or constitution of these realms, while a judgment so highly superior to their own impends.

The second great privilege of the house of peers consists in their having the sole judicature of all impeachments commenced and prosecuted by the commons. And this, again, is a very weighty counterpoise to his majesty's third prerogative of the executive government of these nations by his ministers; since no minister can be so great as not justly to dread the coming under a judgment from which the mightiness of his royal master cannot protect him.

The third capital privilege of the house of peers subsists in their share, or particular department of rights, in the legislature. This extends to the framing of any bills, at their pleasure, for the purposes of good government; saving always to the commons their incommunicable right of granting taxes or subsidies to be levied on their constituents. But on such bills, as on all others, the house of lords have a negative—a happy counterpoise to the power both of king and commons, should demands on the one part, or bounties on the other, exceed what is requisite.

The change of the ancient modus in conferring nobility, has not hitherto, as I trust, been of any considerable detriment to the weal of the people. But should some future majesty, or rather some future ministry, entitle folk to a voice in the second estate on any consideration save that of eminent virtue and patriotic service, might it be possible that such ministers should take a further stride, and confer nobility for actions deserving of infamy; should they even covenant to grant such honours and dignities in lieu of services subversive of the constitution; a majority of such a peerage must either prove too light to effect any public benefit, or heavy enough to effect the public perdition.

THE DEMOCRATICAL OR THIRD ESTATE.

THE election of commoners to be immediate trustees and apt representatives of the people in parliament, is the hereditary and indefeasible privilege of the people. It is the

privilege which they accepted, and which they retain, in exchange of their original inherent and hereditary right of sitting with the king and peers IN PERSON, for the guardianship of their own liberties, and the institution of their own laws.

Such representatives, therefore, can never have it in their power to give, delegate, or extinguish the whole or any part of the people's inseparable and unextinguishable share in the legislative power; neither to impart the same to any one of the other estates, or to any persons or person whatever, either in or out of parliament. Where plenipotentiaries take upon them to abolish the authority of their own principles, or where any secondary agents attempt to defeat the power of their primaries, such agents and plenipotentiaries defeat their own commission, and all the powers of the trust necessarily revert to the constituents.

The persons of these temporary trustees of the people, during their session, and for fourteen days before and after every meeting, adjournment, prorogation, and dissolution of parliament, are equally exempted, with the persons of peers, from arrests and duress of every sort.

They are also, during their session, to have ready access to the king or house of lords, and to address or confer with them on all occasions.

No member of the house of commons, no more than of the house of peers, shall suffer, or be questioned, or compelled to witness or answer, in any court or place whatsoever, touching any thing said or done by himself or others in par

liament, in order that perfect freedom of speech and action may leave nothing undone for the public weal.

They have also, during session, an equal power with the house of lords, to punish any who shall presume to traduce their dignity, or detract from the rights or privileges of any member of the house.

The commons form a court of judicature distinct from the judicature of the house of lords. Theirs is the peculiar privilege to try and adjudge the legality of the election of their own members. They may fine and confine their own members, as well as others, for delinquency or offence against the honour of their house; but in all other matters of judicature, they are merely a court of inquisition and presentment, and not a tribunal of definitive judgment.

In this respect, however, they are extremely formidable. They constitute the grand inquest of the nation; for which great and good purpose they are supposed to be perfectly qualified by a personal knowledge of what hath been transacted throughout the several shires, cities, and boroughs from whence they assemble, and which they represent.

Over and above their inquiry into all public grievances, wicked ministers, transgressing magistrates, corrupt judges and judiciaries, who sell, deny, or delay justice; evil counsellors of the crown, who attempt or devise the subversion or alteration of any part of the constitution; with all such overgrown malefactors as are deemed above the reach of inferior courts-all come under the particular cognizance of the commons, to be by them impeached, and presented for trial at the bar of the house of lords. And these inquisitory and judicial powers of the two houses, from which no man under the crown can be exempted, are deemed a sufficient allay and counterpoise to the whole executive power of the king, by his ministers.

The legislative department of the power of the commons.

is in all respects coequal with that of the peers. They frame any, bills at pleasure for the purposes of good government. They exercise a right, as the lords also do, to propose and bring in bills for the amendment or repeal of old laws, as well as for the ordaining or institution of new ones. And each house, alike, hath a negative on all bills that are framed and passed by the other.

But the capital, the incommunicable privilege of the house of commons, arises from that holy trust which their constituents repose in them; whereby they are empowered to borrow from the people a small portion of their property, in order to restore it threefold in the advantages of peace, equal government and the encouragement of trade, industry, and manufactures.

To impart any of this trust would be a breach of the constitution; and even to abuse it would be a felonious breach of common honesty.

By this fundamental trust, and incommunicable privilege, the commons have the sole power over the money of the people; to grant or deny aids, according as they shall judge them either requisite or unnecessary to the public service. Theirs is the province, and theirs alone, to inquire and judge of the several occasions for which such aids may be required, and to measure and appropriate the sums to their respective uses. Theirs also is the sole province of framing all bills or laws for the imposing of any taxes, and of appointing the means of levying the same upon the people. Neither may the first or second estate, either king or peerage, propound or do any thing relating to these matters that may any way interfere with the proceedings of the commons; save in their negative or assent to such bills when presented to them, without addition, deduction, or alteration of any kind.

After such like aids and taxes have been levied and disposed of, the commons have the further right of inquiring

and examining into the application of such aids; of ordering all accounts relative thereto to be laid before them; and of censuring the abuse or misapplication thereof.

The royal assent to all other bills is expressed by the terms, "Le roy le veut-the king wills it ;" but when the commons present their bills of aid to his majesty, it is answered—“Le roy remercie ses loyal sujets, et ainsi le veut -the king thanks his loyal subjects, and so willeth." An express acknowledgment, that the right of granting or levying monies for public purposes lies solely, inherently, and incommunicably, in the people and their representatives.

This capital privilege of the commons constitutes the grand counterpoise to the king's principal prerogative of making peace or war; for how impotent must a warlike enterprise prove without money, which makes the sinews thereof! And thus the people and their representatives still retain in their hands the grand momentum of the constitution, and of all human affairs.

Distinguished representatives! Happy people! immutably happy while worthily represented!

As the fathers of the several families throughout the kingdom, nearly and tenderly comprise and represent the persons, cares, and concerns, of their respective households, so these adopted fathers immediately represent, and intimately concentrate, the persons and concerns of their respective constituents, and in them the collective body or sum of the nation. And while these fathers continue true to their adopting children, a single stone cannot lapse from the great fabric of the constitution.

THE THREE ESTATES IN PARLIAMENT.

WITH the king, lords, and commons, in parliament assembled, the people have deposited their legislative or absolute