This reafoning may perplex, but, in contradiction to fenfe and feeling, will never afford conviction. A man of taste muft neceffarily feel the reafoning to be false, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. At the fame time, though no man of taste will fubfcribe to the proverb as holding true in every cafe, no man will venture to affirm that it holds in no cafe. Subjects there are undoubtedly, that we may like or dislike indifferently, without any imputation upon our tafte. Were a philofopher to make a scale for human pleasures with many divifions, in order that the value of each pleasure may be denoted by the place it occupies, he would not think of making divifions without end, but would rank together many pleasures arifing perhaps from different objects, either as being equally valuable, or differing fo imperceptibly as to make a feparation unneceffary. Nature hath taken this course, fo far as appears to the generality of mankind. There may be fubdivifions without end; but we are only fenfible of the groffer divifions, comprehending each of them many pleafures of various kinds. To thefe the proverb is applicable in the strictest fense; for with refpect to pleasures of the fame rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another? If a preference in fact be given by any individual, it cannot be tafte, but cuftom, imitation, or fome peculiarity of mind. Nature in her scale of pleafures, has been fparing of divifions: fhe hath wifely and benevolently filled every divifion with many pleasures; in order that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without envying the happiness of others: many hands must be employ'd to procure us the conveniencies of life; and it is neceffary that the different branches of bufinefs, whether more or less agreeable, be filled with hands. A tafte too nice and delicate, would obftru&t this plan; for it would crowd fome fome employments, leaving others, not less useful, totally neglected. In our prefent condition, happy it is, that the plurality are not delicate in their choice. They fall in readily with the occupations, pleafures, food, and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if at first there be any difpleafing circumftance, custom foon makes it easy. The proverb will be admitted fo far as it regards the particulars now explained. But when apply'd in general to every subject of taste, the difficulties to be encountered are infuperable. What fhall we fay, in particular, as to the difficulty that arifes from human nature itfelf? Do we not talk of a good and a bad tafte? of a right and a wrong taste? and upon that fuppofition, do we not, with great confidence, cenfure writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts? Are fuch criticisms abfurd and void of foundation? Have the foregoing expreffions, familiar in all languages and among all people, no fort of meaning? This can hardly be what is univerfal must have a foun<dation in nature. If we can reach this foundation, the standard of tafte will no longer be a fecret. All living creatures are by nature diftributed into claffes; the individuals of each, however diverfified by flighter differences, having a wonderful uniformity in their capital parts internal and external. Each clafs is diftinguishable from others by an external form; and not lefs diftinguishable by an internal conftitution, manifefted by certain powers, feelings, defires, and actions, peculiar to the individuals of each clafs. Thus each clafs may be conceived to have a common nature, which, in framing the individuals belonging to the clafs, is taken for a model or standard. Independent altogether of experience, men have a fense or conviction of a common nature or ftandard, not only in their own fpecies, but in every fpe Ch. XXV cies of animals. And hence it is a matter of wonder, to find any individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external conftruction: a child born with an averfion to its mother's milk, is a matter of wonder, not lefs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one*. With respect to this common nature or ftandard, we are so constituted as to conceive it to be perfect or right; and confequently that individuals ought to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation accordingly from the standard, makes an impreffion upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or diforder: it is difagreeable and raifes in us a painful emotion: monftrous births, exciting the curiofity of a philofopher, fail not at the fame time to excite averfion in a high degree. Laftly, we have a conviction, that the common nature of man is invariable not less than universal : we conceive that it hath no relation to time nor to place; but that it will be the fame hereafter as at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived: giving allowance for the difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact correfponds to our conviction. This conviction of a common nature or standard, and of its perfection, is the foundation of morality; and accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right and a wrong tafte in morals. It accounts not lefs clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong taste in the fine arts. A person who rejects objects generally agreeable, and delights in objects generally disagreeable, is condemned as a monster: we difapprove his taste as bad or wrong; and we have a clear con * See Effays on morality and natural religion, part 1. effay 2. ch. 1. ception ception that he deviates from the common ftandard. If man were fo framed as not to have any notion of a common ftandard, the proverb mentioned in the beginning would hold univerfally, not only in the fine arts but in morals: upon that fuppofition, the taste of every man, with respect to both, would to himself be an ultimate standard. But the conviction of a common ftandard being made a part of our nature, we intuitively conceive a taste to be right or good if conformable to the common standard, and wrong or bad if difconformable. No particular concerning human nature is more univerfal, than the uneafinefs a man feels when in matters of importance his opinions are rejected by others. Why fhould difference in opinion create uneafiness, more than difference in ftature, in countenance, or in drefs? The fenfe of a common standard is the only principle that can explain this mystery. Every man, generally speaking, taking it for granted that his opinions agree with the common sense of mankind, is therefore difgufted with those of a contrary opinion, not as differing from him, but as differing from the common ftandard. Hence in all difputes, we find the parties, each of them equally, appealing constantly to the common sense of mankind as the ultimate rule or standard. Were it not for this ftandard, of which the conviction is univerfal, I cannot difcover the flighteft foundation for rancour or animofity, when perfons differ in effential points, more than in points purely indifferent. With respect to the latter, which are not fuppofed to be regulated by any standard, individuals are permitted to think for themselves with impunity. The fame liberty is not indulged with refpect to the former: for what reafon, other than that the standard by which these are regulated, regulated, ought, as we judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all men? In a word, to this fenfe of a common standard must be wholly attributed the pleasure we take in thofe who espouse the fame principles and opinions with ourselves, as well as the averfion we have at those who differ from us. In matters left indifferent by the standard, we find nothing of the fame pleasure or pain. A bookish man, unless fway'd by convenience, relifheth not the contemplative more than the active part of mankind his friends and companions are chosen indifferently out of either clafs. A painter conforts with a poet or musician, as readily as with thofe of his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as I do, nor the lefs agreeable for preferring mutton. I have faid, that my difguft is raised, not by differing from me, but by differing from what I judge to be the common standard. This point, being of importance, ought to be firmly established. Men, it is true, are prone to flatter themselves, by taking it for granted, that their opinions and their tafte are in all refpects agreeable to the common ftandard. But there may be exceptions, and experience shows there are fome. There are instances without number, of perfons who cling to the groffe r amusements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any relish for more elegant pleasures, fuch for example, as are afforded by the fine arts. Yet thefe very perfons, talking the fame language with the rest of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleasures: they invariably approve those who have a more refined tafte, and are afhamed of their own as low and fenfual. It is in vain to think of giving a reason for this fingular impartiality against felf, other than the authority of the common standard. Every individual of the human fpecies, the most |