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Ged tha na bain-tighearnan
Gallda. fasanta,
Thug oigh na Gaelig,
Barr am mais' orra,
Gur annir sheoighn i

Gun sgoid ri dearc' oirre,
Na h earradh gle mhath
De dh'eudadh breacanach.

Gur foinnidh, mileanta
Direach, dreachmhor, i,
Cha lub am feoirnean
Fo broig 'nuair shaltras i;
Tha deirge a's gile
Co-mhire gleachdanaich,
Na gnuis ghil, eibhinn,
Rinn ceudan airtneulach.

Reidh dheud chomhnard
An ordugh innealta,
Fo bhilibh sar-dhaitht',
Air blath bhermillian ;
Tha h-aghaidh narach
Cho lan de chinealtachd,
'S gun tug a h-aogas,
Gach aon an ciomachas.

Gur binne comhradh
Na oraid fhileanta,
Tha guth ni's ceolmhoir',
Na oigh cheol binn-fhaclach,
Cha laidheadh bron oirn,
No leon, no iomadan,
Ri faighinn sgeul duinn
O bheul na finne sin.

'Nuair thig a Bhealltainn,
'S an Samhradh lusanach,
Bi'dh sinn air airidh,
Air ard nan uchdanan,
Bi'dh cruit nan gleanntan
Gu canntair, cuirteasach,
Gu tric gar dusgadh
Le surd gu moch-eiridh.

'S bi'dh 'n crodh, 's na caoirich,
'S an fhraoch ag inealtradh,
'S na gobh'raibh bailg-fhionn,
Gu ball-bhreac, bior-shuileach,
Bi'dh 'n t-al 's an leimnich
Gun cheill, gun chion orra,
Ri gleachd 's ri comhrag
'S a snotach bhileagan.

Bi'dh mise, a's Mairi
Gach la 's na glacagan,
No'n doire geugach
Nan eunan breac-iteach,
Bi'dh cuach, a's smeorach,
Ri ceol 's ri caiseamachd,
'S a gabhail orain

Le sgornain bhlasda dhuinn.

NOTE.-The above is one of the most popular of William Ross' songs, and is well worthy of being reproduced here. The following appreciative notice of it appears in Reid's" Bibliotheca Scoto-Celtica":"William Ross chiefly delighted in pastoral poetry, of which he seized the true and genuine spirit-' Moladh na h-oighe Gaelich,' or his 'Praise of the Highland Maid,' is a masterpiece in this species of composition. It embraces everything that is lovely in a rural scene, and the description is couched in the most appropriate language."-W. M'K.

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HAVING, in the previous paper, given a simple account of this brilliant engagement, and shewn it to have been the result of the employment of superior arms-combined, certainly, with great bravery-the nonsense which has been written regarding it will now fall to be discussed.

The first absurdity seems to have been adopted more or less by every historian, which is, that Mackay's army was struck with dismay when they found that so great a commander as Dundee allowed them to march unmolested through a pass where they could so easily have been cut off, and that his doing so proved that he was confident of his power to defeat them in the open field.

This is certainly the first and only time in the history of British warfare that the soldiery have been credited with profound strategical reflexions; invariably on other occasions they have been considered as having bull dog courage, and confidence in their officers, but nothing more. Had the feeling indeed been ascribed to the officers, it might have been comprehended, but it seems difficult, without violating all other conceptions of the character of the British private soldier, to accept it. Donald Bane, in his account of the engagement, never hints at it, although he is so candid in the acknowledgment of his want of nerve on other occasions, that it is impossible to suppose that had he so felt he would not have expressed it.

The question, however, naturally occurs, Where had Dundee given such extraordinary previous proofs of great generalship? He had, indeed, distinguished himself as an active and energetic, possibly cruel, adversary of fugitive Covenanters lurking among hills and bogs, and led a successful charge of cavalry against an almost unresisting foe at Bothwell Bridge; but the only engagement in which he had previously held chief command was at Drumclog, where he was defeated by a group of peasantry, favoured by the nature of the ground; and even his bombastic eulogist, Mr Mark Napier, admits that General Dalziel, his superior in command, considered that he acted with unwarrantable rashness in hazarding an engagement in a situation so unfavourable to cavalry action, and never after had much confidence in him.

It is, no doubt, true that in the autumn preceding the Battle of Killiecrankie he fully established his character for military ability by a

series of masterly manoeuvres, by which he kept Mackay completely in check, and secured the north of Scotland from occupation by the Government forces; yet, as no engagement of the slightest consequence took place during the course of these manoeuvres, whatever might have been their effect upon an experienced officer like Mackay, it is impossible to suppose that they could have made any impression on the common soldiery.

Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that his fame as a commander had made as great an impression upon the common soldiery of the day as that of Bonaparte upon the British in the Peninsular War, and it could scarcely be expected to do more, what did it amount to?---but that a great commander had committed a great mistake.

Every general who neglects to avail himself of an obvious advantage of position, commits a grave blunder, and in all recorded history, when such blunders are committed, they afford subject of congratulation to the antagonist, rather than inspire him with awe.

According to the theory of the Killiecrankie history, the English at Flodden ought to have been struck with great awe when the Scottish king allowed them to defile unmolested over the bridge across the Till, in place of battering it down in the middle of the march, which he might by all accounts have easily accomplished, and the epithet of an infatuated fool, and one 'reft of his wits, which has been so justly applied to James the Fourth for his conduct on that occasion, when applied to an imagined similar exploit of Dundee's, is altered into an eulogy of a profound strategical conception.

Mr Mark Napier, whose far-searching eye has penetrated into this, as well as many other millstones, has discovered that it was the result of Dundee's deliberate conviction that he was certain to gain a victory over Mackay in any event, but that if he destroyed him in the Pass, the victory would not have had a sufficiently great moral effect, or impressed the public with an adequate idea of Highland prowess.

This, like the preceding theory, attributes to the surroundings of Killiecrankie an effect which has never been ascribed to other warlike operations; for where, in the annals of history, has it ever been read that when a great military success has been achieved the public have ever concerned themselves with whether it was obtained in fighting without advantage of ground on either side, or whether one party did or did not skilfully avail himself of such natural advantages as rendered his antagonist nearly, if not altogether, helpless?

At this moment one of the great national ballads in Norway celebrates the fact of the Norwegian peasantry having surprised a regiment of Scots mercenaries in a pass, precisely similiar to that of Killiecrankie, and annihilated them with their rifles without the possibility of the Scots making any resistance, as the nature of the ground prevented them from making any effectual reply to the fire of their adversaries, or closing with them, and it is only related of the Scots that they perished more Scotico while firmly and sternly pushing through the defile, without either attempting to break their ranks or surrendering to the enemy.

If any military exploit could be considered devoid of all glory, save of advantage being judiciously taken of the nature of the ground, this surely was one, and yet Norway rang with it for many a long year, and the ballad narrates

How Norway triumphed in her might
O'er the mercenary Scot.

This may certainly be taken as an indication of what public feeling would have been had Dundee assailed and destroyed Mackay at the Pass of Killiecrankie, but it is scarcely in accordance with Mr Napier's theory.

The nature of the ground, and the awful spectacle of the rugged cliffs by which the Pass is surrounded, is alleged to have struck the greatest terror into Mackay's men, which just amounts to this, that Lowland soldiers are incapable of fighting in a wild and rugged country.

At all events, men of such sensitive nerves can never be much depended on as soldiers, in any circumstances, which can hardly be said of the British, and we never heard of its actually taking place, excepting in regard to the Hessians, who refused to march through this very Pass in 1745; but without the best authority, it is pure calumny to charge Mackay's army with any such feelings.

The real facts regarding Mackay's being permitted to pass through the defile unmolested are distinctly stated in the Memoirs of Lochiel, a work unknown to Brown, Chambers, and many other writers (it being then unprinted), and which is characteristically ignored by Mr Napier, whose sensational and transcendental thecries it does not support.

According to the author of Lochiel's Memoirs, Dundee had been obliged to disperse his army, in order to enable them to obtain provisions, and give them the usual time which Highlanders always considered they were entitled to to attend to their domestic affairs.

On learning Mackay's intention to seize Blair Castle, he, with the utmost expedition, collected the forces which were in his vicinity, and marched with all possible despatch to cover that important position. In this he so far succeeded that he reached the Castle before Mackay, but was unable to occupy the Pass so as to prevent Mackay's marching through; and in this way, it may be observed, that each General gained a partial strategical success over his opponent, and sustained a partial defeat. Mackay had succeeded in penetrating the Pass unmolested, but found that Dundee had covered the Castle; while Dundee, although thus far successful, had been unable to interrupt Mackay's progress through the Pass.

Having penetrated the Pass, and learned that Dundee was covering Blair Castle, Mackay felt that it was in the power of his adversary either to accept or decline an engagement, and this he must have foreseen from the first moment he ever thought of penetrating through the Pass, for he could not be ignorant of the general nature of the country, which is such as to render it impossible to force an engagement with an unwilling adversary.

Dundee, who, as is explained in the Memoirs of Lochiel, hesitated till the last moment as to the propriety of risking battle, in order to retain the game in his own hands as long as possible, in place of meeting Mac

kay directly in front, marched along very high ground on the right flank of his adversary, so as to render it impossible that Lowland forces—or, indeed, if the nature of the ground be considered, any troops whatever— could compel an engagement.

Mr Napier, whose talent for finding mares' nests in which to lodge his heroes is undeniable, has here found one of pre-eminent magnitude. Having, as already explained, discovered that Dundee was certain of victory, he represents him as proceeding to make assurance doubly sure, by taking his adversary in flank, and this, according to the profound military strategy developed in Mr Napier's mind, Dundee accomplished by directing his march towards Mackay's right, in place of mecting him in front, thereby taking him in flank, and thus, as Mr Napier emphasises by capitals, giving his adversary "checkmate"; and the proof of this is taken from Mackay's own Memoirs, who says that, seeing Dundee appear on the heights a long way from him, formed his line by a "quart de conversion to the right"-A " quart de conversion" being what is now termed a wheel, by which a line is formed to the right or left, in a direction perpendicular to its former position; therefore, if a body of men is marching in any column of divisions of either squadrons, companies, or sections, with the right or left in front, the line can be formed by a wheel either to the right or left. If the right be in front, and the divisions wheeled to the left, the line is formed precisely in its original relative position; but if the divisions be wheeled to the right, the line is equally formed, but the relative position of the divisions is inverted, and vice versa if the left be in front, but in any case, if the quart de conversion be made, the line is formed, and the column is not taken in flank. It is only when an assailing force makes its attack before the quart de conversion can be effected that the epithet of having been taken in flank can be applied.

It is perfectly true that an adversary marching upon the flank of a column may, without tactically taking it in flank, force it to form in line. upon most disadvantageous ground, and thus obtain a great advantage of position in the subsequent front-to-front onset; but it appears that in the present instance no such advantage was gained, as Mackay admits that he drew up his line on very fair ground for receiving an attack, although it would have been difficult for him from thence to have assailed Dundee, whose great object to the last seems to have been to retain the option of declining battle.

It appears indeed, from Lochiel's Memoirs, that it was at the last determined to engage very much from the fact of its being known that Mackay was deficient both in cavalry and artillery, and it was thought that in this way the engagement would be reduced to a simple tactical contest between musket and bayonet, and broadsword and target, and the Highland chiefs believed that so great was the tactical superiority of their mode of fighting, that they had a better chance (not that they believed it a certainty, as Mr Napier holds) by fighting Mackay, who had so great a superiority of numbers, but unsupported by cavalry and artillery, than by waiting till their own reinforcements arrived, which would have reduced the inequality of their numbers, but given Mackay the chance of being reinforced by cavalry and artillery.

Mackay, who seems to have lived so long abroad that he, to a certain

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