Several of our officers who had the advantage of influence, finding the affairs we were likely to be engaged in not at all to their taste, sought and found staff and other employments at Simpheropol and in the interior, that took them out of danger in the event of another battle like that of Inkerman, for they did not like the idea of again meeting the English and French in the field. These men were all Russians; not a single Pole shirked a duty or refused to meet the enemy's bayonets. In Simpheropol it became very easy to obtain a certificate of a wound that incapacitated the possessor for military service; the average price was about 400 silver roubles ; many availed themselves of this.

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CHAPTER VII.

FROM NOVEMBER 17TH, 1854, TO MARCH 5TH, 1855.

Chorgoun Its fortifications - Differences of opinion between Gortchakoff and Liprandi Winter-quarters Reconnaissances by the Allies Truth-telling-Russian care for the sick - Vodka distributed A gallant band of volunteers Treatment of Poles in the Russian army - The author's plan to quit the Russian service- The plan carried out- - Arrival at the British headquarters.

ON the 17th of November our brigade was ordered to Chorgoun, and we marched thither on the same day. At the descent of the Mackenzie Heights we were ordered to extend our men as much as possible, so that the Allies might take us for a much larger body of troops than we really were. We reached Chorgoun about four o'clock in the afternoon. The position pointed out for our regiment was before the bridge (Traktir), on the low rising ground, where a redoubt for twelve guns was afterwards constructed. The regiment of Borodino took up a position opposite the ford.

Before our arrival at Chorgoun, the 12th division was stationed there under General Liprandi,

who lived at Chorgoun. The regiments of this division occupied the same positions they had gained on the 25th of October. The Hussar brigade of the 6th cavalry division was on the left bank of the river, opposite the regiment of Borodino, with two sotnias of Cossacks. Prince Gortchakoff I., who commanded all the troops in this position, lived at the village of Karlovka. The men of the 12th division had many hardships to support, as there was no water on the ground they occupied; consequently the kitchens were near the canal, and the food was carried to the men in casks or camp-kettles, as the soldiers were never allowed day or night to quit their

arms.

From the 18th to the 27th of November we remained here. Prince Gortchakoff I. was much occupied in fortifying the position of Chorgoun, so that the men of our brigade were employed some upon the works themselves, and others in preparing gabions and fascines. The idea of the Prince was to fortify Chorgoun and then withdraw for the winter the troops that were on the left bank of the river. He said the position of Chorgoun was of the greatest importance, since it kept the enemy from the road to Korales and Bakchi Sarai. The fortifications were as follows: -opposite the bridge, and in front of our regi

ment, a redoubt was constructed for twelve fieldpieces; opposite the ford, near the bald hill, at the foot of the Chorgoun hills, on which was the Chorgoun telegraph, a battery for eight guns; a little above the ford, at the foot of the bald hill, another battery for eight guns, six of which would bear on the stone bridge and the other two on the river. A battery was erected in the ravine of Karlovka above the village. Besides these batteries three parallel trenches connected by zigzags were thrown up on the hill of the telegraph. Notwithstanding these labours we were obliged to do the duties of the advanced posts every third or fourth night.

General Liprandi wished to fortify the position in a very different manner. He said that the works thrown up by Gortchakoff were useless but that good batteries ought to be erected on the hills on the left bank of the river, as on that ground a battle must be fought in the spring. Prince Gortchakoff would not consent to leave any troops on the left bank, as he said the swelling of the waters of the river in the spring would cut off their retreat, to prevent which General Liprandi said it would only be necessary to erect two bridges across the river. Gortchakoff I. and Liprandi could never agree; while the General of our division, Kiriakoff, agreed

with the Prince in everything, for he commanded the 6th corps, of which our division formed part.

The works of Chorgoun were indeed of little use. In the first place, the redoubt that ought to have enfiladed the bridge did not answer the purpose for which it was intended, as it was too high up the hill and consequently too far off. It was also easy to be taken in flank; and, as it was a closed work, there was not room for twelve guns with their horses and tumbrils--not to mention a battalion of infantry that ought to hold it as well as the artillerymen. The Prince wanted our men to erect their huts inside this redoubt. The batteries at the ford were better, but useless, as the position might have been gained without coming under their fire. The battery behind Karlovka was the best of all, perhaps; only in an attack, if the enemy had pressed on, it would have been extremely difficult to save the guns out of it. What the trenches were intended for no one knew, unless it was that Prince Gortchakoff thought he should frighten the Allies by his earthworks without any guns. But the chief blunder was in overlooking a hill on the left bank of the river, that completely commands the position of Chorgoun up to the foot of the Mac