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THE CELTIC MAGAZINE.

No. XIII.

NOVEMBER 1876.

VOL. II.

ACCOUNT OF THE LAST BATTLES AND DEATH IN INDIA OF COLONEL WILLIAM BAILLIE OF DUNAIN,

1780-1782.

BY CHARLES FRASER-MACKINTOSH, F.S.A., SCOT., M.P.

AMONGST the many distinguished soldiers the County of Inverness has produced, few held a better position, or had higher prospects than Colonel William Baillie of Dunain, who died in 1782.

The family of Baillie is of long standing, and traces its descent from the Balliol, who founded the College of that name at Oxford. A branch settled at Dunain about the year 1452, and besides Dunain as it existed until lately, the possessions of the family formerly included Dochcairns, Easter Dochgarroch, Torbreck, Balrobert, and Knocknagail.

At the middle of last century, when Alexander Baillie was proprietor, the fortunes of the family were at a low ebb. Alexander Baillie had two sons, William and John, and two daughters, one Anna, married to George Baillie of Leys, the other Helen, married to Dr Alves of Shipland. William Baillie was intended for the law, but disliking the profession, procured without difficulty, in a stormy period, a Commission as Lieutenant in the old 89th Regiment in 1759, and afterwards entered the service of the East India Company.

His brother, John, afterwards Colonel of the Inverness Fencibles, his cousin, Lieut. Francis Baillie, and several men from the Parish of Inverness, were in the year 1780 serving in India. Thirty years ago, the story of Colonel Baillie's defeat and capture by Hyder Ali and his son Tippoo Saib, through the alleged default of Sir Hector Munro, and his confinement and death in Seringapatam, were often related about Inverness. It is now known but to few, and as we are in possession of several documents bearing upon it, and as an Inverness man was the principal figure, an authentic account may not prove out of place in a Magazine printed in the Highland Capital.

In the year 1780 Hyder Ali made a determined attempt to crush the Company, having some European corps in his service, with several French officers. He crossed the Ghauts, and as a first step, on 9th July, invaded the Carnatic with an army of 100,000 men, plundered and burnt the country to within 50 miles of Madras, and laid siege to Arcot, the capital of the Nabob of the Carnatic, with whom we were at friendship. A force of about 5000 assembled at Madras, in the month of July, to resist this

invasion, under command.of General, afterwards Sir Hector Munro of Novar. The detachment, consisting of about 3000 men, commanded by Colonel Baillie, had been stationed at Gintoir Circar, and at the urgent request of the Naboh, was ordered to join Munro. Colonel Baillie's progress had been, from the 25th of August to the 3d of September, impeded by the rise of the river Arblir, which however he crossed on the 3d, in the afternoon, without opposition, and resumed his march to Conjeveram, where he was to join Munro.

Upon the 4th, the following letter was sent to Colonel Baillie, probably by the Nabob's Secretary. It has some hieroglyphic attached :— SIR,

The great attention which you have on all occasions shown to the interests of his Highness the Nabob, together with the regard which I have at all times expressed towards you, now induce me to write you a letter of congratulation on your having passed the River which impeded your progress, and on your being on the road to join General Sir Hector Munro, whose victorious arm will, with the blessing of God, chastise the unprovoked insolence of Hyder Ali Cawn. The sense which both the Nabob and I have of your services are not unknown to Governor Whiteside and General Munro. It is a pleasure to call one's self the friend of a gallant officer. What can I say more?

Given at Chepauk, 4th September 1780.

Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.

Colonel Baillie, by the 6th, having got as far as the village of Perampauken, where he encamped, was attacked by Tippoo, at the head of 10,000 horse and 5000 infantry, with 14 pieces of cannon. The engagement lasted six hours, when the enemy had to retire with great loss. In August 1781, when the army under Sir Eyre Coote encamped at this place, great heaps of bones still remained. Col. Baillie had 300 native troops killed, his ammunition was almost exhausted, and on the morning of the 7th he wrote a note to Munro, stating that he had but the shirt on his back, that on review he found a like deficiency in ammunition and provision, in short, he added-"I must plainly tell you, Sir, that you must come to me for I see it impossible for my party to get to Conjeveram." Munro received this letter and instantly despatched Colonel Fletcher to Baillie's assistance, but it was at the time strongly felt that Munro did not act with sufficient promptness afterwards. Lord Macleod left India. and resigned command of the 73d, it is said, "from having differed with Munro on the subject of his movements, particularly those preceding Colonel Baillie's disaster."

"An

We row proceed to quote from a faded MS. which is entitledaccount of the overthrow of Lieut.-Colonel Baillie's detachment by Hyder Ali's army on the 10th Sept. 1780. N.B.-The account was taken on the field of battle on the 28th August 1781, from black officers and several others who were in the action, and the correctness of it was afterwards confirmed in conversations on the subject by several of the surviving officers on their releasement from captivity." It is in the hand-writing, to the best of our belief, of General Macleod of the respected family of Geanies in Ross :

"On the evening of the 7th September, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher with the Grenadiers of the army, was detached to join Lieut.Colonel Baillie, with some ammunition for his field-pieces, in doolies and on camels. As it was probable that this party should be obliged to take

a round-about way to avoid the enemy, and meet with obstacles that would make it impossible for it to join Baillie before the night of the 8th Sept., the General concerted that Baillie was not to move, at any rate, before the night of the 9th, when he himself with the army was to march towards him from Conjeveram; upon which account, the General had likewise fixed upon the route by which Baillie was to move, as well as his own army; so that, in case of any attempt by the enemy, the army, and Baillie's detachment, should act to the same point. Fletcher had the good fortune of joining Baillie on the morning of the 8th without meeting with any obstruction. Colonel Baillie's force now consisted of the following

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"A great many of the two Circar battalions deserted during the march from the northward; the battalion (Capt. Powel's) behaved remarkably ill in the action of the 6th. On the night between the 9th and 10th Sept., many of the Sepoys threw away their arms and clothing, and crept off. It may be concluded that not above 500 of the two battalions marched in the line on the morning of the 10th.

"It is well known that Colonel Fletcher and the greater number of his party were men of such mettle, as to imagine that they themselves could cut their way through Hyder's army. Nor was Fletcher's bravery and ambition tempered by much experience, or any reverse of fortune. Baillie was not less brave, or ambitious of military glory, but he had much more experience, and he knew the strength and weakness of the enemy's troops, as well as his own, thoroughly; he saw into the grand game that was begun on the theatre of the Carnatic; he was well acquainted with the character of the bold invader, and he had a just sense of the extraordinary turn our politics and manners had taken of late.

"In the present case the whole charge rested upon him. He was sensible of its weight, and how necessary it was for him to be extremely considerate and circumspect. The warm Fletcher rather exulted over this anxiety and seeming diffidence, and his grenadier officers readily gave into his way of thinking. By many reports Fletcher often repeated his wish of meeting with Hyder's whole force in broad day, and he looked on marching under the cover of night as a measure rather disgraceful."*

The following memorandum is folded up within the manuscript :-"Lieut. -Col. Baillie ranked in the army next above Lieut. Col. Fletcher, both men esteemed as officers of the first merit, none could exceed either in ambition for military fame; their minds-though they were always upon a footing of intimate friendship-were evidently tinged with no small degree of jealousy of each other. The patronage of the Commander-in-chief was particularly engaged to Baillie, who, as soon as the war appeared inevitable, requested to have the command of the Grenadiers of the army, as he had at the

"The detachment marched from Perampaukin at seven at night on the 9th Sept., Fletcher's party in front, followed by Capt. Grant's companies, Powel's battalion, the two European battalion companies, Nixon's battalion, and Lucas' battalion in the rear. The whole marched by sub divisions. The doolies and baggage guarded by two companies from each battalion marched on the left flank.

"The detachment had not proceeded above two miles, when the enemy began to annoy it with rockets and musketry. A mile further the enemy were discovered in force in the rear, and opened some guns there, which raked our line. Upon this Colonel Baillie made some change in his dişposition, and discovering the situation of the enemy in the rear, fired a few rounds among them from two field-pieces, which dispersing them, he resumed his march. Soon after they again opened their guns upon his left at no great distance, and he ordered a corps of Grenadier Sepoys to move out to take them. But they were interrupted by a deep watercourse. Their guns were, however, soon silenced by the fire of ours. At the same time the fire of small arms and rockets on all sides was incessant, and the baggage people and followers became very troublesome, many of them being wounded. Some of the Sepoy corps became uneasy, many deserted, and it was found difficult to maintain strict order and regularity on the march. 'Tis said that Colonel Fletcher and some of his gentlemen now again spoke to Baillie to halt until daylight, to which he agreed. It was about eleven at night when he halted at a top about 4 miles from Perampaukin, and 3 from Polelore.

“There are causes to believe that Baillie here, and General Munro at Conjeveram, were both deceived and betrayed, much about the same time by their hircarrahs. A Sepoy of the guides and a Brahmin hircarrah, that were with Colonel Baillie upon this occasion, attended me on the 28th August 1781 over the melancholy field of slaughter, the Sepoy, giving an account of the fatal affair, told me, that immediately as the detachment halted, Colonel Baillie despatched his head hircarrah, with the strongest injunctions, and promises of great reward, for bringing certain intelligence to him, with all possible expedition, whether or not Hyder's army was near him, or moving towards him; and that the hircarrah returned betwen two and three in the morning, and most confidently assured the Colonel that Hyder with his army still lay near Conjeveram to oppose the General's army, that he had sent more horse to assist Tippoo Saib, but that no considerable force or artillery was arrived or expected. The Brahmin hircarrah checked the Sepoy while he was informing me of this circumstance, but the latter firmly insisted that it was true, adding, that late siege of Pondicherry. The General assured him that he would have that command. Colonel Fletcher returned from Europe a short time before the army took the field, was extremely desirous to have the command of the Grenadiers; but as the General would on no account withdraw his promise to Baillie, Fletcher requested to command the Grenadiers until Baillie joined the army, This was granted, and his frank, popular, and convivial manners were particularly ingratiating with the corps. A just consideration of the above circumstances evinces the great imprudence of sending Fletcher with the Grenadiers to reinforce Baillie. This was the Commander-in-chief's (Munro) first error, which, like all his errors, arose from an indistinctness of judgment, and a facility to be misled by designing men. Of that mischievous class, too many edged themselves into his councils, and the rest of his advisers, weak men, were total novices in Indian intrigue and warfare,"

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