whether he would prefer to live in an Indian State or in British territory, he would invariably reply that the honour of being governed by an Englishman was the greatest honour in the world; that the Englishman was his "mother and his father," besides being pre-eminently a "nourisher of the poor." It was very pleasant to hear this simple recognition of our efforts, and it was deserved. But closer observation of the facts and conditions of life on one side of the border and on the other, and intimate conversations with old acquaintances, who sometimes would throw off reserve and speak freely, suggested that life in an Indian State of the normal, ordinary type, had its charms and advantages. For one thing, there was not so much regulation; there were not so many departments, and above all, not so many subordinate officials, and not so many "Chuprasis."

In this happy land of England we have nothing that in any way resembles the Chuprasi, and it is difficult to convey any idea of the office. He has been called the "red lictor," for in the higher officialdom he dons a red coat. But he pervades all offices from the highest to the lowest. He is an apparitor, a messenger, an orderly, a bailiff, a "follerer." He carries on his coat or his sash a badge (chuprás). He receives a very low pay, but his office is rich and much-desired, for the Chuprasi levies toll on all whom he approaches, and on all who approach the official to whom he is attached. But he is not grateful to his master. In Ali Baba," a book of great charm and insight, there is a description of the man who has done so much harm to our reputation : "The Chuprasi paints his master in colours drawn from his own black heart. Every lie he tells, every insinuation he throws out, every demand he makes, is endorsed with his master's name. He is the arch-slanderer of our name in India.”

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The reader may wonder at this long dissertation on the Chuprasi ; but it explains the system of British India, and perhaps explains why, among other reasons, life in British territory is possibly less congenial than life in Indian States. In a word, there are not enough British officials to cope with the everincreasing burden of administration in British India. It is one thing to give a right order, but an entirely different thing to be sure that the right order is carried out rightly. It mostly depends on the mood of the Chuprasi. But one of the great maxims was low expenditure, and the Chuprasi was on low pay. paper cheap, but in reality a very costly instrument.

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In conversations by the camp fire, night after night—and the Indian is usually freer and more confidential when the sun has gone down-the general opinion of the men on both sides of the border was that British India was over-administered and the Indian State under-administered; that justice was quicker and less costly in the Indian State; that the people were left to their own devices and not worried by daily demands from some department whose very name was incomprehensible. There is a good old Indian proverb: "If you live in a lake, get on with your alligator." In British India the alligators swarmed: in Indian States they were fewer. No doubt the Pursuivant in an Indian State was as voracious in temperament as were his brother Chuprasis over the border, but he rarely visited the villages, and if he were too voracious in action his victim would trudge off to the capital and, in open Durbar, would tell the Rája of the myrmidon's misdeeds. And the Rája would understand. For the Rája knew the village, spoke the patois, knew all about the myrmidon, and objected strongly to anyone interfering with his villagers, so long as they paid the land revenue on which the welfare of the Rája himself and of the State depended.

On one occasion, in a certain British Indian province, an admirable Bill was drafted to prevent the destruction by improper methods of fish, which formed an important food for the people. The Lieutenant-Governor of the province congratulated the young civilian on the excellence of the draft, but added, " so long as I am Lieutenant-Governor I will never agree to any penal legislation. I know what subordinate officials are, they are worse than otters."

This is a very discursive prelude to the consideration of a question which must be faced in India, a question fraught with the greatest consequences to a considerable portion of the world's population. Is the constitution of British India to be democratic ? And, if so, what is to be the position of the Indian States, which are frankly the very antithesis of democracy? Do the various peoples of British India, who have always lived under some form of despotism, benevolent or otherwise, really long for this Western form of government? Have they ever been consulted by the Indians who are styled "Progressive"? And have the implications and the consequences of democracy ever been explained to the quiet folk who live their simple, useful lives in the villages,

and only understand government in the terms of land revenuethose millions who are not politically minded?

It can scarcely be doubted, after the years of intensive propaganda which followed the introduction of the Montagu Reforms, that many Indians expect change, and as suggested above, it is more than possible that the extremely efficient administration which rose to its highest point some twenty-five years ago is too efficient; that the standard is uncomfortable and now, under diarchy, impossible. Some change is necessary, and it may be a compliment to the British that the Indians who have worked for reform and change should have selected as their model the system which has found favour in Great Britain and the Dominions. Alas! they have imported the forms and formulas of Westminster without its spirit and popular sanctions. Knowing the English language they fondly imagined that they had the key to parliamentary practice and lore. They have reckoned without history, for the gulfs which the British have bridged and the mountains they have climbed, in that painful march which led them to constitutional liberty, cannot be traversed by short cuts, however well planned.

The tragedy is that democracy connotes representative government, and that is not possible at present in India; it also postulates institutions auxiliary and ancillary to government, and these are not found in India. A democratic government functioning through a bureaucracy of the present type and standard would prove no blessing to the people. The existing Indian bureaucracy is so developed, so rigid and all-pervading, that it must be directed by a government detached and coldly impartial. It cannot be directed by Indians, unless-and this would be in every way unnatural and undesirable-they ignore the dictates of their religion, the obligations of their caste and the traditions of their race. A less developed, less rigid, and, in the geographical sense, a more limited form of bureaucracy might prove possible, if local governments smaller in size than the present huge and unwieldly areas were formed, more compact and homogeneous in race, religion, and in language, to be administered entirely by Indians. These local governments would be for a time controlled by a Government of India, mostly of British composition. The time will depend on two matters of fact. The first is the capacity of the Indians to stand by themselves, to prevent and resist external

attack and internal disorders. The second fact is their power and will to furnish and to implement the various pledges which the present Government of India has made to many and various interests in British territory, and to the chiefs of the Indian States.

It may be that the Simon Commission will find a way, and that the doubts as to the wisdom of introducing a democratic system into a land of aristocratic-or rather monarchicaltraditions will be regarded as groundless by the Commission and by parliament. In the long and glorious story of the British administration of India great difficulties have been surmounted, and the word "impossible " has never daunted our countrymen, who have given the best of their lives to ensure the safety and undisturbed prosperity of their Indian fellow-subjects. For, be it remembered always that the life of the British official in India is bounded by India and her welfare; there is no savour in life when his Indian career comes to an end. So if men, caring greatly for the happiness of India and honestly longing for the day when Indians can stand as equal members of the British Empire, as "Cives Britannici " before the world, have doubts as to whether the present road and the present pace will bring old friends and fellow-workers into the promised land, they must not be blamed as unsympathetic and reactionary. They are neither, but they dread-perhaps they are timid, as men are in times of earthquake lest the hopes and the natural ambitions of the educated Indians should end in disappointment and disillusion. And then the bitter retrospect; and the fierce recrimination!

In advocating smaller and more compact areas for provincial governments in British India, it has been urged in a previous paragraph that the provincial and local governments should be administered entirely by Indians. The reason for this suggestion is that the Indian rarely develops his full powers while in close contact with British officials. This is noticeable in the Indian States. There Indians seem to acquire quickly the faculty of initiative and prompt decision, qualities which are rarely found across the border in Indian officials of the same caste and the same family. When there is a British official in the offing, the Indians, whether from politeness or from modesty, seem to shrink from taking the initiative. It is true that some great and distinguished Indians have risen to the highest posts in the Civil

Service. But this does not alter the fact that the Indian State gives fuller scope and offers a readier career to Indian talent; nor does it shake the argument that the best training ground for the Indian statesmen of the future will be found in a local government entirely administered by Indians.

It is strange that we should like the Indians: it is stranger that they should tolerate us. For we think in different terms: we have different standards of life and conduct our customs and our ideals often jar on them, just as their "dastur "* sometimes repels us. But both of us have carried on, working for a common master; and this comradeship in work has led to great and life-long friendships. It sounds paradoxical to suggest that this camaraderie should cease. But if the Indians are to be given Home Rule, it is best to be honest and to avoid shams. The only safe and straight preparation for self-government is to start with purely Indian local governments, watched over and helped by a British Government of India. This Government of India must retain control of the army, the railways, postal and telegraph services, and the present provincial capitals, and must have a prior lien on the revenues of the local governments sufficient to pay for the control, for the public debt of India, for the pensions of the services, and for a sinking fund. The Civil Service under the direct control of the Government of India would no longer be executive so far as the local governments were concerned. Its members would discharge functions analogous to those now performed by officers of the political service. They would be advisory agents of the Government of India, to help when called upon by local governments, and to be insistent when called upon by the Government of India to enter a protest against some local action.

The territory to remain under the direct control of the Government of India would be of small extent. It would comprise the present provincial capitals, the sea harbours and the area under railways and canals. It would also embrace the various cantonments of the army. It would, though small in area, be sufficient for the training of the future recruits of the Civil Service of the Government of India; for the numbers of that service could be greatly reduced if the change from executive to advisory functions were adopted. It should be a select and highly paid service,

*Custom.