Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of ConsciousnessWinner in the Psychology & Cognitive Science catagory of the 2005 Professional/Scholarly Publishing Annual Awards Competition presented by the Association of American Publishers, Inc. In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explainedwas published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories—"so rambunctious," Dennett observes, "that several people are writing books just about the tumult." With Sweet Dreams, Dennett returns to the subject for "revision and renewal" of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges. In Consciousness Explained, Dennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model (which posits a privileged place in the brain where "it all comes together" for the magic show of consciousness) with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreams, he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the "fame in the brain" model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that "continue to bedevil the field." With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the "Zombic Hunch" that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his "third-person" approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of "RoboMary," while his discussion of a famous card trick, "The Tuned Deck," is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in "Consciousness—How Much is That in RealMoney?" |
Contents
The Zombic Hunch Extinction of an Intuition? | 1 |
2 The Reactionaries | 8 |
3 An Embarrassment of Zombies | 13 |
4 Broad Functionalism and Minimalism | 17 |
5 The Future of an Illusion | 22 |
A ThirdPerson Approach to Consciousness | 25 |
2 Folk Theories and Philosophy | 31 |
3 Heterophenomenology Revisited | 35 |
1 Mary and the Blue Banana | 104 |
2 Surely Shell Be Surprised | 107 |
3 You Had to Be There | 116 |
4 RoboMary | 122 |
5 Locked RoboMary | 126 |
Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? | 131 |
2 Competition for Clout | 136 |
3 Is There Also a Hard Problem? | 143 |
4 David Chalmers as Heterophenomenological Subject | 47 |
5 The SecondPerson Point of View | 49 |
Explaining the Magic of Consciousness | 57 |
1 the Thankless Task of Explaining Magic | 58 |
2 Dismantling the Audience | 69 |
3 The Tuned Deck | 72 |
Are Qualia What Make Life Worth Living? | 77 |
2 Change Blindness and a Question about Qualia | 82 |
3 Sweet Dreams and the Nightmare of Mr Clapgras | 91 |
What RoboMary Knows | 103 |
4 But What about Qualia? | 151 |
5 Conclusion | 157 |
A Fantasy Echo Theory of Consciousness | 159 |
1 Fleeting Fame | 160 |
2 Instant Replay | 167 |
Consciousness How Much Is That in Real Money? | 173 |
179 | |
189 | |
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Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness Daniel C. Dennett Limited preview - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
actually audience beliefs blue Brain Sciences Capgras delusion Cartesian Theater cells Chalmers's change blindness chapter claim Clapgras cognitive science color qualia color vision computational conscious experience Consciousness Studies contents Damasio David Chalmers Dennett discriminate dispositional echo effects episodic memory explaining consciousness fact fame famous first-person point functional Hard Problem heterophenomenology human hypothesis idea illusion imagine Indian Rope Trick ineffable instance intentional stance intrinsic intuition pump issue Jean Nicod Journal of Consciousness Leibniz look Lycan magician Mark 19s Martians matter mind Multiple Drafts Model Nagel naive physics neuromodulator neurons neuroscience neutral normal perceptual philoso philosophers point of view properties psychology qualia real magic RoboMary robot science of consciousness scientific scientists sciousness Searle seems simply sort subjects suppose sure task term theory of consciousness things thought experiment tion Tuned Deck Tye's unconscious visual Zombic Hunch zombie