Economists require, who want an invariable standard of value. They want something by which they can at once decide whether gold is of more value in 1400, or in 1800, in England or in China, without any reference to anything else. The least reflection will show that this is an impossibility. The only test of value is an exchange, and unless we can effect an exchange there can be no value. How can we exchange an ounce of gold in the year 1572, for an ounce of gold in the year 1872? Mr. Bailey well says, p. 72, "Value is a relation between contemporary commodities, because such only admit of being exchanged for each other; and if we compare the value of a commodity at one time with its value at another, it is only a comparison of the relation in which it stood at these different times to some other commodity. It is not a comparison of some intrinsic independent quality at one period, with the same quality at another period, but a comparison of ratios, or a comparison of the relative quantities in which commodities exchanged for each other at two different epochs. If a commodity A in the year 100 was worth 2 B, and in 1800 was worth 4 B, we should say that A had doubled its value to B. But this, which is the only kind of comparison we could institute, would not give us any relation between A in 100 and A in 1800: it would be simply a comparison of the relation between A and B in each of these years. "It is impossible for a direct relation of Value to exist between A in 100 and A in 1800, just as it is impossible for the relation of distance to exist between the sun at the former period and the sun at the latter." It is obvious that all we can do by a measure of Value is to ascertain in a convenient way the exchangeable relations existing between any quantities at any given time. And by a comparison of prices at different epochs we can observe the differences which have occurred in the exchangeable relations of these quantities between the different times. And this, though far from what is required by those writers, is all that we can have. The fundamental objection then to there being a Standard of Value is simply this, that value is always a ratio, and a single quantity cannot be the measure of a ratio. And yet it is by no means uncommon to hear able men rise up at learned associations and demand that the Government should institute an inquiry to ascertain and affix an invariable Standard of Value, in the same way as they have bestowed great care and pains to fix the standard of length, and capacity, and weight. All they can do is to maintain a fixed weight and purity in the current coin. of the realm; but they can no more control its variations in Value than they can regulate the motions of the stars by Act of Parliament. SECTION II. On the ORIGIN, SOURCE, or CAUSE of VALUE. 5. We have seen that there are three species of Economic Quantities, each containing many varieties, which have value. We have decided that the Value of a Quantity is any other Quantity it can be exchanged for. We now come to the second branch of our inquiry-What is the CAUSE, or SOURCE, of VALUE, and whence does it originate? Now when we are to search for the cause, or source, of value, it may be as well to understand what it is we are searching for. There is a very great number of things of several different natures which all have value: we must therefore manifestly search for some single Cause which is common to them all, and ascertain what that single cause is, by genuine Induction." But the induction which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of sciences and arts must analyse nature by proper rejections and 'exclusions, and then after a sufficient number of negatives come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances."1 "Now what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall analyse experience, and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion." 2 Now the first step in this process of induction is to make a complete collection of all the different kinds of quantities, of whatever nature they may be, which have value. "For whosoever is acquainted with Forms, embraces the unity of nature in substances the most unlike. From the discovery of Forms, therefore, results truth in Theory and freedom in Practice." So Bacon earnestly inculcates as the foundation of all true science a careful collection of all kinds of instances in which the given nature is found" The investigation of forms proceeds thus: a nature being given, we must first of all have a muster, or presentation, before the understanding of all known instances which agree in the same nature, though in substances the most unlike. And such collection must be made in the manner of a history, without premature speculation." Bacon 2 Distributio Operis. 1 Nov. Org., Book i., Aph. 105. 4 Nov. Org., Bk. ii., Aph. 11. then exemplifies his method by an investigation into the Form of Heat: and he gives tables of the divers instances agreeing in the Nature of Heat: also where it is absent: and where it appears in different degrees. "The work' and office of these three tables I call the Presentation of Instances to the Understanding, which presentation having been made, Induction itself must be set to work; for the problem is upon a review of the instances, all and each, to find such a nature as is always present, or absent with the given nature, and always increases or decreases with it, and which is, as I have said, a particular case of a more general nature." "We must make therefore a complete solution and separation of nature, not indeed by fire, but by the mind, which is a kind of divine fire. The first work therefore of true induction (as far as regards the discovery of Forms) is the rejection or exclusion of the several natures which are not found in some instance when the given nature is present, or are found in some instance where the given nature is absent, or are found to increase in some instance where the given nature decreases, or to decrease when the given nature increases. Then indeed after the rejec tion and exclusion has been duly made, there will remain at the bottom, all light opinions vanishing into smoke, a Form affirmative, solid and true, and well defined." 3 An indispensible part of Induction is the rejection of erroneous Forms "I must now give an example of the Exclusion or Rejection of natures which by the Tables of Presentation are found not to belong to the Form [of Heat]; observing in the meantime not only each table suffices for the rejection of any nature; but even any one of the particular instances contained in any of the tables. For it is manifest from what has been said that any one contradictory instance overthrows a conjecture as to the Form ""In the process of Exclusion are laid the foundations of true Induction, which however is not completed till it arrives at an affirmative. Nor is the exclusive part itself at all complete, nor indeed can it possibly be so at first. For exclusion is evidently the rejection of simple natures; and if we do not yet possess sound and true notions of simple natures, how can the process of exclusion be made accurate?" 1 Nov. Org., Bk. ii., Aph. 15. 2 Nov. Org., Bk. ii., Aph. 16. 3 Nov. Org., Book ii., Aph. 18. 6. Bacon has exemplified his process of Induction by investigating the Form of Heat. Our present task is to investigate the FORM OF VALUE. We must begin, following the example of the mighty Master, by making a complete collection of instances of Value. We have already seen that there are three different species of Quantities, each of them containing many varieties, all having Value. We must now enumerate all the different kinds of Quantities which have Value. There are I. CORPOREAL, OR MATERIAL, PROPERTY.-Under this spe- III. INCORPOREAL PROPERTY. Under this species are We have now to investigate the Form of Value of all these different Quantities. We must first of all, by a due and systematic course of rejections and exclusions, eliminate all intrusive and accidental ideas which may sometimes accompany Value; and after completing this process of exclusion, we must end by an Affirmative, and discover that single general cause which is common to all these different Quantities; which being present, Value is present; which when it increases, Value increases: which when it decreases, Value decreases: and which being absent, Value is absent. 7. In modern times when men began to speculate on this subject, the first and most popular doctrine was that LABOUR is the CAUSE of Value. |