be the best way to bring them. They might march across, but if the enemy should fall back of the South Anna this might become hazardous. Send Smith in command, and send neither artillery nor cavalry unless it is deemed expedient to march over to West Point, thence up north side to join this command. I shall be on the Anna to-morrow or meet the enemy this side. Notify me which way they will be sent. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMIES, Near North Anna, Va., May 23, 1864-11 p. m. (Received 4 p. m., 24th.) The army moved from its position of this morning to the North Anna, following closely Lee's army. The Fifth and Sixth Corps marched by way of Harris' Store to Jericho Ford, and the Fifth Corps succeeded in effecting a crossing and getting a position without much opposition. Shortly after, however, they were violently attacked, but handsomely repulsed the assault without much loss to us. We captured some prisoners. The Second Corps holds the bridge just above the railroad, and the Ninth Corps is between that and Jericho Ford, on the north bank, in face of the enemy. It is doubtful whether troops can be crossed except where the Fifth and Sixth Corps are. Everything looks exceedingly favorable for us. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, The enemy have fallen back from North Anna; we are in pursuit. Negroes who have come in state that Lee is falling back to Richmond. If this is the case, Butler's forces will all be wanted where they are. Notify him to hold Smith in readiness to be moved, but to await further orders. I will probably know to-day if the enemy intends standing behind South Anna. U. S. GRANT, JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864-12 noon. (Received 2 a. m., 26th.) The enemy are evidently making a determined stand between the two Annas. It will probably take us two days to get in position for a general attack or to turn their position, as may prove best. Send Butler's forces to White House to land on north side and march up to join this army. The James River should be held to City Point, but leave nothing more than is absolutely necessary to hold it, acting purely on the defensive. The enemy will not undertake any offensive operations there, but will concentrate everything here. Breckinridge is unquestionably here. Sixty-six officers and men have been captured who were with Hoke in the capture of Plymouth. If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canals should be destroyed beyond possibility of repair for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. U. S. GRANT, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL: The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of North Anna, his center on the river at Ox Ford, and his left on Little River, with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock, with his corps and one division of the Ninth Corps, crossed at Chesterfield Ford, and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the Ninth Corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it, where both banks are held by us, so that it could re-enforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The Fifth and Sixth Corps, with one division of the Ninth Corps, run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River and parallel with and near to the enemy. To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by his left leaves Little River, New Found River, and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of an army, to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanovertown. This crosses all these streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. During the night last night the teams and artillery, not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division, with most of the cavalry, will commence a forced march for Hanovertown to seize and hold the crossing. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south_bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy and attack with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already insured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded re-enforcements have contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men and to break down that of the enemy. We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap in the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rails from elsewhere. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major-General HALLECK, Washington. P. S.-Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanovertown it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable, therefore, to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery, and leave men to hold it. U. S. G. HANOVERTOWN, VA., May 29, 1864. The army has been successfully crossed over the Pamunkey and now occupies a front about 3 miles south of the river. Yesterday two divisions of our cavalry had a severe engagement with the enemy south of Harris' [Haw's] Store, driving him about a mile upon what appears to be his new line. We will find out all about it to-day. Our loss in the cavalry engagement was 350 killed and wounded, of whom but 44 are ascertained to have been killed. Having driven the enemy, most of their killed and many of their wounded fell into our hands. U. S. GRANT, Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Lieutenant-General. Chief of Staff. Two MILES SOUTHWEST OF HAW'S SHOP, May 30, 1864—4 p. m. (Received 10.45 a. m., 31st.) There seems to be some prospect of Lee making a stand north of the Chickahominy, his right near Shady Grove. I have heard nothing yet of Smith's troops reaching White House. If I can get up to attack will not wait his arrival. I wish you would send all the pontoon bridging you can to City Point to have it ready in case it is wanted. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. HAW'S SHOP, VA., May 31, 1864-6 a. m. (Received 8 p. m.) The enemy came out on our left last evening and attacked. They were easily repulsed and with very considerable slaughter. To relieve General Warren, who was on the left, speedily, General Meade ordered an attack by the balance of our line. General Hancock was the only one who received the order in time to make the . attack before dark. He drove the enemy from his intrenched skirmish line and still holds it. I have no report of our losses, but suppose them to be light. Major-General HALLECK, Chief of Staff. U. S. GRANT, BETHESDA CHURCH, VA., June 2, 1864–7 a. m. (Received 8.30 p. m.) Yesterday afternoon an attack was ordered to be made on our left at Cold Harbor by the Sixth Corps and the troops under W. F. Smith, Warren, Burnside, and Hancock being held in readiness to advance in their respective fronts. The attack was made with spirit about 5 p. m., continuing until after dark, resulting in our carrying the enemy's works on the right of the Sixth Corps, where we still hold them, and also the first line in front of Smith. The latter, however, is commanded by another line in rear, which made those carried untenable. The enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main assault, but were repulsed with loss in every instance. Several hundred prisoners were taken, but I cannot now say what number nor estimate our or the enemy's casualties. During the night the enemy made several assaults to regain what they had lost, but failed. Major-General HALLECK, Chief of Staff. U. S. GRANT, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED States, (Received 7.55 a. m., 4th.) We assaulted at 4.30 a. m. this morning, driving the enemy within his intrenchments at all points, but without gaining any decisive advantage. Our troops now occupy a position close to the enemy, some places within 50 yards, and are intrenching. Our loss was not severe, nor do I suppose the enemy to have lost heavily. We captured over 300 prisoners, mostly from Breckinridge's command. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Cold Harbor, Va., June 5, 1864. GENERAL: A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would not be practicable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use it for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength in guarding it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. I now find, after more than thirty days of trial, that the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive, behind breast-works, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have, therefore, resolved upon the following plan: I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself, until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some 25 or 30 miles west. When this is effected, I will move the army to the south side of James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on the north side and cross |