of rights are sought, with or without accompanying redressive relief. In addition to this demonstration of its usefulness where it has long been in force, the practice contains obvious theoretical advantages. Much of our modern legislation represents an effort to make more definite the requirements of the general rules of the common law in their application to constantly changing business, economic and social conditions. Business men, particularly, are not satisfied merely to know that they will be able to obtain the protection of the courts to secure relief for wrongs done to them, and to resist claims for wrong alleged to have been done by them. Modern business requires speed and security as the basis for its transactions. Men want to know what they can do and what they cannot do before acting. They want to know that action taken in reliance upon a statute, or upon a contract or other written instrument, may not be set aside by subsequent judicial interpretation. Obviously, judicial procedure which permits them to obtain an authoritative declaration in advance of action will afford them the assurance of security and will enable them to avoid the doubt and delay of redressive litigation after the act. On the other hand, these obvious advantages of the declaratory practice must not be permitted to blind us to disadvantages which will readily occur to the judge and practicing lawyer. There is something substantial and dependable in our common law system which defers the application of the law to particular circumstances until after there have arisen facts and conditions which actuate parties representing conflicting interests to bring to the attention of the judge the exact situation to which he is called upon to apply the principles of the law. At no time prior to the development of an actual controversy between these conflicting interests, is it likely that there will be presented to a judicial tribunal any such real, compelling facts as those which are developed in litigation to prevent immediately threatened damage or to redress damage actually done. There is danger that, in place of the real facts which are now brought before the court, the declaratory judgment practice will call for judicial decisions based upon suggestions and suppositions as to probable facts. Decisions by the courts as to the meaning of written instruments, as to the interpretation and application of statutes, and, generally, as to the rights of individuals in proceedings which anticipate the development of an actual controversy, are likely to develop something of the indefiniteness and confusion which characterize the line of constitutional decisions which determine the due process of statutory interferences with personal liberty and private property. Our courts have long been criticised for alleged inconsistency in principle, or erroneous appreciation of the facts involved in the due process cases. Insofar as such criticism is justified, the judicial delinquency is largely due to the indefiniteness and unsatisfactory nature of the facts before the court. Many of the facts essential to a proper decision cannot be proved but must be left to individual opinion or speculation. Insofar as the declaratory practice greatly increases the number of cases in which a judicial tribunal is called upon to intrepret and declare the law on the basis of assumed or probable, rather than real and developed, facts, it must be regarded as unfortunate. This is particularly true in cases involving rights and duties under statutes where the declaration of right may seriously affect so many private interests not adequately presented to the court. There are, however, instances, especially in the case of rights dependent upon private contracts and wills, in which the usefulness and desirability of the declaratory practice can be conceded. The consequences of its application to wider fields, such, for example, as the determination of rights and duties under statutes-which seems clearly intended by the Wisconsin statute-will be demonstrated by experience. As pointed out in the previous reports of this committee, there is a growing tendency on the part of the public, through their representatives in the legislature, to participate more actively in disciplining members of the Bar for engaging in improper practices. So far as this tendency produces legislation restoring the efficacy of the champerty and maintenance laws, it will be beneficial to the profession. This year several states have made it a criminal offence for lawyers to employ "runners" or for laymen to solicit claims on a contingent basis. Not only in "personal injury" cases, but also in the more lucrative and dignified corporation cases, members of the Bar sometimes forget that they are not public officers whose duty it is to seek out victims of injustice and vindicate their rights, but are officers of the court sworn to represent the individual who, without stimulation, seeks assistance in asserting or protecting his legal rights before a judicial tribunal. The relative powers and jurisdiction of the federal and state governments are seriously affected by "regulatory" and "prohibitory" taxes contained in the Revenue Law of 1918. The child labor law, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is in effect put back on the federal statute books in the form of a prohibitory tax on the net profits of plants in which children are employed. Dealers in narcotic drugs are subjected to a tax which is merely a peg on which to hang a system of federal regulation of their business. It is interesting to note that in this latter case the federal government is making use of the only power available to it for carrying out the international agreement for regulation of the opium trade. If the child labor tax is upheld, it is probable that similar resort to the taxing power will be had if, under the treaty with Germany, Congress is called upon to enact labor legislation to conform to international standards. If these so-called tax acts-which in effect are not revenue measures at all-are upheld, the resulting interference with the reserved powers of the states will be far more serious than would have been possible under such a regulation of interstate commerce as that held unconstitutional in the child labor case. An interesting innovation in the published volume of the session laws is introduced by Oklahoma. Enactments which have been adapted from the laws of other states are annotated in footnotes which direct the reader to such statutes, thereby affording opportunity for examination of the interpretation, if any, which they have received in other jurisdictions. Much of the statute law enacted by our state legislatures is based upon or literally copied from other state or federal laws. The practitioner who may not be a student of political science in touch with the modern statutes of states other than his own will be greatly benefited by this simple statement of the fact that a new enactment which he may be called upon to interpret has been in force in another jurisdiction in which it may have received judicial interpretation. It was manifestly impossible for your committee at the time this report was submitted to select from the great mass of legislation enacted by Congress and the 44 legislative sessions of this year all laws of general and permanent importance and to This review covers the Acts of Congress passed by the final session of the 65th Congress and those enactments of the 66th Congress available on November 1st, and the enactments then available of the state legislatures which were in session this year. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Organization of Courts. Provision "for the more speedy and efficient transaction of the business of the various circuit courts" of the state is contained in Oregon (242), which authorizes the chief justice of the Supreme Court to direct any circuit court judge, irrespective of the circuit for which he was selected, to hold court in any circuit where the condition of the calendar requires his services. The act is intended not merely to empower the chief justice to make the most efficient use of the judicial machinery of the state, but it specifically declares that he "shall take care" that the judges are so assigned as to transact promptly the judicial business. A general investigation of the judicial organization and practice in the state is provided for by Massachusetts (223), which creates a judicature commission to report to the 1920 session of the legislature. Declaratory Judgments. The most important legislation of the year affecting the administration of justice is the so-called declaratory judgment act. Florida (7857) authorizes courts of equity to take jurisdiction of an application for "the determination of any question of construction arising under " a deed, will, contract in writing, or other instrument in writing in which the petitioner claims to be interested, and for a declaration of his rights," whether or not further relief is or could be claimed," and provides that "such declaration shall have the force of a final decree in chancery." It should be noted that this statute authorizes a declaration of the rights of the petitioner only. It is, therefore, no more extensive in its application, and expressly authorizes a less comprehensive declaration of the effect of the written instrument, than Section 7 of the New Jersey Chancery Practice Act of 1915 (Ch. 116). That act authorized applications to a court of equity by any per |