the most generic sense, as meaning | more than the mere tenement, whether of bricks, or stone, or canvas, in which the man physically resides. The words may be taken to mean all that externalism of a man's life in which he feels the most interest, from which he derives the most pleasure-that is really his home. The pleasing surroundings of his life constitute the real house or tabernacle in which he lives.

I. IN THE CASE OF THE WICKED THIS HOME IS DOOMED TO RUIN. "The house of the wicked shall be overthrown." Is business the home of his soul? Does he, the thinking, conscious man, dwell more in it than anywhere else? His business will pass from him. Is wealth the home of his soul? Some men live (without figure) in their gold. The wealth of the wicked will depart. We brought nothing into the world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out. Is society the home of his soul? There are many who live in

society. The fellowship of others is their home; this in the case of the wicked, is doomed to be overthrown. There are no friendships for the ungodly in the future.

II. IN THE CASE OF THE RIGHTEOUS THIS HOME IS DESTINED TO FLOURISH. "The tabernacle of the upright shall flourish." Where is the home of the righteous? Where his heart is. And where is that? First: In the cause of Divine benevolence. In the advance of truth, in the extension of goodness, the progress of humanity, he feels the strongest interest. This cause shall flourish. It must go on. Heaven and earth shall pass away sooner than it shall fail. Secondly: In the society of the holy and the true. The fellowship of the true disciple of Christ is the heaven of his nature, and that shall flourish, it shall increase in numbers, purity, goodness, and influence. "We having received a kingdom that cannot be moved, let us have grace to worship in reverence and godly fear."

THE GREAT PROPITIATION.

Replicant.-In answer to Querist No. 16, p. 352, Vol. XVII., and continued from p. 297, Vol. XX.

IV. The atonement of Christ as explained by the theory of expediency.

Thinking men, one by one, became dissatisfied with the various

theories already mentioned. Some of the objections which have been stated seemed to them to be insurmountable. Grotius gave up the necessity of substitution altogether, and proposed a theory of expediency. Gilbert, in his Congregational lecture, denied all substitutionary or expiatory reference in the atonement of Christ

in relation to children who died in infancy. After many oscillations the majority seem to be now settling down to the theory of expediency.

As I am anxious to give a fair statement of each theory, it will be better done, in this case, by quotations from authors who accept and advocate the expedient view of the Christian atonement. Dr. Pye Smith says that the atonement is a "compensative resource, by which the salvation of the sinner may be obtained, in consistency with the honours of the divine government."

Here it is asserted that the atonement (a) affects God as governor; (b) compensates the governor, or state, for the wrong doings of sinners, and (c) renders possible "may"-the salvation of these sinners. But it seems to me that it really renders their salvation necessary; for if a government, if public justice receives compensation for wrong, would it not be unjust on the part of that government to punish the wrong doer? If it be right to punish the criminal it is because the compensation has not been in all points complete; but in the case of the atonement the compensation is supposed fully to cover all losses resulting from crime.

Dr. Jenkyn says the "atonement is an expedient substituted in the place of the literal infliction of the penalty, so as to supply to the government just and good ground for dispensing favours to an offender." This definition is far less definite, and therefore less satisfactory, than the preceding one by Dr. Pye Smith. In both the atonement affects God as governor; in both the possibility and not the necessity of pardon is supposed: but in the former this is secured by compensating the government; in the latter it

is not stated how the possibility is attained. In fact, the whole matter is a mere assumption.

Dr. Wardlaw gives a more comprehensive definition in these words:"The grand design is to preserve unsullied the glory of the great principles of eternal rectitude; to show the impossibility of the claims of equity, founded in these principles, and essential to the government of the universe, being dispensed with; to settle in the minds of God's intelligent creatures, as the subjects of his moral administration, the paramount obligation and immutable permanence of their claims; to give such a manifestation of the divine regard to these elements of his immaculate administration as to preclude the possibility of any, the remotest, surmise that in the pardon of sin they have been at all overlooked or placed in abeyance; and thus to render it consistent with divine propriety, or, in other words, honourable to the whole character as well as to the law and government of Jehovah, to extend pardoning mercy to the guilty and to reinstate them in his favour, according to the provisions of the Gospel." This definition by a multiplicity of words and a variety of matter seems to refer to something wonderfully great. But let us carefully analyze the definition and express it more briefly and simply. The definition asserts that our Lord by his death, (1) preserved the glory of justice; (2) showed the perpetuity of the claims of justice; (3) proved God's regard to these principles and claims, notwithstanding the forgiveness of transgressors; and (4) rendered the salvation of sinners honourable to the government of God. The faut of such a definition is not simply its length, but specially tl. no effort is made in any part

of the book to prove the truth of any of its assertions. Everything is assumed and nothing is proved. Indeed, the advocates of this theory seem to be unconscious of the need of any proof. They assume that God needed something, but they do not know what, though some use the word compensation, and others satisfaction; but no definite meaning is attached to these. They next assume that the death of Christ furnished what was needed, whatever it was; but no attempt is made to show how the death of Christ operated on the divine mind. Butler speaks very disrespectfully of those who do attempt an explanation when he says, "In what particular way the blood of Christ had this efficacy there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain; but I do not find that the Scripture has explained it."

But as Dr. Wardlaw's definition of the atonement seems to embrace all the assumptions which are usually made, we shall examine them in order.

Assumption the First.-That the death of Christ preserved unsullied the glory of justice.

Yet Dr. Wardlaw expressly states that the claims of retributive justice-the justice which awards good or evil, according to personal merit-are left untouched by the atonement. He emphatically states that this justice admits of no substitution; its claims are met only by the personal suffering of the transgressor. What seems to me strange is, that the claims of this justice can be laid aside without any compensation, yet the claims of public justice cannot be suspended without public satisfaction involving death. The claims of retributive justice are disregarded by these theorists because they see that really they could not be

met in any way by the sufferinge of our Lord; but as our Lord did suffer, and as it is assumed that He suffered to meet the demands of some kind of justice, it is further assumed that public justice required satisfaction, and that nothing but the death of the Son of God could supply the satisfaction required.

No effort is made to show why retributive justice may, in some cases, be left without satisfaction. It is assumed, and assumed rightly, that God can, under certain conditions, withhold the punishment of sin from the sinner, though strict justice demands its infliction. Had these theorists attempted to account for the neglecting of the claims of retributive justice in the divine administration, they would have discovered that the same reasons would show it to be possible for God to forgive sin, in some cases, notwithstanding any justice.

Justice is an essential element of moral character, but not the only element; and though nothing can be done by a virtuous being which is contrary to justice, yet may many things be done which are beyond and above justice, because not required by it. Justice may be exceeded, but not contradicted. Mercy is an attri bute of God, as well as of every other virtuous being; but mercy lies altogether beyond justice. The province of mercy begins where that of justice ends. As far as justice-mere justice-goes, there is no room for mercy, but from the point where the path of mere justice ends, the golden path of mercy extends indefinitely. Mercy is not opposed to justice, but is in every point above it, and never descends so low. It is mercy that passes over the claims of retributive justice, and leaves the penitent sinner unpun ished, except as he is punished

by sorrow for every thought and act of sin; and mercy may, in a similar manner, pass over the claims of public justice. After all, mercy, by a peculiar process of her own, meets, most fully, the claims of every kind of justice, not in the letter, but in the spirit.

While it is acknowledged that mercy meets the claims of retributive justice if they are met at all, the theorists to whom we now refer, assume that those of public justice are met alone by the death of Jesus. Public justice has reference to the well-being of a whole community (Hare); and in this case has reference to the happiness of all God's intelligent creatures. A firm persuasion of the justice of God as well as of his benevolence, is essential to their happiness; and it is supposed that both his benevolence and justice are proved by the death of Christ. Dr. Wardlaw wisely leaves out, however, from his definition, every reference to the benevolence of God. "He gave his Son," it is true, to suffering, but that of itself is no proof of benevolence; it may be proof rather of a deficiency of natural affection. A good father might have sacrificed his own life, but surely could not have inflicted infinite pain upon his son. On the supposition which underlies this theory, that the Son-that Jesus Christ-was a different being from God, the sufferings of the Son are manifest proofs of his own benevolence, but certainly prove nothing in that way of God, his Father.

Do the sufferings of Christ demonstrate the justice of God as a Governor-the justice of the divine administration ? Let us look at the Crucifixion from a distant point, as it would be looked upon by intelligent beings throughout the creation. How does the matter seem to stand?

Rebellion has taken place in a small province of the empire. A whole nation is found guilty of treason; but among the rest there is one of whose innocence there is no question. He has obeyed the laws of his country under every condition of being. He is, confessedly, unconnected with the revolt. True, he has an affection for the rebels, and is heartily sorry for their lot; still he hates their rebellion. He pities them most sincerely, and is anxious that they should have another trial after they have received his teaching on the relation of subjects to their rulers. He offers to suffer anything for them, and the government accepts of his offer, and speedily hasten his public execution. The guilty are free and the innocent suffers. I do confess that I see no justice here. If the government be so regardless of personal merit that it cares not whether the innocent or the guilty endures the pain, I should be suspicious that the next act would be the punishment of the innocent without any personal consent. At · any rate, I have no doubt that such a conduct on the part of any human government would meet with general disapproval; and surely that which would be disgraceful in the government of men, cannot be glorious in the government of God.

Archbishop Trench undertakes to meet this objection (see HoмILIST, Vol. XVIII., p. 348), by supposing many acts committed by the scholars of a school, each act being deserving of punishment. Among the scholars there is a young prince, whose conduct is blameless. He offers to suffer the punishment instead of his fellowscholars, and assures the teacher that that is the only way in which the good conduct of the scholars can be secured for all future time. Dr. Trench regards the punish

ment of the prince under these conditions, as perfectly just.

Men's consciences seem to be made of very different materials First of all Dr. Trench introduces into his statement of the case an element which is foreign to it. "The punishment of the prince will secure the future obedience of the scholars, and nothing else will." Now, that is an assumption, a pure assumption, as applied to the death of Christ. Supposing our Saviour's death not to be the result of any punishment inflicted upon Him by God, but undertaken to show his infinite love-God's infinite love-to man; would not his death, viewed in that light, be as likely to prevent men from sinning, as his death viewed as an infliction of God? It seems to me that there was no need for our Lord's death to be the result of any punishment, in order that that death might be a stimulus to virtue, and a check to sin. It might be the result of self-sacrifice just as well.

But apart altogether from this groundless assumption, let us look at the punishment of the prince in its relation to justice. To me the conduct of the teacher who accepted the offer of the prince and inflicted upon him the punishment, would seem monstrously unjust. The generous and heroic disposition of the prince would be worthy of the highest admiration. His willingness to suffer might beneficially act upon the disobedient, and a free forgiveness given to the transgressors, under these peculiar circumstances, on condition of a promise to reform, might be justifiable; but the man who took advantage of the generosity of the prince and inflicted pain upon him, would be nothing better than a brute, void of any sense of justice or propriety.

Suffering for others is the highest and truest virtue. But

while one individual might voluntarily undergo pain and loss for another, he would be acting in a region of morality far higher than justice-in the region of mercy; but a government, as the maintainer of justice, could never agree to the acceptance of the pain of the innocent, for the punishment of the guilty. Our Lord sacrificed his life in promoting human welfare. His sufferings were voluntarily undertaken, and so far it was all mercy; but had another party-a second person-inflicted pain as the penalty of sin, the whole transaction would have been lowered into the region of justice, and the conduct of the latter would have been unjust.

The first assumption having failed, let us consider the second assumption-viz., that the death of Christ showed the perpetuity and continuity of the claims of public justice. This it did not do. The claims of public justice are supposed to be actually set aside. Public justice-justice which secures the happiness of the vir tuous community-can never be satisfied unless the criminal himself suffer the evil consequence of his evil deeds. If he be not aetually punished, he must undergo a painful process of genuine sorrow for sin, and become permanently virtuous. But if the criminal is not punished, is not even required to find either surety or substitute, but has these found for him by the king, how can the virtuous population be assured that such crimes will not be repeated? The king seems to favour the felon, and shield him from justice by providing a substitute. According to this theory, the guilty is free and acquitted, and an innocent person, in no way connected with the crime, is publicly dishonoured, and that by the chief magistrate. Crime is not punished, but advantage is taken