About this time, Colonel Smith's quartermaster, in charge at Martinsburg, came on to the field, and inquired of me where Colonel Smith could be found, as he wished to know what disposition should be made of the wagon train, stating that all the Government property, excepting a small quantity of forage, had been sent by cars to Harper's Ferry, and that the teams were harnessed and ready to move. As Colonel Smith was not at hand, and conceiving that no time should be lost, I ordered the quartermaster to take charge of the teams, and to move as rapidly as possible toward Williamsport, and, unless he had orders to the contrary, to move from Williamsport to Pennsylvania. It will be seen by my report of June 25 that, from the time of my arrival at Martinsburg, I had looked upon a retreat as inevitable, and that the only question was when and where to make it. Before 12 o'clock I notified Colonel Smith that a retreat was inevitable, and early in the afternoon it was agreed between Colonel Smith and myself that at all events the troops would retreat on Williamsport at sundown, if not forced to do so before. The attack in the morning demonstrated that the rebel forces had passed Winchester, and the information received that they had captured Bunker Hill made it probable that they were in force sufficient to whip the force at Martinsburg, and that they were only awaiting artillery, as it was evident from 10 a. m. until near sunset that it was our artillery, in the absence of any guns on the part of the rebels, which kept them in check. Milroy's dispatch, stating that he had been attacked on the 13th by Ewell's force, of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, and Imboden's and Jones' forces, always estimated at from 6,000 to 8,000, making a total of over 20,000 men, convinced me, having only left Winchester on the evening of June 11, that General Milroy would be defeated on Sunday, the 14th instant, as it was apparent from Milroy's dispatch that the attack was made by one of the most efficient army corps of Lee's army, and the inference was fair that this corps was not alone in the Valley. The following copy of a telegram to Major-General Schenck will show the opinion I entertained of General Milroy's position: MARTINSBURG, W. Va., Major-General SCHENCK, Commanding Middle Department : Left Winchester at 2 o'clock this p. m. Milroy deserves credit for his fortifications, &c. It will take all Lee's cavalry and light artillery to whip him out. If threatened with nothing more, I think he can keep his position. DAN. TYLER, From 12 o'clock until sunset the question was the proper time to commence the retreat. If the retreat had commenced immediately after the departure of the baggage train toward Williamsport, the train might have confused the retreating column, and it was clear, if it could be done, that the best plan was to arrest the rebel cavalry at Martinsburg, and give the train time to secure its passage into Pennsylvania. This was done, and the train escaped. The next thing (as it was impossible with the small force at Martinsburg to move forward to Bunker Hill, as suggested in Orders, No. 159), was to hold on at Martinsburg until the last moment, in order to cover any men who might escape in that direction from Winchester, and for that object, and for the security of the Martinsburg baggage train, I proposed, if possible, to hold Martinsburg until sundown, by which time I supposed the baggage train would be safe, and the troops escaping in the way of Martinsburg would have arrived. The result was, the baggage train did escape, and not a man of Milroy's defeated army attempted to escape by way of Martinsburg, the rebels having completely cut off his retreat in that direction. To cover the chance of an opportunity to assist Milroy, the holding on to Martinsburg until near sunset was manifestly important, and at the same time offered a chance for the Martinsburg force to escape. To have held on later (say until next morning), would have done no good, and would have insured the capture of the entire Martinsburg command. Is was evident the enemy was in force, and had commenced a serious attack, and there was nothing in the character or condition of Colonel Smith's command to authorize the least hope that the attack could be repulsed, and there was every reason to believe that under the circumstances the good of the service required these troops, if possible, for the garrison at Harper's Ferry. The loss of four pieces of Maulsby's battery requires more explanation than I am able to give, as I have as yet no report from Captain Maulsby. Captain Maulsby, by his conduct at Martinsburg, showed that he was a gallant soldier, and there can be no doubt but that he can satisfactorily explain his conduct in connection with the loss of his guns. Maulsby's battery, after 6 p. m. of the 14th instant, was divided, one section, under the command of a lieutenant, facing to the west, covering some rebel infantry and cavalry that were moving in that direction on Martinsburg. The other two sections, commanded by Captain Maulsby, were facing south, covering the rebel forces that were passing either to amuse or attack the forces posted on the hill near the cemetery. The detached section was 150 yards to the rear of the section under the immediate command of Captain Maulsby, and the lieutenant in command was alone responsible for the section. Just before sunset the rebels for the first time showed that they had artillery in position, as they opened fire from six or eight guns with good range. The first shot passed over Captain Maulsby's four guns, and plunged into the detached section, killing and wounding some horses, and producing a bad effect in the infantry supports, a battalion of the One hundred and sixth New York Volunteers, which fell back in disorder. For the next twenty minutes I exerted myself personally in rallying the infantry and in stimulating Maulsby's two sections to serve the guns as steadily and rapidly as possible, to cover the retreat, for which it was evident the time had come. Not finding Colonel Smith on the field, I then ordered Captain Maulsby to throw a half dozen shots from each of his guns as rapidly as possible, and then to limber up and follow the infantry. On riding to the rear, I found one piece of the detached section limbered up and the other rolled down the hill, upset, and the limber missing, and that Colonel Smith, with his regiment, had left the field, while the One hundred and sixth New York Volunteers were standing in line, apparently awaiting orders. It was evident that something should be done at once, and, being unable to find Colonel Smith, I ordered the One hundred and sixth New York to move to the rear, and rode forward myself to ascertain what had become of Colonel Smith and the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, and, finding neither, I sent a staff officer, Captain Woodhull, to the Williamsport road, who returned without any information as to Colonel Smith or his regiment, but with the information that the rebels had entered Martinsburg, and were already on or near the Williamsport road. During the absence of Captain Woodhull, I had been looking unsuccessfully for Colonel Smith and his regiment on the Shepherdstown road, and, riding back, met the One hundred and sixth New York near the point where that road turns off from the Williamsport road, and seeing that the Williamsport road was already in possession of the rebels, and nothing heard from Colonel Smith, the only course left was to take the Shepherdstown road, and risk the direct march to Harper's Ferry. After marching nearly a mile, Colonel Smith with his regiment was found on the same road. Being a stranger and entirely unacquainted with the roads, and the guides, whom Colonel Smith had notified me were on the field, having disappeared, I had to assure myself by personal inquiry as to the different roads, and it was not until the column was halted and reformed after overtaking Colonel Smith's regiment that I ascertained that Maulsby's battery was not in the column. Seeing artillery moving with the rear of the column, I had supposed the entire battery was present. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Capt. R. N. SCOTT, DANIEL TYLER, Brigadier-General. ADDENDA. HEADQUARTERS DELAWARE DEPARTMENT, Lieut. Col. DONN PIATT, Chief of Staff, Eighth Army Corps, Baltimore, Md.: COLONEL: Some time since I forwarded to the headquarters Middle Department my report of the operations in and around Harper's Ferry, from the 15th to the 26th day of June, 1863, and, in justice to myself, in reference to a certain investigation recently made by the War Department, I ask that the report may be sent to the headquarters of the army or to the Secretary of War, with such remarks as the major-general commanding may think proper. * I feel it due the service to set forth in this report the facts connected with the administration of affairs previous to my arrival there, and to state that the condition of things on the Maryland shore and on Maryland Heights was such that a sudden attack with a small force on the 14th June would have successfully carried the works. So far as I could learn, the troops were doing nothing to strengthen the defenses, and although Brigadier-General Kelley received notice on the 14th of June that he might be attacked, and that Ewell had already attacked Milroy, and that McReynolds had evacuated Berryville, and that Martinsburg was attacked, still, not a move was made at Harper's Ferry; all the subsistence, forage, ammunition, hospitals and hospital stores, and other similar supplies were left or exposed. on the Virginia side, and, had the enemy advanced in any force, their capture was inevitable. *Reference is to original of report of July 1, a copy of which (printed on pp. 19-33) was submitted to the court of inquiry. I feel obliged, in justice, to report that when Brigadier-General Kelley received orders to turn over the command to me, he merely reported the order to me, and left immediately with his whole staff by the first train of cars, and that I could not find a single record or report of the command, and the only means I had of ascertaining subsistence, ammunition, supplies, forage, &c., was by taking inventories of the same. I deem it my duty to report these matters to department headquarters, as I feel that Brigadier-General Kelley's neglect during a somewhat long command at Harper's Ferry to put the place in a condition for defense, and to have availed himself of the means in his hands for that purpose, was inexcusable, and might have brought disgrace on the service and inflicted a great injury on the campaign of 1863; and I am compelled to this course from the fact that for more than a week after I relieved Brigadier-General Kelley I felt that this disgrace and injury would be put to my charge, owing mainly to General Kelley's neglect of duty. With great respect, your obedient servant, No. 381. Report of Col. Benjamin F. Smith, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, of attack upon Martinsburg. MARYLAND HEIGHTS, June 27, 1863. GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the attack on Martinsburg, W. Va., on the 14th instant: The United States troops at Martinsburg consisted of eight companies of the One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, Lieut. Col. William H. Harlan commanding; eight companies of the One hundred and sixth New York Volunteers, Col. E. C. James commanding; Maulsby's Independent West Virginia Battery; one comany of cavalry, of the First Battalion Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, Captain Firey commanding; a small detachment from the First New York Cavalry, and a few of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. It was expected some days before that an attack would be made on the place, and I had received orders to make preparations accordingly. All the stores at the depot were loaded on the cars, and sent to Baltimore and Harper's Ferry, in anticipation of an attack by an overwhelming force. Brigadier-General Tyler, with his staff, consisting of Capt. Max Woodhull and Lieut. E. L. Tyler, had been directed by Major-General Schenck, commanding Eighth Army Corps, to proceed to Martinsburg, and make sure that proper dispositions would be made according to circumstances. About 8 a. m. Sunday, June 14, my vedettes were driven in, and reported the enemy advancing by the Winchester turnpike in force. I immediately ordered the whole of my command to move in that direction, and take a position behind the stone fences between the Winchester and Charlestown roads, throwing out skirmishers and scouts in all directions, endeavoring to find out the strength and posi tion of the enemy. My orders were to fall back on Harper's Ferry, if attacked by a superior force, either by the Williamsport or by the direct road. Finding that my position was one that could be easily cut off from these roads, with the approbation of General Tyler, I changed my position to the high ground near the cemetery and nearer the roads. My object was to gain time, so that I could get my brigade train well on the road to Williamsport. This I succeeded in doing by throwing an occasional shell and keeping my skirmishers well out to engage the enemy. About noon, I received the following communication from General A. G. Jenkins, commanding rebel troops, viz: HEADQUARTERS, &C., Camp near Martinsburg, June 14, 1863. The Commanding Officer U. S. Forces near Martinsburg : SIR: I herewith demand the surrender of Martinsburg. Should you refuse, you are respectfully requested to notify the inhabitants of the place to remove forthwith to a place of safety. Small-arms only will be used for one hour upon the town after your reception of this note. After that, I shall feel at liberty to shell the town, if I see proper. Should you refuse to give the necessary notification to the inhabitants, I shall be compelled to hold your command responsible. Very respectfully, yours, P. S.-An immediate reply is necessary. A. G. JENKINS, To this communication I replied as follows, having first submitted it for the approval of General Tyler: A. G. JENKINS, Brigadier-General, &c.: HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES, GENERAL: Martinsburg will not be surrendered. You may commence shelling as soon as you choose. I will, however, inform the women and children of your threat. Very respectfully, yours, B. F. SMITH, Colonel, Commanding U. S. Forces. Immediately after their demand, I notified the inhabitants, and they left the town in large numbers. Jenkins did not open his musketry and artillery, as he threatened, but was held in check until near sunset, when I had received notification that all my wagons had crossed 'the ferry at Williamsport, and I was prepared to fall back. Just as I had given orders to the pickets and skirmishers to fall back slowly and cautiously, the enemy opened upon me from three different points, their batteries having during the day obtained my range. I had ten minutes before given the order to limber up and get under arms, preparatory to falling back to the ferry, when the enemy opened with such a concentrated fire it cannot be wondered at that the men were thrown into temporary confusion. However, I brought the men off in good order, and was not followed by the enemy on the Shepherdstown road, which I took with the main portion of the command, crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown Ford, and following the towpath of the canal to Maryland Heights, where I arrived safely, and reported to General B. F. Kelley, commanding. One section of Maulsby's battery, commanded by Lieut. John S. S. Herr, went with the main body of the command on the Shepherdstown road, but one of his pieces overturning in a gully was lost, the wheel being broken. The limber was brought away. The other two sections of the battery, under Capt. Thomas A. Maulsby, with Lieutenants Graham and Means, took the Williamsport road, and, after |