rather a pure trochee,=

'); (4) on the last syllable only

either when it is known or obscurely felt to be a syllable formed by the contraction of two into one, hence really etymologically composed of rise and fall, as is shown in the sign

(musically represented or P), in which cases very early

contractions have been retained in the feeling of the language (as, that of -v from -áwv, cf. Lat. -árum, found even in the Sanscrit), or when, as an inflection-ending, it receives special emphasis (a grave inflection-ending). Here belong, in the noun, in the 1st and 2d Decl., the terminations of the oblique cases of the genitive and dative, in distinction from those of the casus recti, which receive the simple grave tone (on which see p. 34, note): 1st Decl. -s, -î -aîv, -ŵv, -aîs, but -ǹ, -à -aì, -às; 2d decl. -oû, -ô, -oîv, -ŵv, -oîs, but -i, -où, -oùs; Attic 2d Decl. - -ων, -ὤν, -ς, but ὡς, -ών, - -ῷ, ὡς (only the Gen. sing. deviates from the rule); contracted forms of the 2d Decl. -oûs, -oî, -oîv, -ŵv, -oîs, but - in the Nom. and Acc. sing. and dual. Here are to be reckoned also some adverbial forms, which strictly, as in all languages, are similar oblique cases; not only those that are commonly counted among this class, in -, -ŷs, -oû, -î for -, -o (in names of places, as locative), as ens, óμoû, eikŷ, but also, as I think, the most common adverbial ending -ws, when the final syllable is accented (cf. the Sanscrit adverbial endings -ût and -ŭsja, the former ablative, the latter genitive of words in -as-os, from which -ws). So in the verb, the grave endings in the simple (shortened) stem of the 2d Aor. Inf. -eîv, Subj. pass. -ŵ, -s, etc., Imp. middle -oû, as also of the so-called 2d Fut. of

1 These are commonly explained by the rules of contraction, and for the recusant Accusative - (instead of - from -óa) an arbitrary analogy, i.e. conformity to the Nom., is assumed. But by reference to the above general law of declensions the difficulty is solved without doing any violence. The difficult Vocative o, found with the Nom. & (whose diphthong also in Sanscrit undergoes a gunification, i.e. a diphthongification, of the i and u in the Voc. in ê, ô ai, au (eu)) has the circumflex probably on account of the diphthong (which, as being compound, is everywhere held to be longer than a simple long syllable, and accordingly can more easily draw the circumflex to itself), as eû from eùs (in an open syllable, made such by the dropping of the final s).

=

the verbs in A, μ, v, p: -ŵ, -eîs, etc., -eiv, -ŵv, and of the socalled Attic Fut. -, -eis, etc.; whose strong circumflex endings I would derive, not, with Buttmann, from contraction after the previous rejection of the s in the future, but from the weak or pure stem and an inflection peculiar to itself, and independent of that of the 1st Fut. (as of the 1st Aor.).1 As to the cases in which this accent stands on monosyllables which seem to be neither contractions nor inflection-endings, the interrogatives πῶς, ποῖ, που, etc. are doubtless to be taken as case-endings, like the corresponding adverbial-endings; in other cases, the antithesis-as vov and the enclitic vvv-and other emphasis, or an effort to make up for the smallness of the word by a counter-weight, as Tûρ, pûs, etc., may have led to it. Moreover it cannot but be that in final syllables or monosyllables which have also the downward slide the boundary between the two is often indistinct, and our present means of investigation allow us to come to no determinate result.

1 The very similarity and close relation to one another of the 1st Aor. and 1st Fut. on the one hand, and the 2d Aor. and 2d Fut. on the other, and on the contrary the total difference of the formations on both sides, clearly shows that we have before us here two different modes of formation of the Pret. and Fut., which go independently alongside of each other. In the Aor. this is already acknowledged; but it is true also of the Fut. The one, 1st Aor. and 1st Fut., is formed by welding on the auxiliary verb as (esse) in the corresponding forms, as is now evident from the Sanscrit, and repeats itself in almost all languages. The other, 2d Aor. and 2d Fut., however, is formed from the pure stem in its simplest form with strong mode-endings; the former often with a reduplication in front (so in Sanscrit); the latter has no analogy in Sanscrit, but has it in Latin, and is plainly, in strictness, a Subjunctive (like the Lat. Fut. in the 3d and 4th Conj.), which, as is well known, is most closely related to the Future. That those strong endings with the circumflex however, cannot have arisen merely from contraction, is shown by the Inf. of the 2d Aor. act. -eîv (Dor. -év or -, with -ev, -ny in the Pres.), which can be derived from no conceivable contraction, and by the Imp. middle -ob, which at least does not conform to the rule of contraction, and points to an -éro, consequently (as in -è of the Imp. act. of many words, in -éσeas of the Inf. middle, and -wv, -els of the Part.) can be explained only by an independent tendency of the accent towards the formation-endings, i.e. a tendency lying in the character of the formation. Since, nevertheless, in the case of - there are in Ionic corresponding resolved forms, it is obvious how little reliance can be placed on this argument in the other cases.

ARTICLE II.

THE DIVINE AND HUMAN NATURES IN CHRIST.

BY REV. EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, D.D., LATE PROFESSOR IN EAST WINDSOR

THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

THE fundamental idea of Christianity is a deed, rather than a doctrine or a law. As a moral force it had its beginning in the faith of Abel. As a historic fact it began in that marvellous birth at Bethlehem, in which God revealed himself to men in man's nature. Any adequate philosophy of Christianity must, therefore, take into account this central fact. It must be able to construe it in all its modes and tenses; its logical and chronological relations; its vital forces, simple and compound, ethical and psychological. But who can thus compass this most stupendous work of God? Who can ascend to its sublime heights, or sound the depths of its wisdom and love?

When we propound the doctrine of man we have a single idea, an identical and finite organism, and in a department where consciousness helps us and experience gives us light. Even when God is our theme the subject, though illimitable, is homogeneous and a unit. But when we come to study the person of Christ our Lord, we pass from the simple to the complex, from the difficult elements of the problem to its more difficult solution. Ideas, not only distinct, but metaphysically opposite, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, require to be conciliated in the most wonderful of all unities and agencies.

Just here comes the real "conflict of the ages." Upon this battle-field the contest between faith and false philosophy, reason and revelation, has been sharpest. More and more the opposing forces are drawn towards this centre, where all

1 Concio ad Clerum; delivered at the Commencement of Yale College, July 26, 1864, on the text John i. 1-14.

VOL. XXIV. No. 93.

for the church is to be won or lost. The deniers of miracle and of mystery array themselves more and more defiantly against this greatest of miracles and profoundest of mysteries. Never, perhaps, has the thinking world been more attracted to the founder of Christianity, as the problem of history as well as theology, than in the present age. Germany, that vast mental kaleidoscope, where beliefs and disbeliefs revolve and sparkle with the fascinations of genius; where the philosophies, atheistic and pantheistic, have been employed in coroners' inquests and reputed post-mortem examinations of the Christian religion, and in digging its grave; where the schools, serious and sardonic, have been intent on pulling down the kingdom of heaven, the land of Luther, notwithstanding these adverse things, has yet, during the last halfcentury, produced a Christological literature rich in hermeneutical and historical research beyond that of almost any other age or nation.

But, in entering on my subject, I have the fullest conviction that, while the light elicited by these discussions is shining more directly than ever upon him whom we call Saviour and Lord, philosophy cannot interpret for us either him or his mission. Science cannot do it. The life of Christ must explain for us the mystery of his person; and only the peculiarity of his person is able to account for the peculiar facts of his life. He himself is the key to himself, and to the whole evangelic history, of which he is the central and controlling figure. Christ in the Bible, Christ in the church, is "the light he gives for us to see him by."

The complex idea of the God-man is made up of the separate ideas of God and man. These two factors bespeak, therefore, our careful examination. No essential element of either can be left out of the inquiry without disturbing the process, and no foreign one can be brought into it without prejudicing the result.

I. My first inquiry relates to the Divine Nature in Christ. Let me in the outset free my subject from the incubus of a certain philosophic pre-supposition, that a conception of the

Infinite by the finite is impossible. It is an objection to this assumption, that it forecloses all inquiry, and at the startingpoint gives speculative Atheism as the foregone conclusion. It banishes from the province of thought an idea, which, though it may be vague, is yet more positive than any other, and which has determined, and is determining more than all others, the great problems of philosophy and of faith, — the idea of the Infinite. By what force does that which is inconceivable rule thus absolutely, and mould our intellectual and religious processes? If God cannot be thought, how can he be revealed or known? And if he cannot be known, how can it be true that this is "eternal life " to know God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent? We are brought by this supposition to the wail of universal orphanage that sweeps over Atheism and Pantheism as really as over the Christian faith. For if we cannot conceive of the Infinite to affirm his existence, we cannot to deny it, or to affirm that everything is God. If the idea of personality," as the Pantheist asserts, "loses all significance beyond the province of the finite," so, for the same reason, does the idea of being or thing. Does the infinite baffle us here? It baffles us everywhere. We cannot, it is true, comprehend the Absolute, but we can apprehend him. Incomprehensible and inconceivable are not synonomous. I cannot grasp Mont Blanc in my palms; but I can look on its towering summit from the distance. From its sunny vale and the surrounding peaks I can survey its rugged acclivities and drink in all its grand and glittering beauties. In like manner the infinite-divine is cognizable to the finite-human. For to know the Infinite is not to limit or measure him, but to distinguish him from all that is capable of limitation or measurement.

The significance of the term "Logos," or "the Word," must be sought in the drift of the Christian scriptures, of which the first verse of John's Gospel is an epitome: "In the beginning was the Word." But what is the beginning ('Ev ȧpx?) here referred to? Was it the opening of the old dispensation or of the new?

The commencement of the