his followers upon it. When this suggestion was flatly refused he laid himself out to do all the harm he could. In April and May riots, for which he was undoubtedly indirectly responsible, broke out in the principal towns of the Delta, and in Alexandria had to be suppressed by British troops.*

In July, 1921, Adly came to London, and for the next five months carried on negotiations with Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office. Unfortunately Zaghlul's behaviour had stiffened the British attitude. What might have been conceded for the sake of a generally agreed settlement was not now so easily yielded. Towards the end of November it was known that a crisis had been reached, but the announcement of a breakdown was received with surprise and consternation. Adly at once returned to Egypt and placed his resignation in the Sultan's hands. He complained that Lord Curzon had all along been trying to elaborate the Milner proposals to the disadvantage of Egypt, and that the final draft representing the limits of British concession was tantamount to a pact of permanent subjection. No definition of the location of British troops had been laid down. It had been insisted that no political treaty was to be concluded without British sanction. He objected to the extensive powers proposed for the judicial and financial advisers. Egypt could not, he said, accept the British claim to take over the responsibility for foreign interests as the abolition of the Capitulations was a matter for Egypt to negotiate herself. The clauses referring to the Sudan were unacceptable to him. Thus two years of patient labour came to nought, and matters were not improved by the tone of the communication in which the British point of view was made known.t

Zaghlul made the most of the revulsion of feeling. For a moment he aspired to succeed Adly as Prime Minister, but as the British Government made it clear that they would not negotiate with him, the Sultan looked elsewhere, and left him to attempt to make the formation of any new government impossible. In anticipation of outbreaks of violence Lord Allenby forbade Zaghulist demonstrations, and ordered him and his principal adherents to take no part in politics and retire to the provinces. Zaghlul himself and several of the others refused to obey. They were consequently arrested on December 23 and deported to the

*See Cmd. 1527, 1921.

†See Cmd. 1555, 1921.

Seychelles Islands, whence Zaghlul himself was later transferred to Gibraltar for reasons of health. Sporadic riots and strikes. followed their removal from the scene, but the state of mind which caused the rising of 1919 no longer existed; in fact there was now as much relief as anger. Nevertheless, this action, though justifiable enough in the interests of order, could not but appear as the first fruits of the "no more nonsense " policy which the British Government now seemed to have adopted.

Upon Adly's resignation the Sultan had sent for Sarwat Pasha, but he would only consent to take office on the understanding that the British Government would put its acceptance of the Milner Mission's basic recommendation beyond question by recognising the principle of Egyptian independence. Lord Allenby made it clear that military government was the only alternative. In consequence of these considerations the Declaration of February 1922, was issued. Egypt was recognised as an "independent sovereign State," and it was announced that martial law would be abolished as soon as an Act of Indemnity had been passed; but freedom of action was reserved on four points pending agreement between the two countries. These four points, which were meanwhile to remain in statu quo were :

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.

(d) The Sudan.

The communication of this decision to foreign Powers* was accompanied by the announcement of a sort of "Monroe Doctrine." The British Government would regard the "reserved points" as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved." They would not "admit them to be questioned or discussed," and would consider any interference by another Power in Egyptian affairs as “an unfriendly act."

The occasion of the abolition of the Protectorate was marked by the adoption by the Sultan of the title of King. The British declaration of February, 1922, is a landmark in Egyptian history. *See Cmd. 1617, 1922.

It ended what may broadly be called the war period. The principle of Egyptian independence was conceded. Upon the Egyptian Government was now laid the responsibility for such constitutional and administrative reconstruction as might be necessary. Henceforward the British Government's policy would be to watch this process, to intervene only when the reserved points should be at issue, and to await an opportunity for their final settlement. Although it was desirable that this situation should not be unduly prolonged, a "modus vivendi was in fact established which, despite serious outbreaks of political crime, has at any rate enabled Anglo-Egyptian relations to be maintained on a uniform and workable basis for the last six years. The centre of gravity has been shifted to Egypt, and to the attempts of successive Egyptian Governments to set their own house in order. As these have shown success or failure, so have the prospects of a settlement with Great Britain waxed and waned.

Sarwat Pasha's success in obtaining the British declaration of February, 1922, did not unfortunately give him the necessary authority to deal with the internal situation, which was indeed one of great difficulty. The transition to a new régime required unity and stability, but the country remained divided. The "Wafd" and "Watanist" parties were irreconcilable. Adly Pasha's newly-formed Liberal party, though its programme closely resembled that of the government, was too busy seeking popularity for its support to be certain. The relaxation of all social and political discipline during the turmoils of the past four years had led to an enormous increase of crime. Public security, especially in the provinces, was not being effectively maintained. Under the influence of extremist agitation an organised campaign of assassination developed, as a result of which several British soldiers and officials, as well as two of Adly Pasha's prominent followers, lost their lives. The efficiency of the public services had in most branches declined. The British element in the administration, which for over a generation had been the main source of efficiency, was already reduced in numbers, and such officials as remained were compelled to drop almost entirely into the background. Although there were still British advisers in the Ministries of Finance, Justice and Interior, the Financial Adviser no longer attended Cabinet meetings to represent their views, as had formerly been the practice. Finally the draft of a new

constitution on democratic lines, which a Government Commission produced in the autumn, failed to win the approval of the king, who desired to concentrate as much power as possible in his own hands. At the same time the inclusion in it of provisions regarding the Sudan was objected to by the British Government as incompatible with the reserved points. Overwhelmed by circumstances, not strong enough either to make himself independent of faction, or to wear down opposition, Sarwat Pasha resigned at the end of November.

For a while it seemed as if no one able or willing to take control of the situation would come forward. Tewfik Pasha, an adherent of the court party, held office for a few weeks, but he soon fell foul of the British over the Sudan. Attempts by the king to exercise his personal authority, and to secure modifications of the draft constitution for his own advantage, only further confused domestic affairs. On Tewfik's resignation in February, 1923, it was almost impossible to find a successor. Adly Pasha offered to try and clear up the question which stood in the way of calling together an elected assembly, but was unable to form a government. Disorder once more became rife and martial law, which everyone had hoped to see disappear, had to be used by Lord Allenby to suppress a series of outrages. At last resort was had to the old expedient of a " Ministry of Affairs," and in March a government of nondescript complexion took office, under Yehia Pasha Ibrahim.

The supposed "stop-gap " ministry, however, developed unexpected qualities. To the annoyance of those who might have taken office, but held back in order to profit from each other's mistakes, Yehia Pasha embarked boldly on a constructive policy. Braving the outcries of the disappointed, who maintained that the mandate of a mere " Ministry of Affairs " was being exceeded, he promulgated the Electoral Law and secured the release of a number of political prisoners. Not content with this, he also promulgated the long-deferred Act of Indemnity* and secured, in accordance with British promises, the abolition of Martial Law. A further vexed question was solved by the adoption of a comprehensive scheme for the compensation of British and other foreign officials who should desire or be compelled to leave the Egyptian service. Amongst other important measures was a plan

*See Cmd. 1998, 1923. †See Cmd. 1999, 1923.

of Egyptian martial law to be applied when necessary by the Egyptian Government.

Things seemed to be taking a really satisfactory turn at last when Zaghlul Pasha, who had been released from his exile at Gibraltar, in the spring, on grounds of ill-health, returned to Egypt in September, 1923. At first his reception was only moderately enthusiastic. People recognised in him the stormy petrel who was always preventing the country from settling down. An absence of two years, without destroying his personal prestige, had weakened its effect. Had he been anything of a statesman he would have taken advantage of the calmer frame of mind then pervading the country to retrieve his past errors of judgment. But popular acclamation was still to him the only measure of his justification and "complete independence" his only conception of a policy. With elections imminent for the new Assembly (the first under the new constitution and, indeed, since the war), and knowing that his party's victory at the polls would involve his acceptance of the responsibility for governing the country, he did not abate one jot of the old wild vagueness of his appeals. He succeeded, as so often before, in carrying away audiences of excitable students and ignorant peasants. When the Assembly was finally constituted he found himself at the head of an overwhelming majority. Yehia Pasha thereupon resigned, and in January, 1924, Zaghlul became Prime Minister.

Once more everything went back into the melting pot, for it was inevitable that the new government should be hostile to accommodation with Great Britain. It so happened that Zaghlul's accession to official power coincided with the coming into office of a Labour Government in England. There were not wanting those who imagined that the popularly acclaimed leader of the Egyptian people would obtain a sympathetic hearing from Mr. MacDonald and his followers. When, however, Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan provoked disturbances and mutiny among the Egyptian officials and troops stationed there, the British Government showed no signs of yielding. In September Zaghlul came to London, where he repeated to Mr. MacDonald the demand for the complete independence of Egypt with the Sudan. He was met by an equally firm determination on the part of the British Government to adhere to the declaration of February,