coftly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, every thing fuperb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders. Simplicity, elegance, propriety, and every thing natural, fweet, or amiable, are defpifed or neglected; for these are not at the command of riches, and make no figure in the public eye. In a word, nothing is relished, but what ferves to gratify pride, by an imagined exaltation of the poffeffor above thofe he reckons the vulgar. Such a tenor of life contracts the heart and makes every principle give way to felf-intereft. Benevolence and public fpirit, with all their refined emotions, are little felt and lefs regarded. And if thefe be excluded, there can be no place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.

The exclufion of claffes fo many and various, reduces within a narrow compass thofe who are quaified to be judges in the fine arts. Many circumftances are neceffary to form a judge of this fort: there must be a good natural tafte: this taste must be improved by education, reflection, and experience: it must be preferved alive, by a regular courfe of life, by ufing the goods of fortune with moderation, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which gives welcome to every rational pleasure without deviating into excefs. This is the tenor of life which of all contributes the most to refinement of taste; and the fame tenor of life contributes the moft to happiness in general.

If there appear much uncertainty in a standard that requires fo painful and intricate a selection, we may poffibly be reconciled to it by the following confideration, That, with refpect to the fine arts, there is less difference of tafte than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, ftrong or weak. Thefe, if at all perceived, are feldom misapprehended by any taste; and the fame marks

are

are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective tafte is incurable; and it hurts none but the poffeffor, because it carries no authority to impofe upon others. I know not if there be fuch a thing as a taste naturally bad or wrong; a taste, for example, that prefers a groveling pleasure before one that is high and elegant. Groveling pleasures are never preferred: they are only made welcome by thofe who know no better. Differences about objects of tafte, it is true, are endless: but they generally concern trifles, or poffibly matters of equal rank where the preference may be given either way with. impunity. If, on any occafion, the difpute go deeper and perfons differ where they ought not, a depraved taste will readily be difcovered on one of other fide, occafioned by imitation, cuftom, or corrupted manners, fuch as are described above.

If, after all that is faid, the ftandard of taste be thought not yet fufficiently afcertained, there is ftilt one resource in which I put great confidence. What I have in view, are the principles that conftitute the fenfitive part of our nature. By means of these principles, common to all men, a wonderful uniformity is preferved among the emotions and feelings of different individuals; the fame object making upon every perfon the fame impreffion; the fame in kind, at leaft, if not in degree. There have been aberrations, as above obferved, from thefe principles; but foon or late they always prevail, by refloring the wanderers to the right track. The uniformity of tafte here accounted for, is the very thing that in other words is termed the common fenfe of mankind. And this discovery leads us to means for afcertaining the common fenfe of mankind or the standard of taste, more unerringly than the felection above infifted on. Every doubt with relation to this standard, occafioned by the practice of different nations and different times, may be cleared by applying

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plying to the principles that ought to govern the tafte of every individual. In a word, a thorough acquaintance with thefe principles will enable us to form the standard of tafte; and to lay a foundation for this valuable branch of knowledge, is the declared purpose of the prefent undertaking.

I.

APPENDIX.

Terms defined or explained.

ONSIDERING the things I am confcious of, some are internal or within my mind, some external or without. Paffion, thinking, volition, are internal objects. Objects of fight, of hearing, of fmell, of touch, of tafte, are external.

2. The faculty by which I difcover an internal object, is termed an internal sense: the faculty by which I discover an external object, is termed an external fenfe. This distinction among the fenfes is made with reference to their objects merely; for the fenfes, external and internal, are equally powers or faculties of the mind.

3. But as felf is an object, and the only one that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I am confcious of myfelf, must be diftinguished from both the internal and external fenses.

4. By fight we perceive the qualities of figure, colour, motion, &c.: by the ear we perceive the qualities high, low, loud, foft: by touch we perceive rough, fmooth, hot, cold, &c.: by tafte we perceive fweet, four, bitter, &c. by fmell we

:

perceive

e

perceive fragrant, ftinking, &c. Qualities, from our very conception of them, are not capable of an independent existence; but muft belong to fomething of which they are the qualities. A thing with refpect to its qualities is termed a fubject, or fubftratum; because its qualities reft, as it were, upon it, or are founded upon it. The fubject or fubftratum of visible qualities, is termed fubftance, of audible qualities, found; of tangible qualities, body. In like manner, tafte is the fubftratum of qualities perceived by our fenfe of tafting; and fmell is the fubftratum of qualities perceived by our fenfe of fmelling.

5. Subftance and found are perceived exifting in a certain place; often at a confiderable distance. from the organ. But fmell, touch, and tafte, arc perceived at the organs of fenfe.

6. Objects of internal fenfe are conceived to be attributes deliberation, reasoning, resolution, willing, confenting, are internal actions: paffions and emotions are internal agitations. With regard to the former, I am confcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conscious of being paffive.

7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head; of paffions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally and many effects produced, of which we are not confcious. When we investigate the ultimate caufe of animal motions, it is the moft probable opinion, that they proceed from fome internal power: and if fo, we are, in this particular, unconscious of our own operations. But confcioufnefs being imply'd in the very conception of deliberating, reasoning, refolving, willing, consenting, these operations cane not go on without our knowledge. The fame is the cafe of paffions and emotions; for no internal agitation

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agitation is denominated a paffion or emotion, but what we are conscious of.

9. The mind is not always in the fame state: it is at times chearful, melancholy, fevere, peevish. These different states may not improperly be denominated tones. An object, by making an impreffion, produceth an emotion or paffion, which a gain gives the mind a certain tone fuited to it.

10. Perception and fenfation are commonly reckoned fynonymous terms, fignifying the confcioufnefs we have of objects; but, in accurate language, they are diftinguifhed. The confcioufness we have of external objects, is termed perception. Thus we are faid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, found, tafte, fmell, &c. The confcioufnefs we have of pleasure or pain arifing from external objects, is termed fenfation. Thus we have a fenfation of cold, of heat, of the pain of a wound, of the pleasure of a landfcape, of mufic, of beauty, of propriety, of behaviour, &c. The consciousness. we have of internal action, fuch as deliberation, refolution, choice, is never termed either a perception or a fenfation,

II. Conception ought to be diftinguished from: perception. External things and their attributes: are objects of perception: relations. among things. are objects of conception. I fee two men, James. and John: the consciousness I have of them is a perception: but the conscioufnefs. I have of their relation as father and fon, is termed a conception.. Again, perception relates to objects really exifting:: conception to fictitious objects, or to thofe framed: by the imagination.

12. Feeling, befide denoting one of the external fenfes, has two different fignifications. Of these. the most common includes not only fenfation, but alfo that branch of confcioufnefs which relates to paffions and emotions: it is proper to fay, I have a

feeling