Before we proceed farther, it may be proper to take a review of the rules laid down in this and the preceding fection, in order to make fome general obfervations. The natural order of the words and members of a period, is undoubtedly the fame with the natural order of the ideas that compofe the thought. The tendency of many of the foregoing rules, is to fubftitute an artificial arrangement, in order to reach fome beauty either of found or meaning that cannot be reached in the natural order. But feldom it happens, that in the fame period there is place for a plurality of these rules. If one beauty can be catched, another must be relinquifhed. The only question is, Which ought to be preferred? This is a queftion that cannot be refolved by any general rule. But practice, fupported by a good taste, will in moft inftances make the choice easy. The component words and members of a period, are ascertained by the fubject. If the natural order be not relished, a few trials will difcover that artificial order which has the beft effect. All that can be faid in general is, that in making a choice, found ought to yield to fignification. The tranfpofing words and members out of their natural order, fo remarkable in the learned languages, has been the fubject of much speculation. It is agreed on all hands, that fuch tranfpofition or inverfion, bestows upon a period a very fenfible degree of force and elevation; and yet writers feem to be at a lofs in what manner to account for this effect. Cerceau * afcribes fo much power to inverfion, as to make it the characteristic of French verfe, and the fingle circumftance which in that language diftinguishes verfe from profe. And yet he pretends not to fay, that it hath any other power but to raise surprise; he must mean curiofity; which * Reflections fur la poefie Francoife. pe is done by fufpending the thought during the riod, and bringing it out entire at the clofe. This indeed is one power of inverfion; but neither its føle power, nor even that which is the most remarkable, as is made plain above. But waving cenfure, which is not an agreeable task, I enter into the matter. And I begin with obferving, that if a conformity betwixt words and their meaning be agreeable, it must of course-be agreeable to find the fame order or arrangement in both. Hence the beauty of a plain or natural style, where the order of the words correfponds precifely to the order of the ideas. Nor is this the fingle beauty of a natural style: it is alfo agreeable upon account of its fimplicity and perfpicuity. This obfervation throws light upon the fubject. For if a natural ftyle be in itself agreeable, a tranfposed style cannot be fo. And therefore, it cannot otherwife be agreeable, but as contributing to fome positive beauty which is excluded in a natural ftyle. To be confirmed in this opinion, we need but reflect upon fome of the foregoing rules, which make it evident, that language, by means of inverfion, is fufceptible of many beauties that are totally excluded in a natural arrangement of words. From these premiffes it clearly follows, that inversion ought not to be indulged, unless in order to reach some beauty fuperior to that of a natural ftyle. It may with great certainty be pronounced, that every inverfion which is not governed by this rule, will appear harsh and ftrained, and be difrelished by every one of tafte. Hence the beauty of inverfion when happily conducted; the beauty, not of an end, but of means, as furnishing opportunity for numberlefs ornaments that find no place in a natural style. Hence the force, the elevation, the harmony, the cadence, of fome compofitions. Hence the mani fold fold beauties of the Greek and Roman tongues, of which living languages afford but faint imitations. SECT. III. Beauty of language from a refemblance betwixt found and fignification. T se found and figni HE refemblance betwixt fication of certain words, is a beauty, which has escaped no critical writer, and yet is not handled with accuracy by any of them. They have probably been erroneoufly of opinion, that a beauty lo obvious in the feeling, requires no explanation in the understanding. In order to fupply this defect, I fhall give examples of the various refemblances betwixt found and fignification; and at the fame time fhall endeavour to explain why fuch refemblances are beautiful. I begin with examples where the refemblance betwixt the found and fignification is the most entire; proceeding to others, where the refemblance is lefs and lefs fo. There being frequently a strong resemblance betwixt different founds, it will not be furprifing to find a natural found imitated by one that is articulate. Thus the found of a bow-ftring is imitated by the words that express it. The ftring let fly, Twang'd fhort and sharp, like the fhrill fwallow's cry. Odyssey xxi. 449. 'The found of felling trees in a wood: Loud founds the ax, redoubling ftrokes on ftrokes; Iliad, xxiii. 144. But But when loud furges lafh the founding shore No perfon can be at a lofs about the cause of this beauty. It is obviously that of imitation. That there is any other natural resemblance betwixt found and fignification, muft not be taken for granted. There is evidently no refemblance betwixt found and motion, nor betwixt found and fentiment. In this matter, we are apt to be deceived by artful reading or pronouncing. The fame paffage may be pronounced in many different tones, elevated or humble, sweet or harth, brifk or melancholy, fo as to accord with the thought or fentiment. Such concord, depending on artful pronunciation, must be diftinguished from that. concord betwixt found and fenfe, which is perceived in fome expreffions independent of artful pronunciation. The latter is the poet's work: the former must be attributed to the reader. Another. thing contributes ftill more to the deceit. In language, found and fenfe are so intimately connected,, as that the properties of the one are readily communicated to the other. An emotion of grandeur,, of sweetness, of melancholy, or of compaffion, though occafioned by the thought folely, is transferred upon the words, which by that means refemble in appearance the thought that is expreffed by them*. I have great reason to recommend these observations to my reader, confidering how inaccurately the prefent fubject is handled by critics. Not one of them diftinguishes the natural refemblance of found and fignification,. from the artif cial resemblance now described. Witness Vida in *See chap. 2.. part 1. fect. 4. particular, particular, who in a very long paffage has given very few examples, but what are of the latter kind +. That there may be a resemblance betwixt natural and artificial founds, is felf-evident; and that in fact there exist fuch refemblances fuccefsfully employ'd by writers of genius, is clear from the foregoing examples, and many others that might be given. But we may safely pronounce, that this natural refemblance can be carried no farther. The objects of the several fenfes, differ fo widely from each other as to exclude any resemblance. Sound in particular, whether articulate or inarticulate, resembles not in any degree taste, smell, or motion; and as little can it resemble any internal fentiment, feeling, or emotion. But muft we then agree, that nothing but natural found can be imitated by that which is articulate? Taking imitation in its proper fenfe, as involving a refemblance betwixt two objects, the propofition must be admitted. And yet in many paffages that are not defcriptive of natural found, every one must be fenfible of a peculiar concord betwixt the found of the words and their meaning. As there can be no doubt of the fact, what remains is, to inquire into its cause. Refembling caufes may produce effects that have no resemblance; and caufes that have no resemblance may produce refembling effects. A magnificent building, for example, refembles not in any degree an heroic action; and yet the emotions they produce, being concordant, bear a resemblance to each other. We are ftill more fenfible of this refemblance, in a fong where the music is properly adjusted to the fentiment. There is no resemblance betwixt thought and found; but there is the strongeft refemblance betwixt the emotion raised by mu Poet. L. 3. 1. 365-454. |