ambiguity by being affixed to fome of thofe ideas. This practice would by degrees take away part of the uncertainty of language. And for this reafon I cannot but congratulate our English tongue, that it has been abundantly enriched with the tranflation of words from all our neighbour nations, as well as frorn ancient languages, and thefe words have been as it were enfranchised amongst us; for French, Latin, Greek, and German names will fignify English ideas, as well as words that are anciently and entirely English.

It may not be amifs to mention in this place, that as the determination of the particular fenfe in which any word is used, is called the definition of the name, fo the enumeration of the various fenfes of an equivocal word, is fometimes called the divifion or diftinction of the name; and for this purpose good dictionaries are of excellent use.

1 This distinction of the name or word is greatly neceffary in argumentation or difpute; when a fallacious. argument is ufed, he that answers it diftinguishes the feveral fenfes of fome word or phrafe in it, and fhews in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is as evidently falfe.

SECT. IV.

Of the Definition of Things.

S there is much confufion introduced into our

A ideas, by the means of thofe words to which

they are affixed, fo the mingling our ideas with each other without caution is a farther occafion whereby they become confufed. A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage, and the vain notions of birth and quality, conftantly joins and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and the imagines thefe to be effential to her nature, and as it were neceffary to her being; thence fhe is tempted to look upon menial fervants, and the lowest rank of mankind, as ano

ther fpecies of beings quite diftinct from her felf. A plough-boy, that has never travelled beyond his own village, and has feen nothing but thatched houses and his parish-church, is naturally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the very nature of a house, and that must be a church which is built of stone, and especially if it has a fpire upon it. A child whofe uncle has been exceflive fond, and his fchoolmaster very fevere, eafily believes, that fondness always belongs to uncles, and that severity is effential to masters or instructors. He has seen also foldiers with red coats, or ministers with long black gowns, and therefore he perfuades himself that these garbs are effential to the characters, and that he is not a minister who has not a long black gown, nor can he be a foldier who is not dreffed in red. It would be well if all fuch mistakes ended with childhood.

It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex ideas become confufed, not only by uniting or blending together more fimple or fingle ideas, than really belong:to them, as in the inftances jnft mentioned; but obfcu rity and confufion fometimes come upon our ideas alfo, for want of uniting a fufficient number of fingle ideas to make the complex one: fo if I conceive of a leopard only as a fpotted beaft, this does not diftinguish it from a tyger or a lynx, nor from many dogs or horfes, which are spotted too; and therefore a leopard must have fome more ideas added to complete and diftinguish it.

I grant that it is a large and free acquaintance with the world, a watchful obfervation and diligent fearch into the nature of things that muft fully correct this kind of errors: the rules of logic are not fufficient to do it but yet the rules of logic may inftruct us by what means to diftinguish one thing from another, and how to fearch and mark out as far as may be, the contents and limits of the nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us great affistance towards the remedy of these mistakes..

As the definition of names frees us from that confufion which words introduce, fo the definition of things will, in fome measure, guard us against that confufion

which mingled ideas have introduced: for as a definition of the name explains what any words means, fo a definition of the thing explains what is the nature of that thing.

In order to form a definition of any thing we must put forth these three acts of the mind.

First, compare the thing to be defined with other things that are most like to itself, and see wherein its effence or nature agrees with them; and this is called the general nature or genus in a definition: fo if you would define what wine is, firft compare it with other things, like itself, as cyder, perry, &c. and you will find it agrees effentially with them in this, that it is a fort of juice.

Secondly, consider the most remarkable and primary attribute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other things that are most like it; and that is its effential or specific difference: fo wine differs from cyder and perry, and all other juices, in that it is preffed from a grape. This may be called its speci-. al nature, which diftinguishes it from other juices.

Thirdly, join the general and special nature together, or (which is all one) the genus and the difference, and thefe make up a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice preffed from grapes, is the definition of wine.

So if I would define what winter is, I confider first wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it, (viz.) fummer, fpring, autumn, and I find they are all feasons of the year; therefore a feafon of the year is the genus. Then I obferve wherein it differs from these, and that is in the fhortness of the days; for it is this which does primarily diftinguish it from other seasons; therefore this may be called its special nature of its difference. Then by joining thefe together I make a definition. Winter is that feason of the year wherein the days are fhorteft. I confefs indeed this is but a ruder definition of it; for to define it, as an accurate aftronomer, I must limit the days, hours and minutes.

After the fame manner if we would explain or define what the picture of a man is, we confider firft the genus or general nature of it, which is a reprefentation; and I

herein it agrees with many other things, as a statue, a fhadow, a print, a verbal description of a man, &c. Then we confider wherein it differs from these, and we find it differs from a verbal defcription in that it is a reprefentation to the eye and not to the ear; it differs from a ftatue in that it is a representation upon a flat furface, and not in a folid figure; it differs from a fhadow, in that it is an abiding representation and not a fleeting one: it differs from a print or draught, because it reprefents the colours by paint as well as the shape of the object by delineation. Now fo many or rather fo few of these ideas put together, as are just fufficient to diftinguish a picture from all other reprefentations, make up its effential difference or its special nature; and all thefe are included in its being painted on a plain furface. Then join this to the genus, which is a reprefentation; and thus you have the complete definition of the picture of a man, (viz.) it is the reprefentation of a man in paint upon a surface (or a plane.)

Here it must be observed, that when we speak of the genus and difference as compofing a definition, it must always be understood that the nearest genus and specific difference are required.

The next general nature or the nearest genus muft be used in a definition, because it includes all the rest; and if I would define wine, I must fay wine is a juice, which is the nearest genus; and not say, wine is a liquid, which is a remote general nature; or wine is a fubftance, which is yet more remote, for juice includes both fubftance and liquid. Befides, neither of these two remote general natures would make any diftinction between wine and a thousand other fubftances or other liquids, a remote genus leaves the thing too much undiftinguished.

The fpecific difference is that primary attribute which diftinguishes each fpecies from one another, while they itood ranked under the fame general nature or genus. Though wine differs from other liquids in that it is the juice of a certain fruit, yet this is but a general or generic difference, for it does not diftinguith wine from cyder or perry; the fpecific difference of wine

therefore is its preffure from the grape; as, cyder is preffed from apples and perry from pears.

In definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary attribute that diftinguishes the fpecies or fpecial nature, and not attempt to define wine by its particular taftes, or effects, or other properties, which are but fecondary or confequential, when its preffure from the grape is the most obvious and primary diftinction of it from all other juices. I confefs in fome cafes it is not fo easily known which is the primary idea that diftinguishes one thing from another; and therefore fome would as foon define winter by the coldness of the feafon, as by the shortness of the days; though the shortness of the days is doubtlefs the most juft, primary and philofophical difference betwixt that and the other feasons of the year, fince winter days are always fhorteft, but not always the coldeft; I add also that the fhortness of the days is one cause of the coldness, but the cold is no caufe of their thortness.

THE

SECT. V.

Rules of the Definition of the Things.

HE fpecial rules of a good definition, are thefe :: Kule I. A definition must be univerfal, or as fome call it adequate; that is, it muft agree to all the particular fpecies or individuals that are included under the fame idea; fo the juice of a grape agrees to all proper wines, whether red, white, France, Spanish, Florence, &c.

Rule II. It must be proper and peculiar to the thing defined, and agree to that alone; for it is the very defign of a definition effectually to diftinguifh one thing. from all others: fo the juice of a grape agrees to no other fubftance, to no other liquid, to no other being: but wine.

These two rules being obferved, will always render a