Self-Knowing AgentsLucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action. |
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able accept actions active agent agent’s awareness allows appeal approach argue argument assume basic basis belief bodily actions bodily awareness body capacity capacity for first-person carry Chapter claim clear component concept conscious consider constituted creature demonstrative dependent determined discussion distinct Evans example explain expressive face fact failed first-person reference follows further give given going governed grounds guaranteed hold identify immediately imply independent intentions involve judgements judging kind knowledge matter means mental movements moving nature object offered ourselves pain particular perceive perceptual perhaps person physical play possibility presented problem properties psychological question raised rational reason received reflexive relation representation respect result role rule seems self-ascription self-consciousness self-knowledge sense someone successful sufficient suggestion suppose thing thought true trying understand utterances