position of foreigners, arising out of the body of treaties and customs known as the Capitulations, gave most foreign Powers a direct interest in the internal administration of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, which extended to the Egyptian judicial organisation. The relations between Turkey and Egypt were therefore of international concern, and in some measure Great Britain was the mandatory of Europe in Egypt; for, owing to the British occupation, which followed the disorders of 1882, British advice predominated in the country.*

When war broke out between Great Britain and Turkey on November 5, 1914, Egypt became technically enemy territory, and its inhabitants, being technically Ottoman, became enemy subjects. The absurd situation had arisen that the suzerain" de facto was at war with the suzerain" de jure." British control could not possibly be abandoned. The free navigation of the Suez Canal, which no respect for the International Convention of 1888 would have safeguarded if this waterway had fallen into Turco-German hands, was of vital importance to the Allies. To secure the canal, the use of Egypt as a base for Allied forces was an absolute necessity. To abolish Turkish suzerainty was not enough, for Egypt would then have been left without any status at all, and would still have required British protection in order to ward off Turkish attacks. The only obvious solutionsand a rapid decision was necessary-were for Great Britain either to annex Egypt or to proclaim a protectorate.

The British Government, after hesitating over the advantages of removing at one stroke by annexation the encumbrance of a native administration and of international trammels, wisely decided in favour of a protectorate. In this way they showed respect for Egyptian national feeling and avoided raising difficulties among other Powers. They moreover recognised the impossibility of governing the country without Egyptian co-operation, which

*Up to 1914 modern Egyptian history is covered by a number of authoritative books and by an admirable series of annual reports from the British Agent and Consul-General. The two similar reports issued since the war do not treat the subject with anything like the same breadth or depth. These with the official documents subsequently published are a very fragmentary record of fourteen most eventful years. It is the purpose of this article to present a continuous narrative of this period and, in supplementing published sources of information, the writer has principally called upon his own experience.

would certainly have been withheld in the event of annexation. It is sometimes forgotten that neither at this nor any other time has there been any direct British administration of Egypt. British and other foreign officials are servants of the Egyptian, not of the = British, Government.

Meanwhile, martial law had been proclaimed, and the meeting of the Legislative Assembly was indefinitely postponed. In order to make it clear that Great Britain took sole responsibility for any action she might take as a result of the state of war, a declaration to this effect was issued.*

The Protectorate was proclaimed on December 18, and next day a further proclamation announced the deposition of the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was at the time in Europe, on the grounds of his adhesion to Turkey, and the accession of his uncle, =Prince Hussein Kamel, with the title of Sultan. An important letter was addressed to the new ruler setting forth the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on the basis of the Protectorate. The British Government described themselves as taking over the rights of the Sultan of Turkey and the Khedive" as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt." The authority of the Sultan of Egypt would thus derive directly from the British Crown. It was laid down that Egypt's foreign relations should be conducted through the British High Commissioner. Restrictions on the size of the Egyptian army were removed, the abolition of the Capitulations was foreshadowed, and the intention was stated of pursuing a

domestic policy aiming at a progressive extension of democracy. In the words of the letter, the British Government was "convinced

that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government." The letter concluded by dissociating the war with Turkey from any

religious motives.

At the same time, King George sent a message to Sultan Hussein containing the following passage: "I feel convinced that you will be able, with the co-operation of your ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt and the wealth, liberty and happiness of its people." These and other phrases were subsequently used in support

*See The Times, Nov. 9, 1914.

The full text does not seem to have been reproduced anywhere since.

†See The Times, Dec. 19, 1914.

of the widespread belief among Egyptians that the Protectorate was only a war measure. Although there was no real justification for this view, there were some grounds for the impression that an attitude of benevolent neutrality would be rewarded. As Lord Milner's mission (to which reference will presently be made) pointed out in its report: "Egyptians were certainly given to understand that efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations, and great pains were taken to assure them that their national status was not changed for the worse by the Protectorate."*

In these circumstances, Egyptian ministers found themselves in an embarrassing position. On the one hand, should Turkey and Germany prove victorious, connivance in any violation of the Sultan's constitutional rights would make them liable to a charge of rebellion. Nor could they ignore the religious bonds uniting Egypt as a Moslem State to the Sultan as Khalif, and the bonds of tradition and sentiment which excited sympathy for the fate of the only great independent Moslem Power. On the other hand, only those few to whom a return of the old autocratic régime meant personal profit wanted the resumption of effective control by Turkey. Moreover, with the British actually on the spot, "force majeure" could be pleaded; while, in the event of an allied victory, Egypt might be able to claim some of its fruits. The Egyptian Government accordingly decided on a policy of acquiescence. It acquiesced in the proclamation of martial law, in the suspension of the Legislative Assembly, in the establishment of the Protectorate, and in the deposition of the Khedive. It even went so far in recognising the new state of things as to acknowledge the authority of a new ruler with a new title, who definitely represented a constitutional connection with Great Britain. The members of the Egyptian Government made it clear, however, that they were continuing in office solely for the performance of administrative duties.

The course taken by the Egyptian Government was not unreasonable. It meant originally that nothing would be done to hinder the Commander-in-Chief, who, by virtue of martial law, was now the supreme executive authority; but as time went on it came to mean a great deal more than this. The whole administrative machinery of the country was before long placed

*Cmd. 1131, 1921; p. 8.

unreservedly at the disposal of the military authorities. British officials in Egyptian Government service were allowed to give all the help they could to the army, and were frequently lent for military purposes. The railway department facilitated the transit of troops and stores, provided material, and played a large part in the construction of the railway across Sinai. The British adviser of the Egyptian Ministry of Communications actually combined this office with that of Director of Military Railway Transport. The canal defences were largely constructed under the direction of the Egyptian engineering services. The Survey Department co-operated very extensively in the production of maps. The requisitioning of animals and foodstuffs was mainly effected through the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior. The recruitment of Egyptian Labour and Transport Corps was not only permitted, but actively assisted by the civil authorities. At the Armistice, approximately 150,000 Egyptians were serving in these auxiliary formations, not only in Egypt itself, but in Palestine, Mesopotamia, Salonica, and even in France. Finally, Egypt made a direct contribution to the war when, in 1918, the Council of Ministers accepted liability for certain expenses incurred on behalf of the army to the extent of over three and a-half million pounds. Passive neutrality had become active benevolence as the war proceeded, and this attitude was undoubtedly a very substantial

factor in the defeat of Turkey.

Egypt had indeed benefited enormously by war conditions. She had been absolved of all obligations and yet remained entirely secure. British troops had brought in and spent large sums of money. The commercial community were able to take full advantage of the high prices of cotton. The cost of living did not rise to more than 20 or 30 per cent. above pre-war until some time after the Armistice. There was no increase of taxation. The public debt was actually diminished and private indebtedness fell over 25 per cent.

level

But, at the same time, the seeds of future difficulties had been Sown. For four years native institutions had been subordinated to military requirements. The suspension of the Legislative Assembly and the censorship of the press stopped the normal outlets of public opinion. The Sultan and his government had

"For various specific effects of the war, see Cmd. 957, 1920; and

Cmd. 1487, 1921.

Ministerial

to take their cue from the Commander-in-Chief. decrees had to harmonize with proclamations under martial law, though the latter were often a convenience to the native administration because they made it possible to over-ride the Capitulations and, temporarily at any rate, to apply legislation to all the inhabitants of the country. But the requisitions of necessaries and the recruitment of labour had not been accomplished without causing dissatisfaction; disagreeable restrictions, which were cheerfully borne in belligerent countries for the sake of the common cause, naturally failed to make a similar appeal to Egyptians. It is not surprising that when the war ended the pent-up life of the nation should have burst forth and, in view of the ferment of new ideas throughout the world, it was not unnatural that the stream should have set in a political channel.

But neither the Foreign Office in London, nor the Residency in Cairo, nor the Egyptian Government itself, was prepared for so sudden and emphatic an ebullition of nationalist sentiment as that by which all found themselves faced immediately after the Armistice. The British Government had assumed the permanence of the Protectorate: it proposed to secure at the Peace Conference recognition of the Protectorate and of the transfer to Great Britain of Turkish rights over Egypt, and in return for assuming responsibility for all foreign interests to obtain consent to the abolition of the Capitulations, the "Caisse de la Dette," and other international trammels.

It had long been realised that constitutional and administrative changes would be necessary, but no scheme had, so far, been adopted. In 1917 a commission, composed partly of Egyptians and partly of English and other foreign officials, with Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, as chairman, had been appointed to draw up a plan for the new régime. In the autumn of 1918, Sir William Brunyate, the Judicial and Acting Financial Adviser, presented the commission, on its instructions, with a memorandum dealing particularly with the possibility of giving representatives of the foreign communities a share in legislation as a substitute for the existing veto of various foreign Powers under the Capitulations. He suggested a bi-cameral legislature, consisting of a purely Egyptian and popularly-elected body, and a senate, in which ministers and British advisers should have seats, together with unofficial Egyptian members and representatives of the