: feeling of cold, of heat, or of pain; and it is not lefs proper to say, I have a feeling of love, of hatred, of anger, or of any other paffion. But it is not applied to internal action for it is not proper to fay, that a man feels himself deliberating or refolving. In a sense less common, feeling is put for the thing that is felt; and in this fenfe it is a general term for every one of our paffions and emotions. 13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impreffion be made upon our body, is probable from reafon, and is afcertained by experience. But it is not neceffary that we be made fenfible of the impreffion. It is true, that in touching, tafting, and fmelling, we feel the impreffion made at the organ of fenfe: but in feeing and hearing, we feel no impreffion. We know indeed by experience, that before we perceive a vifible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica; and that before we perceive a found, an impreffion is made upon the drum of the ear: and yet here, we are not confcious either of the organic image or the organic impreffion: nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception. Al we can fay, is, that we see that river, or hear that. trumpet *. 14 Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I re Yet a fingular opinion that impreffions are the only objects of perception, has been espoused by some philofophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the fenfes of feeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being confcious of an organic impreffion or of any impreflion. See the treatise upon humannature, where we find the following paffage, book 1. p 4. fect. 2. "Properly fpeaking it is not our body we per"ceive when we regard our limbs and members; fo that "the afcribing a real and corporeal existence to these im"preffions or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain," & call call an object in this manner, it appears to me the fame as in the original furvey, only more faint and obfcure. For example, I faw yefterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a river. I endeavour to recall it to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of it or reprefentative image? Not fo. I tranfport myself ideally to the place where I faw the tree yesterday; upon which I have a perception of the tree and river, fimilar in all refpects to the perception I had of it when I viewed it with my eyes, only more obfcure. And in this recollection, I am not confcious of a picture or reprefentative image, more than in the original furvey: the perception is of the tree itself, as at firft. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively furveying a fine ftatue, I close my eyes. What follows? The fame object continues, without any difference but that it is lefs diftin&t than formerly. This indiftinét fecondary perception of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore the precife and accurate definition of an idea, in contradistinction to an original perception, is, "That "perception or confcioufnefs of a real object, which "a perfon has by exercising the power of memory." Every thing one is confcious of, whether internal or external, paffions, emotions, thinking, refolving, willing, heat, cold, &c. as well as external objects, may be recalled as above by the power of memory*. 15. The *From this definition of an idea, the following propofition must be evident, That there can be no fuch thing as an innate idea. If the original perception of an object be not innate, which is obvious, it is not lefs obvious, that the idea or fecondary perception of that object cannot be innate. And yet to prove this felf-evident propofition, Locke has bestowed a whole book of his treatise upon hu man 15. The original perceptions of external objects, are either fimple or complex. A found may be fo fimple as not to be refolvable into parts: fo may a taste and a smell. A perception of touch, is generally compounded of the more fimple perceptions of hardness or softness, joined with smoothness or roughness, heat or cold, &c. But of all the perceptions of external fenfe, that of a vifible object is the most complex; because the eye takes in more particulars than any other organ. A tree is compofed of its trunk, branches, leaves: it has colour, figure, fize: every one of these feparately produceth a perception in the mind of the spectator, which are all combined into the complex perception of the tree. 16. The original perception of an object of fight, is more complete, lively, and diftin&t, than that of any other external fenfe: and for that reason, an idea or fecondary perception of a vifible object, is more diftinct and lively than that of any other object. A fine paffage in mufic, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable accuracy: but the idea of any other object, and alfo of found after the shortest interval, is extremely obfcure. 17. As the range of an individual is commonly within narrow bounds of space, opportunities feldom offer of an enlarged acquaintance with external objects. Original perceptions therefore, and their correfponding ideas, are a provision too scanty for the purposes of life. Language is an admirable man understanding. So necefary it is to give accurate definitions, and fo preventive of difpute are definitions when accurate. Dr. Berkeley has taken great pains to prove another propofition equally evident, That there can be no fuch thing as a general idea. All our original perceptions are of particular objects, and our fecondary perceptions or ideas must be equally fo. contrivance contrivance for supplying this deficiency; for by language, the original perceptions of each individual may be communicated to all; and the fame may be done by painting and other imitative arts. It is natural to fuppo e, that the most lively ideas are the most fufceptible of being communicated to others. This holds more efpecially when language is the vehicle of communication; for language hitherto has not arrived at any greater perfection than to exprefs clear and lively ideas. Hence it is, that poets and orators who are extremely successful in defcribing objects of fight, find objects of the other fenfes too faint and obfcure for language. An idea thus acquired of an object at fecond hand, ought to be distinguished from an idea of memory; though their resemblance has occafioned the fame term to be apply'd to both. This is to be regretted; for when knowledge is to be communicated by language, ambiguity in the fignification of words is a great obftruction to accuracy of conception. Thus nature hath furnished the means of multiplying. ideas without end, and of providing every individual with a fufficient ftock to anfwer, not only the neceflities, but even the elegancies of life. of 18.. Further, man is endued with a fort of creative power: he can fabricate images of things that have no existence. The materials employ'd in this operation, are ideas of fight, which may be taken to pieces and combined into new forms at pleafure:: their complexity and vivacity make them fit materials. But a man has no fuch power over any his other ideas, whether of the external or internal fenfes he cannot, after the utmost effort, combine these into new forms: his ideas of fuch objects are too obfcure for this operation. An image thus fabricated cannot be called a fecondary perception,. not being derived from an original perception: the poverty of language however, as in the cafe immediately diately above mentioned, has occafioned the fame term idea to be apply'd to all. This fingular power of fabricating images independent of real objects, is distinguished by the name imagination. 19. As ideas are the chief materials employ'd in thinking, reasoning, and reflecting, it is of confequence that their nature and differences be underftood. It appears now, that ideas may be diftinguished into three kinds; firft, Ideas or fecondary perceptions, properly termed ideas of memory; fecond, Ideas communicated by language or other figns; and, third, Ideas of imagination. These ideas differ from each other in many refpects; but the chief foundation of the diftinction is the diffesence of their caufes. The first kind are derived from real existences that have been objects of our fenfes language is the cause of the fecond, or any other fign that has the fame power with language; and a man's imagination is to himself the caufe of the third. It is fcarce neceffary to add, that an idea, originally of imagination, being convey'd to others by language or any other vehicle, becomes in the mind of thofe to whom it is convey'd an idea of the fecond kind; and again, that an idea of this kind, being afterward recalled to the mind, becomes in that circumstance an idea of memory. 20. Human nature is not fo conftituted, as that its objects are perceived with indifferency: thefe, with very few exceptions, raife in us either pleafant or painful emotions. External objects, at the fame time, appear in themfelves agreeable or difagreeable; but with fome difference betwixt thofe which produce organic impreffions, and those which affect us from a diftance. When we touch a foft and smooth body, we have a pleasant feeling as at the place of contact; and this feeling we diftinguifh not, at least not accurately, from the agreeableness of the body itself. The fame holds in general with regard |