without followers, and very often big bands of soldiers with no chiefs.1 Indeed, the Republican-Radical and Radical-Socialist party, the largest Parliamentary group for many years until the elections of 1919, had to go frequently outside its own group of members to give support to other men as ministers. This absence of party leaders is a very striking difference between the French parliamentary organization and the English system.

Thirdly, within the House the groups sit in a semi-circle facing the Tribune from which the members speak. The great party names of Liberal and Conservative, Republican and Democrat, or the allinclusive Government and Opposition, are not the great marks of political difference in France. The groups are classified, in the first place, according to where they sit. On the Left are the Liberals of all shades, from the Revolutionary Socialists to those members who think that reform is good sometimes. In the Centre are the groups that sway this way or that according to circumstances: they have a distinct political belief, and strive to achieve "le juste milieu." On the Right are the Conservatives and the Monarchists, some of whom are still as irreconcilable to the Republican form of government as are many of the Socialists to the present economic organization of the world except that in Russia. Further than this, the groups within the broad denomination of Left, Right, Centre, Left Centre, Extreme Right and Left, etc., are subdivided, in policy, into smaller groups which have names which are supposed to denote their political differences. But few people can unravel the real differences, e.g., what is the apparent difference between "Independent Group" and " Group of Deputies not inscribed on any list of Groups?

There is thus a certain confusion in French parliamentary life, a confusion which does not arise, originally, from any attempt at coalition (which is the cause of confused thinking in England at the present moment), but from actual differences of political opinion, which, though perhaps imperceptible to the ordinary person, and especially a foreigner, are yet sufficient to keep the groups in independence, openly declared immediately interest makes it pay any group or groups to express their difference openly. "There are probably very few persons in France except journalists and professional politicians who could pass an examination successfully upon the differences between the political principles and aims professed respectively by any two of the above parties, or at any rate by any two of the seven of them which are acknowledged as belonging to the Left, with the exception of the Unified Socialists."

1" In England, leadership is very manifest, concentrated, although the democratic movement of the last forty years has profoundly changed its character. In France, leadership is less clear, less striking. It is the mass of veterans of political struggles, journalists of renown, already celebrated parliamentarians or young talented men full of promise who, by their articles in the press, their speeches at the tribune or in the country, by their reports in the preparation of very important laws, bring themselves to the general notice of the nation, and more particularly to that of their political co-religionists."-Jacques, op. cit., pp. 19, 20.

2 See New Europe, October 30th, 1919, p. 57.

Why have I laboured this question of confusion of groups and the lack of clear organization? It is because democracy, preoccupied with getting a living, and ill-informed on many things, must place a certain amount of trust in its elected governors. That trust can only be placed properly in a candidate who represents some body of doctrine, and who has some definite mode of attacking problems of public administration as they arise. The machinery of parties has, in Anglo-Saxon countries, provided the ordinary citizens with something simple and permanent, "something which can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognized at successive elections as being the same thing that was loved and trusted before . . ."1 There is a label to a party, and to a party there is a clearly recognizable attitude of mind towards problems of government. In France, however, the differences between groups have so little meaning to the country at large that the candidates often present themselves to their constituencies with some vague label, and decide only after election what group they will join, or whether to form a new group altogether. In short, the demarcations of opinion within. the Chamber of Deputies are hardly drawn from opinion in the country." Government is carried on by men united in a Ministry made by extremely private negotiations. An English party leader would be horror-stricken to see his men leave him to take office in a new ministry composed of hostile groups; members of French groups do so without reproach. There is no party discipline and an organization of Whips as this is known in England. Office in England comes from standing by your party: often in France by deserting it. This has tended to make personal considerations take precedence of political considerations in the government of France. The elections of 1919 were fought on something like a big twoparty election. This was not because the French had learnt that their method of organization might be improved, but because the issues of the war and post-war problems had set practically all parties against the Socialists. The backwardness of France in the matter of social legislation had resulted in a great outcry on the part of the Socialists, and the latter, too, had been turning towards Bolshevik political theory as an alternative to their "decadent Parliament," just as many people look with dismay at the breakdown of free Parliamentary government in England. The ordinary bourgeois Republicans, and especially those who are not radical in tendency, are now put on the defensive, for they have property. They were therefore determined to unite against the Socialists and Radicals. The article of the attack was-" A struggle against Bolshevism, against all sorts of dictatorships, and against all forms of violence." The anti-Socialist bloc won a great victory. This bloc supports 1 Human Nature in Politics, Prof. Graham Wallas, p. 83 et seq.

2 Cf. confirmation of this view in Jacques, op. cit., p. 33: "Life inside the assemblies has its own laws, it is dominated by considerations of opportunity and personal arrangements, by the tyranny of the question of confidence and the fear of opening, sometimes in grave situations, a ministerial crisis."

See Dell, op. cit., pp. 142, 143.

M. Millerand in so far as the Prime Minister in France is now the tool of the President. Their policy is to " avoid raising questions which would divide us "-in the twentieth century, after a great war! The Unified Socialists were left with 68 seats out of 626. Outside any groups were what were called seven wild men,' "des sauvages," among whom was the Prime Minister, destined soon after to be President of France. This isolation in itself is a fine illustration of French group life-the Prime Minister belonged to no party such a situation is quite normal in the organization of

groups.

III.

How does all this affect control of the Ministry? The Ministers are responsible to the Chambers; more importantly, perhaps, to the Chamber of Deputies. To maintain its power the Ministry must have a working majority, and since it cannot get it from any one party or group in normal times, the groups must combine for the purpose of supporting a Ministry. They do so, after repeated conferences and negotiations between deputies and groups, possible ministers and the Presidents of the Republic and the House. On what terms? At ordinary times it is recognized that a group may withdraw its support in the House on any measure or in any debate on the question of confidence, whenever it wishes. There are no Whips to obey, no party allegiance to respect, just the whim of the group to follow.

Certain important consequences follow:

Firstly, the dependence of the Ministry in France on the Deputies is very real. Much more so than in England, where the Cabinet may threaten a dissolution and involve the members in a new election with all its cost and uncertainty of success. The Ministry in France is, therefore, bound hand and foot to the demands of the component groups. The Ministry has no instrument of retaliation, because the Chamber cannot be dissolved until its four years' tenure runs out. The Government sometimes brings forward Bills knowing that it will have to withdraw them through insufficient support in order to get the sympathy of some insistent group.1

Secondly, the ministers must please all the groups, so that they have to go to the extreme of compromise and accommodation to secure their support. Bribery by the offer of jobs for friends and relatives is very common. This means weak government and slack administration. That this is no imaginary evil will be seen by the

1 See Barthélemy, Problème de la Compétence dans la Démocratie, p. 119. WaldeckRousseau (Private Papers): "We have been condemned to adopt, as a rule superior to all others, the necessity of not falling. We have had to make concessions of principle while exerting ourselves to avoid their realization. One day, to avoid downfall which menaced us through an interpellation by Klotz and Magniaude, we were obliged to introduce a measure for income-tax; another day we were forced to take sides in the question of workers' pensions. We could not establish the income-tax, nor realize actually, as it was then conceived, the measure on pensions."

following quotation from a speech by M. Millerand in answer to one of his critics when he asked the House for a vote of confidence in his Ministry:

I have heard it said that the composition of the Cabinet has caused a certain uneasiness. If such uneasiness exists, allow me to calm it. We are not all men of one party. To serve the Republic, to serve France, I invite the help of all.

I am not going to be the "prisoner " of any faction. Do you suppose that the Cabinet which is offered you, after all the lessons of the war, has any intention of engaging again in that internal discord, or of adopting those administrative practices against which more than one of us have strongly protested. This Government comes before you as one of harmony and efficient work. And what the Government is, that will its subordinates be. Prefects, sub-prefects, officials of every sort have one duty and one only-administration. There can be no suggestion that any official of any class, in any circumstances whatever, will so far lower himself as to become agent of any person or group of persons. If he does he shall pay dearly.1

Thirdly, since the members of the groups are bound largely by personal considerations (the possibility of getting office later), and the groups are free to desert the ministry, the ministries are very unstable. Some ministries have lasted a day: others about two years; the average is something like ten months in office per ministry. In forty-seven years, from 1871 to 1918, there were sixty-eight ministries. Groups are formed by Deputies whose intellect and personality would never give them a chance of becoming "ministrable," i.e., possible holders of office, otherwise. Indeed, the number of groups is largely increased because Deputies will not attach themselves to those groups already existing and containing a large number of potential Prime Ministers.

Fourthly, though the Ministries change and the Prime Minister usually goes, most often about half the members join the new Ministry, and it is a common thing for a defeated Prime Minister to be succeeded by one of his own colleagues. There is much intrigue, partly as a cause, partly as an effect of this. "A change of Ministry is often nothing more than a redistribution of the parts in the same troupe of actors. They are the same who again come before the public, after having changed costume in the wings.”2 It is known in France as the waltz of portfolios," and must have a serious effect on control of the Civil Service.

There seems to be much less loyalty among members of a Ministry in France than there is in England. As a matter of fact, good party and Cabinet government is almost impossible unless the members of the Ministry " mean the same thing," unless they really do have some common ideas on policy before they commence seeking political arrangements. One man will respect the parliamentary prospects of another if their fundamental outlook on politics is much the same, and if a common party with common traditions binds them

1 Chamber of Deputies, January 22nd, 1920, Political Review of the Foreign Press, Vol. I, No. 13, p. 365. * Barthélemy, Problème de la Compétence dans la Démocratie, p. 123.

together; but where people join with unlike, from motives of immediate expediency, the result must be very largely affected merely by the personal sympathies and antipathies and not by a strong desire for the common welfare. Thus the true view of Party is lost. Parties should be instruments of power, and not the end of power. Personalities should enter only in so far as personal desires, ambitions, and character are instrumental in securing the welfare of the community. In fact, in France personalities do enter strongly through the group system and its underlying cause: a certain fierceness of character in politics.

The result is that legislation of any great importance is scanty, and does not command great respect; many reforms are left untouched in such a régime, and the administration, which should be held in firm control by the elected authorities, is left to a large extent uncontrolled. This leads to a final judgment of the system : it is essentially undemocratic, for though the people elected the men, they did not elect them to do the things they afterwards do, or to form the particular combinations of groups for control of a Government that they do.

The principle that government should be by the consent of the governed by means of a Parliamentary Executive may not be accepted by all people, but where it is accepted it would be agreed, probably, that the ideal connection between the people and the executors of policy, and, nowadays, the initiators of legislation, would be close, continuous and direct, through a medium, the Ministry, immediately responsive to the most delicately expressed desires of the governed. France falls short of this ideal by a long way. In England personality is linked with measures, and what may almost certainly be the future Government comes before the nation for acceptance or rejection at a General Election. That is to say, the Ministry is made because it represents a majority. In France, through the group system, the Ministry looks out for a majority after formation, and gets to work without express popular mandate for that particular combination of men and measures. That is, the kind of government is remote from the opinion of the people. Instead of the policy being anterior to the grant of power, it tends to be subsequent.

Thus the French, who are intensely jealous of arbitrary power and an uncontrolled Executive, have no certain control over the central machine. Responsibility is lost where the person or body of persons who wield power cannot be definitely pointed out, where you have no great understandable Parties. Consequently the French have to look to other means to balance the evils of their particular political organization by groups, and those means, into which I cannot go now, are two: the Parliamentary Commissions and the Interpellation, both of which have obvious merits and defects. Much of the trouble arises from the fact that actually there is no one in France with the power to dissolve the House when