Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessConsciousness is a perennial source of mystification in the philosophy of mind: how can processes in the brain amount to conscious experiences? Robert Kirk uses the notion of "raw feeling" to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience; he argues that there is no need for recourse to dualism or private mental objects. The task is to understand how the truth about raw feeling could be strictly implied by narrowly physical truths. Kirk's explanation turns on an account of what it is to be a subject of conscious perceptual experience. He offers penetrating analyses of the problems of consciousness and suggests novel solutions. His sustained defense of non-reductive physicalism shows that we need not abandon hope of finding a solution to the mind-body problem. |
Contents
6 | 14 |
IS THE NOTION SOUND? | 30 |
9 | 70 |
3 | 78 |
PERCEPTUAL INFORMATION | 106 |
CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS | 136 |
THE CHARACTER OF RAW FEELING | 175 |
THE GAP HAS BEEN BRIDGED | 210 |
239 | |
245 | |
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Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness Robert Kirk No preview available - 1994 |
Common terms and phrases
acquire acting directly actually argument assumption Basic Package behavioural capacities blindsight brain bundle theories C-quale causal causes chapter character claim components concepts conscious experience conscious perceptual experience Consciousness Explained constitute creatures Dennett dualism epiphenomenalism epiphenomenalists example external folk psychology functionalist GIANT idea identity inputs instantiated intelligibility gap internal processes introspective inverted spectrum involved kinds of raw logically Machine Table robot main assessment processes mental mind minimal physicalism Nagel neurones normally notion of raw objection pain pantomime horse particular pattern perceptual consciousness perceptual information philosophical phosphenes physicalists position private language argument psychology psychophysical identity purely physical qualia question raw feeling reason red things relational relevant seems sort statements stickleback story Strict Implication thesis strictly implied structure of contrasts subject of conscious subject of raw suggestion supervenience suppose Swiss Cheese principle theory Transformation thesis true truths visual Wittgenstein Zombie