an exact science, we must carefully examine all its fundamental Conceptions and Axioms, and reduce them to the state of generality and simplicity, required by the above canons. Hence, if we meet with Conceptions and Axioms which violate them by containing several ideas, we must apply the general principles of Inductive Logic to discover which is the true general idea, and eliminate all other accidental, particular, or intrusive ideas. On the Formation of General Conceptions. 17. Socrates, says Aristotle, was the first to frame general definitions, because he saw that all systematic reasoning must be based upon definitions; and every philosopher of note, from that day to this, has repeated the same thing. The chief charge alleged by Bacon against the Logic of the schools was, that it was wholly incapable of penetrating the recesses of nature. "The Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, but words are the tokens and signs of Conceptions. So that, if the very conceptions of the mind (which are, as it were, the soul of words and the foundation of this superstructure and edifice) are badly and inconsiderately formed from the facts, vague, nor sufficiently definite and limited, faulty in short in every way, it ruins every thing." Over and over again he repeats that the formation of Conceptions, or Definitions, and Axioms, or General Laws, by true induction is the only way of expelling fallacies. So, in affirming that the Conceptions and Axioms of his own day were utterly worthless, he says:- "The discoveries already made in the sciences are of such a sort as scarcely to be below the surface of the vulgar notions; but, in order to penetrate to the deep recesses of nature, both Conceptions and Axioms must be derived from facts, by a more certain and guarded method." Again:-"The formation of Conceptions and Axioms, by a true induction, is assuredly the true remedy to drive away and expel fallacies. And of these fallacies, the fallacies of language (Idola fori), which men gain from one another by common discourse, are the most troublesome of all. For the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. For words plainly exert a power over the understanding, and throw everything into confusion, and lead 1 Distributio Operis. 2 Nov. Org., B. I., Aph. 18. men away into numberless empty controversies and phantasies; for men believe that their understanding controls their language, but it is also true that language re-acts and turns back its power over the understanding, which is the very thing which has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive. But words are commonly framed by the capacity of the vulgar, and divide things according to the lines which are most obvious to the minds of the vulgar. And whenever a clearer intellect and a more careful observation wishes to shift these lines to a truer agreement with nature, words cry out against it. Thus it happens that great and important discussions of learned men often turn into controversies about words and names, with which, according to the wise custom of mathematicians, it would be more prudent to begin, and so bring them into order by Definitions.” 1 2 Again-"The formation of ideas or true Conceptions and Axioms by true induction is, no doubt, the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away fallacies. To point them out is of great use; for the doctrine of fallacies is to the interpretation of nature what the doctrine of the refutation of sophisms is to common Logic." Also-" The fallacies which words impose upon the understanding are of two sorts. They are either names of things which do exist, but are confused and ill defined, and hastily and irregularly formed from the facts. And this class which is formed by a bad and unskilful abstraction is intricate and deeply rooted." "And the assistance of this induction is to be used, not only in discovering general laws, but also in the formation of conceptions. And assuredly in this induction the chief hope lies." Bacon then places the foundation of all science in the extirpation of fallacies (Idols) and the obtaining true general conceptions (Ideas) from nature and reality itself by genuine induction, which are not to be fanciful fictions of the mind. He maintains that conceptions are to be obtained in the same manner as Axioms or General Laws. But he has not given any examples of his method, nor indeed was it possible that he should do so. No Logic can shew how it can be done. It is the part of Imagination, or Invention, to devise and suggest fundamental 1 Nov. Org., B. I., Aph. 89. 2 Nov. Org., B. I., Aph. 40. Nov. Org., B. I., Aph. 105. not. conceptions, and of Logic to determine whether they be true or The Baconian method of induction has been far more generally applied to General Laws than to Conceptions. From whence some have drawn the conclusion that his method is practically useless. We hope that we shall be able to shew that this is not so, but that the Baconian, or Inductive, Logic may be applied with decisive effect in determining the controversies which prevail up to the present hour as to every single General Conception in Economics. And most men eminent as clear thinkers since the days of Bacon have dwelt upon the importance of true conceptions. Thus Hobbes says "In the right definition of names lies the first use of speech, which is the acquisition of science. And in wrong or no definitions, lies the first abuse from which proceed all false and senseless tenets." And again-" Every man who aspires to true knowledge should examine the definitions of former authors, and either correct them, or make them anew." One of the most valuable parts of Locke's Essay, is that in which he dwells upon and enforces the necessity of accurate general terms, and the importance of refining and polishing common language for philosophical purposes. And he especially notes the mischievous consequences that follow from the inconstant use of them-"It is hard to find a discourse written upon any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention the words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes in one collection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another, which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my ideas to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to great folly, or greater dishonesty." Again-"Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it is generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions, in the volumes and variety of controversies the 1 Leviathan, pt. I., c. 4. 2 Essay, B. III., c. 10, § 5. world is distracted with, yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages." Locke then says that by proper attention being paid to language, Moral Science may be reduced to demonstration.-" Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think that Morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics; since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known. * * * And, therefore, the negligence and perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than those in Natural Philosophy. Yet this, the least that can be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same word constantly in the same sense; if this were done, which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity, many of the books extant might be spared: many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end, several of these great volumes, swollen with ambiguous words now used in one sense, and by and bye in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass. How true all this is of Economics, any one who has read the subject can tell! * * So also Mr. Mill perfectly acknowledges in a general way the importance of true conceptions. "How to define a name may not only be an inquiry of considerable difficulty and intricacy, but may involve considerations going deep into the nature of the things which are denoted by the name.' Again "Few people have reflected how great a knowledge of things is required to enable a man to affirm that any given argument turns wholly upon words. There is, perhaps, not one of the leading terms of philosophy which is not used in almost innumerable shades of meaning to express ideas more or less widely different from one another. Between two of these ideas a sagacious and penetrating mind will discern, as it were intuitively, an unobvious link of connection, upon which, though perhaps unable to give a logical account of it, he will found a perfectly valid argument, which his critic not having so keen an insight into the things, will mistake for a fallacy turning on 2 Essay, B. III., c. 2, § 16, 17, 26. 3 Logic, B. I., c. 8, § 7. 1 Essay, B. III., c. 10, § 22. the double meaning of a term. And the greater the genius of him who safely leaps over the chasm, the greater will probably be the crowing and vain glory of the mere logician who, hobbling after him, evinces his own superior wisdom by pausing on its brink, and giving up as desperate his proper business of bridging it over." And concluding the chapter, he says" And since upon the result of this inquiry respecting the causes of the properties of a class of things, there incidentally depends the question what shall be the meaning of a word, some of the most profound and most valuable investigations which philosophy presents to us have been introduced by, and have offered themselves under the guise of inquiries into the definition of a name."2 After so distinctly recognizing the importance of true definitions, it might naturally be expected that Mr. Mill should bestow extraordinary care on the ascertainment and settlement of the Fundamental Conceptions of Economics, the obscurity and confusion of which, every one knows, have given rise to the greater part of the controversies in the subject. But just as in the former case, where Mr. Mill, after having amply acknowledged that Moral Science is to be cultivated in the spirit and method of Physical Science, when he comes to Economics in particular, turns his back upon himself, and maintains that it is an à priori science; so here, after amply acknowledging the importance of true Philosophical Conceptions, when he comes to Economics he says "It is no part of the design of this treatise to aim at metaphysical nicety of definition where the ideas suggested by a term are already as determinate as practical purposes require." But what definition in Economics is as determinate as practical purposes require? Not a single one ! And in a subsequent chapter we shall see how contradictory are many of Mr. Mill's definitions. On the Formation of General Axioms, 18. Having obtained General Conceptions or Definitions of Quantities treated about, our next purpose is to discover the General Law which governs their relations to each other, and in searching for this, we must observe that, there can be but Logic, B. I., c. 8. § 7. 2 Logic, B. I., c. 8, § 7. 3 Pol. Econ., p. 2. |