1922, together with an offer of a treaty of alliance by which the reserved points might be settled.*

Zaghlul now found himself in a difficult position. He had swept the country by promising the impossible. His failure to advance the cause of complete independence was beginning to lose him support, but as head of the government and responsible for law and order, resort to violence would only recoil on himself. He accordingly offered to resign in November, knowing of course that he would not be allowed to do so, and in this way strengthened his position once more. Within a few days however a tragically dramatic event put an entirely different complexion on the situation. On November 19, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan, was assassinated in the streets of Cairo.

This crowning act of political crime, for which it was impossible not to hold morally responsible the Nationalist extremists, together with their leader and inciter, Zaghlul Pasha, the actual Prime Minister, could not fail to arouse the British Government to immediate and drastic action (Mr. Baldwin had just replaced Mr. MacDonald). Egypt was required not only to apologise, and to track down and punish the murderers, but to promise the suppression of violent political agitation, to pay a fine of £500,000, to order the withdrawal of Egyptian officers and troops from the Sudan, to agree to permission being given for the Sudan to increase the area to be irrigated by the Gezira scheme to an unlimited extent, and to accept such measures as the British Government might think necessary for the future protection of foreign interests.

This ultimatum has been criticised for making wider demands than reparation for the murder of any individual could justify; but it must be remembered that this was not an isolated incident. From the British Government's point of view it seemed essential to exact penalties which would put an end to the whole situation. which made such crime possible. The Egyptian Government made no difficulty about accepting the first four demands, it boggled a bit at the last, but it flatly refused to comply with the other two (i.e. withdrawal from the Sudan and the unlimited extension of the Gezira scheme). The British reply was the *See Cmd. 2269, 1924.

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military occupation of the Alexandria customs; whereupon Zaghlul Pasha resigned and his place was reluctantly taken by Ahmed Ziwar Pasha, a former Minister of Justice and then President of the Senate. Bowing to "force majeure " Ziwar Pasha accepted all the British demands and at the same time adjourned Parliament, from which, with its Zaghlulist majority, he could not hope for support.

Had the British Government seen their way to modify the severity of their terms in return for the conciliatory spirit which Ziwar Pasha had shown, the position of the new Egyptian Government would have been much stronger. Egyptian ministers would have had something to show for their compliance, instead of having to face the cry of being the tools of British policy. Nevertheless, the appalling results of Zaghlul's administration were not without some reaction. A general election was held early in 1925, with the result that the official Zaghlulist party only returned 102 out of 214 members. Ziwar Pasha was thus able to form Coalition Government of the other parties, but to everyone's amazement the new Legislative Chamber proceeded as its first act to elect Zaghlul its president. Such a situation practically put an end to the possibility of parliamentary government, and in consequence the king agreed to an immediate dissolution, while Ziwar Pasha announced his intention of introducing a new electoral law before further elections were held. He was supported by many of the older and more educated elements, and particularly by the king's party, in believing that too great a measure of democratic franchise had been too suddenly thrust upon the people, and that if the country was to be saved from domination by demagogues appealing to the unreasoning passions and prejudices of the almost entirely illiterate masses, some restriction of the franchise was absolutely necessary.

This scheme fell through owing to the withdrawal of the Liberal members of the Coalition from the government, in consequence of a purely domestic incident connected with a prosecution before the Moslem religious courts. The Liberals then joined the Zaghlulists in demanding the summoning of the dissolved parliament on the grounds that no new parliament had been elected within the time specified by the constitution. Technically, no doubt, the demand was justified, but in the circumstances it is not surprising that it was refused. The pressure

exerted by the opposition was, however, so great that Ziwar Pasha agreed to hold the elections on the basis of direct adult male suffrage. The result was the return in May, 1926, of an Assembly composed of 164 Zaghlulist, 14 government and 36 other members. Zaghlul himself was with difficulty restrained from taking the premiership. He finally agreed, however, to support Adly Pasha, the Liberal leader, in the formation of a government, and himself accepted election to the presidency of the Chamber.

This solution merely meant putting another façade on to a political situation which in essentials remained unchanged. Ever since the first elections at the end of 1923, Zaghlul had proved himself to have command of the parliamentary position. He was even able to question the legality of Ziwar Pasha's actions during 1925, when the constitution had been virtually suspended. His followers in the Chamber looked to him for guidance as to whether the new Prime Minister was to be supported or not. It is all the more to Adly Pasha's credit that for a year he managed to steer clear of any serious embroilments either with the "Wafd " with Great Britain.

or

In April, 1927, Adly Pasha, his patience exhausted by the difficulty of pursuing any policy of his own, and of restraining the extravagances of his supposed allies in the Chamber, resigned. His place was taken by Sarwat Pasha, but he also had a majority of Zaghlulists in his Cabinet, and was dependent on the Zaghlulist majority in parliament.

During the winter, however, there had been indications of a new and unexpected friendliness in the press; also rumours of a willingness on Zaghlul's part to make some effort to end the deadlock with Great Britain. The acceptance of office by Sarwat Pasha seemed a further ground for optimism. The projected visit of King Fuad to England might also, it was thought, be turned to good account. In spite of the unaltered hostility of the "Wafd" party the Egyptian Government really seemed to want a settlement, and when King Fuad came to England in the summer, Sarwat was able to have conversations with Sir Austen Chamberlain which subsequently developed into official negotiations.

These negotiations resulted in agreement on a draft treaty, which was published early this year. The most important

*See Cmd. 3050, 1928.

difference between this and previous proposals was the use made in it of the League of Nations. After ten years the question of the location of the British troops to be maintained in Egypt for the protection of Imperial communications was, if still in dispute, to be submitted to the League, and any other matters, if they could not be settled by direct negotiation, were to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant. It was also intended that Egypt should actually become a member of the League.

But once more reasonable hopes have been disappointed. Though an Egyptian statesman had been found with sufficient wisdom and breadth of view to reach agreement with a British Government, he has failed in carrying with him the support of the popular party in his own country. The "Wafd," under its new leader, Nahas Pasha-for Zaghlul had died in August, 1927remains irreconcilable. Yet extreme nationalism is a hopeless creed; complete independence," as understood by Egyptian nationalists, is a chimera. The country cannot escape the implications of its geographical position, and it is not strong enough to stand alone. These are the rock-bottom facts. Great Britain is specially interested in Egypt because the Suez Canal is more important to her than to any other country. Otherwise her interest is negative. She does not want Egypt (and consequently the Suez Canal) to come under anyone else's dominant influence, and if she were to withdraw altogether from a special relation to Egypt there is no doubt that sooner or later some other country would step in. It is probable that, if this were clear to Egyptians, they would have no hesitation in expressing a preference for a connection with Great Britain. Nor is there anything derogatory in the kind of relationship which the rejected draft treaty seeks to establish. There are many sovereign States whose independence is limited. We need not merely seek examples among other Oriental nations, such as China, Persia or Turkey, who are bound in certain respects by international treaties. We need not even compare Egypt with Panama, Cuba or other Central American republics, whose freedom of action is quite definitely circumscribed by the United States. We can point to European States, such as Belgium or Switzerland, whose position has made them the subject of special arrangements, involving obligations on all sides.

It is to be feared, however, that there is not sufficient incentive in Egypt for a settlement at present, and that the necessity of regularising her international position in general, and of doing so in accord with Great Britain in particular, will only be learnt by experience. Without British assistance Egypt cannot hope to get rid of the Capitulations. They are a millstone of international interference. They can be got rid of by negotiation or by denunciation; but in either case the guarantee for the safety of foreign interests which Great Britain has assumed cannot be shaken off, and need only be noticeable to the extent that action under it is necessary. Were Egypt well enough governed the guarantee would be of no practical importance, but it cannot be said that the state of public security during the last few years has been such as to make it superfluous. It is no answer to say that if foreign interference were removed no disturbances would take place. The only evidence which can be accepted is orderly administration over a period of time, whatever the circumstances.

It may be that Egyptians think that they have obtained the concessions, which have been made since the war, by agitation. The vacillation of successive British Governments gives some colour to such belief, but the trouble really was that up till the declaration of February, 1922, Great Britain did not know what she herself wanted. That declaration settled this matter and incidentally protects Egypt from all other foreign interference. Were Egypt to quarrel with some other Power she would realise soon enough the value of having a champion in Great Britain. Does she suppose that Italy would not have had her own way over the Lybian frontier had it not been for the presence of Great Britain in the background? It is difficult to see what further safeguards against any abuse of British privileges could be given beyond those offered through the League of Nations in the draft treaty. If Egypt can suggest any it is not likely that they will be refused, but they will not alter the essential facts. The present undetermined position can continue, but it is to the disadvantage of everyone concerned. The consequent uncertainty is to Great Britain hardly more than an inconvenience, but the recurrent crises to which it gives rise are bad both for Egypt's material welfare and for her moral credit. While our relations with Egypt are based on a unilateral declaration we have greater freedom of action, more scope for interference, than if we were bound by