Induction is anterior to deduction, as we must reason from the facts collected by perception up to principles before we reason from principles. These two modes of reasoning may be said to go hand in hand, the one verifying the conclusions deduced by the other. The science of mechanics presents a remarkable instance of their combined action. They have given rise to two opposite methods of instruction-analysis and synthesis. The synthetical or deductive method of reasoning is principally confined to the exact sciences: but the analytical or inductive method has a more extensive application; it forms the basis of reasoning in the common affairs of life and the acquisition of experience; it guides us in the study of languages and in all experimental and speculative investigations. Physical science is based upon inductions drawn from observation of the world without, and metaphysical science upon inductions similarly drawn from reflection upon the world within. Analogy, the source of induction, is the act of judgment by which we discover the conformity which exists between things. It is analogy which represents natural effects by onomatopoeia, deduces metaphysical terms from the names of sensible objects, multiplies the expression of thought by the inflections and arrangement of words, adorns discourse by imaginative conceptions; or, in the imitation of nature, modifies her forms and colours; in a word, it is the exhaustless source from which springs everything that is beautiful in language or the arts. Analogy is especially the light of language-it presides over its formation; facilitates its intelligibility, use, and acquisition. When custom is doubtful, analogy decides. Tracing analogies is the first exercise of the judgment, and the kind of reasoning best understood and most practised by children. The frequent opportunities which they have of applying this mode of reasoning in acquiring their own language, make it so instantaneous an act of the mind, that, for the most part, it remains unnoticed. It is by the errors into which the irregularities of language often lead them, that the correctness of their judgment, in this respect, may be observed: they hear houses, liked, greater, fattest, and will imitate these forms in other words, saying, by analogy, mouses, striked, gooder, baddest. This mental operation is very valuable in instruction, and especially in the acquiring of language; in fact, without analogy, it would be utterly impossible to suit the forms of expression to the evervarying circumstances of social and intellectual life. By analogy we pass from the known to the unknown, and thus extend the sphere of our knowledge. Socrates founded his method of teaching chiefly on analogy. Generalisation is another act of the judgment, which forms an essential element of induction. By its means we classify individual truths under general propositions, and are, thereby, aided in retaining them and fixing their mutual relations. By abstraction we consider one property common to many objects; by generalisation we bring together the various objects which possess that property. Generalisation is therefore dependent on abstraction: there may be abstraction without generalisation; but there cannot be generalisation without abstraction. The powers of abstraction and generalisation should be carefully cultivated, as they aid in the analysis of thought and contribute to the correctness of the judgment. They preside over classifications, which form the basis of all sciences, especially of the inductive, and considerably assist the memory in all the departments of knowledge. These powers act a prominent part in the acquisition of language; for the clear comprehension of generic and specific terms, which constitute the great bulk of its nomenclature, entirely depends on the classification of things into genera, species, and individuals. As the deficiency or absence of one physical faculty leads to a greater exercise and consequent development of the others, so the weakness of one of the mental powers leads to an increase of energy in the others. Hence, persons deficient in memory, usually endeavouring to supply that deficiency by the exercise of reasoning, often surpass in abstractive powers and intellectual acquirements those who, being endowed with greater facility of memory, employed, in their youth, this faculty to the prejudice of the others. Exercise renders the reasoning process so rapid, that we draw conclusions, as it were, intuitively, without feeling conscious of the chain of ideas by which the mind has arrived at them. When the power of judging and reasoning rightly arises really from intuition, and is applied to the common affairs of life, it takes the name of good sense, an expression which, although bearing some affinity to understanding and reason, must not be confounded with them. These latter terms are of higher import: they both imply the combined action of the mental powers; but understanding is more particularly the capacity of logical reasoning, whereas reason is essentially the power of intuition. Logical acuteness, or a capacity for reasoning out principles, is the characteristic of a good understanding; a vivid natural aptitude for the discovery of truth independently of patient ratiocination is the charactistic of reason. However, the fallibility of individual understanding and reason renders an appeal to either insufficient as a test of truth: hence, tradition and the testimony of mankind are usually regarded as principles of appeal superior in authority. Trust in human tradition and testimony is so universal, that private judgment may, for the greater part, be tried and tested by the tone, the convictions, the general consciousness of the age in which we live: individual reason is, after all, but a portion of universal reason. Sound judgment assists moral education by enabling man easily to distinguish good from evil. It prompts him to regulate his conduct according to the various situations in which he may be placed. It produces tranquillity of soul; for it guards against violent emotions, by the mental habit of bestowing in all things the attention which they deserve, of considering them in their true light, and estimating them by their just value. Without rectitude of judgment, man is a slave to prejudice and passion; his memory only exposes his folly; his imagination and sympathies continually lead him astray; his habit of observation multiplies his errors; his spirit of invention and discovery causes his ruin; his reasoning, although it may be logical, by starting from wrong premises, brings him to false conclusions. Even moral qualities often become dangerous when unaccompanied by sound judgment courage degenerates into rashness, indulgence into weakness, frankness into indiscretion, economy into avarice, and religion into superstition or fanaticism. The intellectual faculties exist originally in all men ; but they, not less than the physical and moral, vary in every individual in quality and degree of activity, each giving rise to a variety in consciousness, aptitude, and capacity. Some persons are endowed with greater powers of perception, and others of conception. In some, memory predominates; in others, imagination; and in others, judgment; in many, sensation prevails over reason. One individual receives clearer ideas from sensations of sight, another from those of hearing, and so forth, as the eye, the ear, or the other organs are naturally more active or correct. Some memories retain facts better; others, places; others, words; others, tunes, &c., according to the peculiar energy of the perceptive powers which take cognisance of these different classes of objects. Imagination is in one person more inventive, in another more imitative; some are prone to deductive, others to inductive reasoning. These differences among men are again indefinitely multiplied by the reciprocal influence which the different orders of faculties have over each other: the predominance of certain moral faculties modifies the course of ideas, as the predominance of certain intellectual faculties modifies the affections and inclinations. Hence, the diversity of taste, or genius, as it is called, which is early manifested for different pursuits. The infinite variety of nature, in physical complexion and outward form, is but the symbol of that which marks the spirit within. This remarkable diversity of dispositions and abilities, which is again wonderfully increased by the different exercises to which the faculties are subjected in the varied circumstances of life, and in the different processes of education, is one of the greatest boons which an all-wise and all-bountiful Providence has conferred on social man. With our limited powers, and the immensity of nature before us, moved as we are by different impulses, we attend to different objects, and thus benefit the whole race of mankind by bringing to the mass each individual acquisition. How dull and monotonous would existence be, and how limited and slow the progress of civilisation, if all had the same inclinations, the same pursuits, the same opinions, the same acquirements, and the same mode of life. (3.) SECT. III.-INTELLECTUAL ACQUIREMENTS OR INSTRUCTION. The second part of intellectual education—the acquisition of knowledge-embraces all nature. There exists nothing, from the imperceptible atom to the most sublime object in creationfrom the simplest phenomena of our existence to the impenetrable mysteries in which the Divinity is veiled-that man does not desire to know, or does not make an object of serious study. Such are the wise provisions of the Maker of all things, that not only are the external world and its relations to our constitution so arranged as to hold forth to us every inducement to cultivate our faculties, but the very acquiring of knowledge is the most efficient means by which those faculties can be cultivated and improved. Instruction is the natural nourishment of the mind, and is as necessary for its growth as food is for that of the body. (3.) See Appendix. Intellectual acquirements have been for a long time the sole object of education; but of late the cultivation of the faculties has, on account of its greater importance in childhood, been exclusively recommended by some educationists. The right course lies, we think, between these extremes; the two departments of intellectual training should always be combined. The acquisition of knowledge and the development of the mental faculties lend to each other reciprocal assistance; for, if the mental activity which is employed in the study of any branch of instruction invigorates the faculties, a high intellectual development must, on the other hand, considerably facilitate the acquisition of knowledge. It is by devoting an equal attention to these two points that the end of intellectual education will be gained, that we shall secure to our children inexhaustible sources of enjoyment, means of success in their respective professions, the power of being useful to others, and an honourable place in society. "Knowledge is power," says Bacon; it may be added, knowledge is happiness; for it is only another name for truth, the discovery of which is the object of every study. What pleasures can equal those which flow from this heavenly source? The pursuit of science and literature presents an extensive field of enjoyment in a life of leisure, and of relaxation in a life of business; it cheers the gloom of solitude and the dreariness of sleepless nights; it braves the severest trials of fortune, and alleviates the heaviest affliction. The habit of intellectual industry and patient perseverance which it creates, tends to bring the bodily appetites under the subjection of mental power, and supplies healthy stamina to the growing mind. Every new step made in the pursuit of knowledge ennobles the mind, and brings it nearer to its divine archetype. "Ignorance is the curse of God; Knowledge, the wing wherewith we fly to Heaven." * The possession of knowledge divests us of the prejudices which necessarily result from the ignorance incident to our nature; it elevates us above human weaknesses and vulgar propensities; it attaches us to our fellow-creatures by the facility which it affords of serving them; it subserves morality by calming the effervescence of the passions, and creating habits of serious con * Shakspeare, King Henry VI., 2nd Part, Act 4. |