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No. 13.

Report of Surg. J. Theodore Heard, U. S. Army, Medical Director.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,
September 18, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following brief report of such points as relate to the operations of the medical department of this corps during the recent campaign:

The Fourth Army Corps participated in all the movements, skirmishes, and battles in which the Army of the Cumberland was engaged. It moved from Cleveland, Tenn., on the 3d day of May, and on the 4th of that month encountered the cavalry pickets of the rebel army near Catoosa Springs, and formed connection with the other corps of the Army of the Cumberland at that point. From that time until the 7th of the present month it was engaged in a series of skirmishes and battles, the most prominent of which are Tunnel. Hill, Buzzard Roost, Resaca, Calhoun, Adairsville, Kingston, Dallas, Kenesaw, and Atlanta.

The system of brigade hospitals was abolished at the outset of the campaign, and that of division hospitals established, as by Circular No. 4, of March 25, 1863, from the Surgeon-General's Office. This system, with a few modifications, was also ordered as a permanent organization, and at the present time is in full and successful operation.

The frequent changes in the position of the troops necessitated almost a daily change in the location of these hospitals. They were, however, always within easy distance of the command, and were conducted by the chief surgeons of divisions, and by the surgeons in charge, with energy and ability. Operations were primary, and every possible attention and care given to the patients.

Medical and commissary supplies were abundant, except during the three weeks that the army was in front of Dallas, or New Hope Church, and far distant from the depot of supplies. However, although at that time they were not abundant, yet they proved sufficient, and at no time have patients suffered from the want of such supplies.

All wounded and seriously ill were sent to the rear as rapidly as transportation could be procured. This was rendered absolutely necessary by the constant forward movement of the army.

The total number of hospital tents and extra flys in use at the three division hospitals of the corps was as follows: Hospital tents complete, 64; extra flys, 60. This amount of canvas proved sufficiently ample to cover all the wounded and seriously sick, which it was necessary to provide for at any one time. In fact, the amount of transportation (six wagons to a division) allowed for hospital purposes will not permit of a larger supply of tents being carried. The following figures, taken from the weekly reports, show the number of cases treated in this corps from the 3d of May to the 10th of September: Taken sick, 13,380; wounded, 5,562; returned to duty, 10,689; sent to general hospital, 8,327; died, 397. Of the number sent to general hospital, many have already returned to their commands.

The frequent movements of the army, the constant skirmishing and fighting, the bad roads, and especially the inclemency of the

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season at the early part of the campaign, were obstacles which called into play all the energies of the medical officers of the corps, and of the officers of the ambulance corps. Too much praise cannot be given these officers for their untiring zeal and hearty co-operation. The ambulance corps was not organized until after the campaign, had commenced, consequently many and serious obstacles had to be overcome; but notwithstanding the many unavoidable drawbacks this corps proved efficient, and at the present time promises still greater efficiency. Early in July forty-nine new ambulances were drawn, by order of the medical director of the department, which filled a deficiency which had existed from the commencement of the campaign.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. THEO. HEARD,

Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers, Medical Director.

Surg. GEORGE E. COOPER, U. S. Army,

Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland.

No. 14.

Report of Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley, U. S. Army, commanding First Division, of operations May 3-July 26.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,

1864.

I have the honor to state that at 12 m. on the 3d day of May the First Division, under my command, marched from its camp at Blue Springs, under orders to move to Catoosa Springs. The division took the main road to Dalton, and encamped the same night one mile south of Red Clay.

Marching early the next morning, we reached Catoosa Springs at noon, near Dr. Lee's house. General McCook's cavalry, which was in advance of the infantry, exchanged shots with the rebel pickets, who ran away in the direction of Tunnel Hill. We remained in camp the 5th and 6th, and on the morning of the 7th marched for Tunnel Hill, this division leading. After passing Dr. Lee's house the main road leading down the base of Rocky Face was taken. Skirmishers were deployed, and the enemy's skirmishers were soon encountered. We found the road obstructed by fallen trees, but all difficulties were soon overcome, and we soon found ourselves in sight of the enemy's intrenchments upon Tunnel Hill. As the force of the enemy was entirely uncertain, Brigadier-General Cruft, with the First Brigade, was directed to attack the line in front, and Brig. Gen. W. C. Whitaker, with the Second Brigade, was sent to move down the ridge near Rocky Face and attack in flank. This movement at once dislodged the rebels, who seemed to have only cavalry and artillery. Captain Simonson, chief of artillery, who promptly brought forward a section of rifled guns of the Fifth Indiana Battery, had a few fine shots at the retiring cavalry, and hurried their pace. The division was formed in line of battle facing east, having before us Rocky Face, the summit of which we could observe occupied by the enemy in quite strong force. In getting possession of Tunnel Hill the division lost 4 men wounded.

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Early on the morning of the 8th the division advanced in line of battle to within 400 or 500 yards of Rocky Face. The enemy still held some round hills intrenched at the entrance of Buzzard Roost Gap, from which they annoyed the division by a flank fire. In the afternoon General Davis formed a force to charge these hills, and Captain Simonson turning his batteries upon them they very easily fell into our hands. The skirmishers of this division advanced with those of General Davis' division, driving the rebels into their intrenchments and developing the full strength of the position before us. Early the next morning our skirmishers pushed up to the foot of the palisades under cover of the brushwood, and maintained a constant fire with the enemy all day. In the evening I received orders to press the enemy strongly in the gorge of Buzzard Roost. This duty was assigned Colonel Champion with his own regiment (the Ninety-sixth Illinois) and Eighty-fourth Indiana, LieutenantColonel Neff. Our men drove the rebels quickly to their main lines, and pushed up to the foot of the perpendicular rocks of the mountain and maintained themselves until night, when all but the pickets were withdrawn. The fire of the enemy was severe, much of it coming almost from overhead. Our loss in this affair was 50 or 60 men killed and wounded. Major Boyd, Eighty-fourth Indiana, a brave and devoted officer, here received a mortal wound. During the 10th we occupied our position, slight skirmishing going on. The enemy

varied the performance by throwing shells into the valley we occupied from some howitzers they had dragged to the top of the ridge. On the morning of the 11th we made arrangements to relieve General Davis' division in the occupancy of the hills commanding the entrance to Buzzard Roost Gap. It being reported that the enemy was leaving, a reconnaissance was ordered toward evening. This was made by the First Brigade, Brigadier-General Cruft commanding. The Thirty-first Indiana and One hundred and first Ohio were deployed as skirmishers, and pushing boldly forward drove the enemy from his first line (an intrenched picket-line), but were met by a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Our men maintained their position until dark, and during the night, having relieved General Davis' troops, we threw up works facing those of the enemy, and about 600 yards from them. This reconnaissance cost us, as upon the 9th, about 50 men killed and wounded. During the 12th we watched the enemy closely, the Fourth being the only corps before Dalton. Early on the morning of the 13th we learned the rebels had left their works.

FROM THE EVACUATION BY THE ENEMY OF DALTON TO THE EVACUATION OF RESACA.

As soon as the evacuation of his works by the enemy was known, we started in pursuit. Passing through Dalton we moved down the Sugar Valley road. The enemy left but little behind him but his well-built earth-works. A few cavalry opposed our progress. We camped at night about nine miles south of Dalton, camping in line of battle, facing toward Tilton, our backs to Rocky Face. On the morning of the 14th the division marched toward Tilton, to ascertain if any of the enemy remained in that direction. Upon reaching the main Dalton and Resaca road I received orders to move south toward Resaca, this division being the only one on that road and forming the left flank of the army. The division advanced to within

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about two and a half miles of Resaca, driving in the skirmishers of the enemy; but as Wood's division, on our right, had not yet come up, and as firing was heard in rear of our right, the division was halted and directed to barricade. At 2 p. m. Wood advanced and made connection with the right of this division, and we advanced together until stopped by the heavy fire of artillery coming from the enemy's works. I received about this time an order from the general commanding the corps to hold the Dalton road running by my left flank. To do this I stationed Cruft's brigade upon the left of the road, posting two of his regiments upon a round-topped hill about 100 yards from the road, and directing them to intrench themselves. These troops were not yet in position when the enemy was seen forming to attack them in flank, and word was at once sent the corps and department commanders of this fact. In the mean time Simonson's battery, which had been advanced, was, as a matter of caution, withdrawn and posted to sweep the open ground to the rear of the threatened brigade. The attack came about an hour before sundown, and perpendicular to my line. The Thirty-first Indiana, stationed upon the round-topped hill, found itself fired into from three directions. They did the best they could under the circumstances; they got out of the way with such order as troops can hurrying through a thick brush. Directing their attack more to our rear than flank, the One hundred and first Ohio and Eighty-first Indiana were soon driven back, and the enemy was bursting exultingly upon the open field when Simonson opened on them with canister, which soon broke and dispersed that attack. The enemy formed in the woods and attempted to cross the open field again, but met the same savage shower of canister. Robinson's brigade, of the Twentieth Corps, had also arrived and formed facing the attack. The broken regiments of the First Brigade had reformed near the battery, and the enemy was easily repulsed with very severe loss to him. The troops of the brigade did as well as could be expected, situated as they were. Attacked in flank, and greatly outnumbered, they could only get out of the way the best they could. Had it not been for the timely aid of the battery it would have gone hard with the brigade. Captain Simonson and the Fifth Indiana Battery deserve great praise; their conduct was splendid. The coming up of the Twentieth Corps was also timely, though, in my opinion, the fire of the battery was in itself adequate to the successful repulse of the enemy. The -night and the day following our lines were adjusted and strengthened, and a constant fire was kept up upon the enemy. The division was formed ready to follow up General Hooker's attack had he broken the enemy's line. Artillery firing was kept up during the night upon the rebel position. About 11 o'clock the rebels made a demonstration on our pickets, occasioning a general discharge of cannon and muskets along the whole line. Soon after, early on the morning of the 16th, it was found the enemy had evacuated under cover of the night. The loss of the division about Resaca, killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 200.

FROM THE EVACUATION OF RESACA TO THE EVACUATION OF THE LINE OF THE ETOWAH.

Early on the morning of the 16th the pursuit was commenced. Finding the bridges at Resaca destroyed, this division built a temporary foot bridge upon the ruins of the railroad bridge over the

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Oostenaula and pushed on the same evening, camping near Calhoun. On the 17th marched in rear of Newton's division and formed line on his left at 5 p. m., three miles north of Adairsville, where the enemy had made a stand. This division was not engaged. On the. 18th passed through Adairsville, getting considerably entangled with the Army of the Tennessee; camped at Cox's house. Early on the morning of the 19th the division took up the line of march for Kingston. The cavalry pickets of the enemy were soon encountered and driven before us through Kingston. We found them posted in considerable force upon the hills east of Kingston beyond the crossing of the creek. Cruft's and Whitaker's brigades were formed in line facing the enemy, and Colonel Grose was instructed to feel his way down to the left of the railroad and drive him from his position. This was readily accomplished after some severe skirmishing. The enemy upon the main Cassville road gave back very stubbornly, and at a point about three miles from Cassville the enemy was discovered, formed in three lines of battle perpendicular to the road, and very soon after the appearance of the head of the column the entire rebel line advanced toward us. The division was deployed as hastily as possible; batteries were put in position, and other troops were coming up to form upon the flanks of the division, when the enemy was seen to be withdrawing. Some volleys from the rifled batteries caused them to move off in a good deal of confusion, and the whole division advanced in line to the rebel position. Finding the enemy had left, the division moved on in accordance with orders, with a view of reaching Cassville. When within about a mile of that place and while changing the direction of the skirmishers, the head of the column received a sudden volley from the enemy across an open field. The division was again deployed, and as night had arrived, the men were instructed to fortify their position. Very sharp skirmishing was kept up the early part of the night, and early in the morning we found the enemy had again abandoned his works and retired across the Etowah.

FROM THE CROSSING OF THE ETOWAH TO THE CROSSING OF THE

CHATTAHOOCHEE.

From the evening of the 19th to the morning of the 23d we remained in camp at Cassville preparing for our movement upon Dallas and thence Marietta. The order was to take twenty days' rations, but this division was only enabled, from limited transportation, to carry seventeen days'. The division crossed the Etowah the evening of the 23d and camped near Euharlee. Made a tedious day's march on the 24th, reaching camp two miles from Burnt Hickory at 10 o'clock at night in a rain-storm. On the 25th we marched for Dallas, keeping the roads to the right of the main road. At 3 p. m. were ordered to close up rapidly, as General Hooker had found the enemy in force. We crossed the Pumpkin Vine near sunset, and at night closed up to Hooker's left. On the 26th Colonel Grose's brigade went into line on the left of Geary's division. We also put in a battery to play upon the enemy's lines. Early on the 27th moved the division to the left to relieve Wood's division, which moved off to the left to attempt to turn the enemy's right. The position of the division here remained substantially the same until the night of the 4th of June, during which the enemy evacuated his line.

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