attractive qualities, which proceed from the fubftantial forms of thofe various bodies. He imagines that he has explained why the loadstone's * north pole fhall repel the north end of a magnetic needle, and attract the fouth, when he affirms, that this is done by its fympathy, with one end of it, and its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in truth, all these names of fympathy, antipathy, fubftantial forms and qualities, when they are put up for the causes of thefe effects in bodies, are but hard words, which only exprefs a learned and pompous ignorance of the true cause of natural appearances; and in this fenfe they are mere words without ideas.

This will evidently appear, if one afk me, why a concave mirror or convex glafs will burn wood in the funbeams, or why a wedge will cleave it? and I fhould" tell him, it is by an uftorious quality in the mirror or glafs, and by a cleaving power in the wedge, arifing from a certain unknown fubftantial form in them, whence they derive these qualities; or if he should afk me, why a clock ftrikes, and points to the hour? and I-fhould fay, it is by an indicating form and fonorific quality; whereas I ought to tell him how the funbeams are collected and united by a burning glass; whence the mechanical force of a wedge is derived; and what are the wheels and fprings, the pointer and hammer, and bell, whereby a clock gives notice of the time, both to the eye and the ear. But these uftorious and cleaving powers, fonorous and indicating forms' and qualities, do either teach the enquirer nothing at all but what he knew before, or they are mere words' without ideast.

*Note, Some writers call that the fouth pole of a loadftone which attracts the fouth-end of the needle; but I chufe to follow those who call it the north pole.

+ It may be objected here. "And what does the modern philofopher with all his detail of mathematical numbers, and diagrams, do more than this toward the folution of these difficulties? does he not defcribe gravity by a certain unknown force, whereby bodies tend downward to the centre; hath he found the certain and mechanical reasons of attraction, magnetism," &c. I anfwer, that the moderns have found a thoufand things by applying mathematics to natural philofophy, which the ancients were ignorant of; and when they use any names of this kind, viz. gravitation, attraction, &c. they ufe them only to fignify, that there are fuch effects and fuch caufes, with a

H

And there is many a man in the vulgar and in the learned world, who imagines himself deeply skilled in the controverfies of divinity, whereas he has only furnished himself with a parcel of fcholaftic or mystic words, under fome of which the authors themselves, had no juft ideas; and the learner, when he hears, or pronounces them, hath scarce any ideas at all. Such fort of words fometimes have become matters of immortal contention, as though the gofpel could not stand without them; and yet the zealot perhaps knows little more of them than he does of Shibboleth, or Higgaion, Selah, Judges xii. 6. Pfal. ix. 16.

Yet here I would lay down this caution, that there are feveral objects of which we have not a clear and diftinct idea, much less an adequate or comprehensive one, and yet we cannot call the names of these things, words without ideas; fuch are the infinity and eternity of God himself, the union of our own foul and body, the union of the divine and human natures in Jefus Chrift, the operation of the holy Spirit on the mind of man, &c. Thefe ought not to be called words without ideas, for there is fufficient evidence for the reality and certainty of the existence of their objects; though there is fome confufion in our cleareft conceptions of them; and our ideas of them, though imperfect, areyet fufficient to converse about them, fo far as we have need, and to determine fo much as is neceffary for our own faith and practice.

Direct. II. Do not fuppofe that the natures or effences of things always differ from one another, as much as their names do. There are various purposes in human life, for which we put very different names on the same thing, or on things whofe natures are near a-kin; and thereby oftentimes, by making a new nominal fpecies, we are ready to deceive ourselves with the idea of another real fpecies of beings and thofe, whofe underftandings are led away by the mere found of words,

frequent confeffion of their ignorance of the true fprings of them : they do not pretend to make these words ftand for the real causes of things, as though they thereby affigned the true philofophical folution of thefe difficulties; for in this fenfe they will ftill be words without ideas, whether in the mouth of an old philofopher or a new one

fancy the nature of thofe things to be very different whose names are fo, and judge of them accordingly.”

I may borrow a remarkable inftance for my purpofe almoft out of every garden, which contains a variety of plants in it. Most or all plants agree in this, that they have a root, a ftalk, leaves, buds, bloffoms, and feeds: but the gardener ranges them under very different names, as though they were really different kinds of beings, merely because of the different use and service to which they are applied by men as for inftance, thoie plants whofe roots are eaten fhall appropriate the name of roots to themselves; fuch are carrots, turnips, radifhes, &c. If the leaves are of chief ufe to us, then we call them herbs; as fage, mint, thyme: if the leaves are eaten raw, they are termed fallad; as lettuce, purflain if boiled, they become pot-herbs; as fpinage, coleworts; and fome of those fame plants, which are pot-herbs in one family, are fallad in another. If the buds are made our food, they are called heads, or tops; fo cabbage-heads, heads of afparagus and artichoaks. If the bloffom be of most importance, we call it a flower; such are daifies, tulips, and carnations, which are the mere bloffoms of thofe plants. If the hulk or feeds are eaten, they are called the fruits of the ground, as pease, beans, strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of known and common ufe to us, in medicine, we call it a physical herb, as carduus, fcurvy-grafs; but if we count no part ufeful, we call it a weed, and throw it out of the garden; and yet perhaps our next neighbour knows fome valuable property and ufe of it; he plants it in his garden, and gives it the title of an herb, or a flower. You fee here how fmall is the real diftinction of these several plants, confidered in their general nature as the leffer vegetables: yet what very different ideas we vulgarly form concerning them, and make different fpecies of them, chiefly because of the different names given them.

Now when things are fet in this clear light, it appears how ridiculous it would be for two perfons to contend, whether dandelion be an herb, or a weed; whether it be a pot-herb or fallad; when by the custom or fancy of different families, this one plant obtains all these

names according to the several uses of it, and the value that is put upon it.

Note here, that I find no manner of fault with the variety of names which are given to several plants, according to the various ufes we make of them. But I would not have our judgments impofed upon hereby, to think that these mere nominal species, viz. herbs, fallad, and weeds, become three really different fpecies of beings, on this account, that they have different names and ufes. But I proceed to other inftances.

It has been the cuftom of mankind, when they have .been angry with any thing, to add a new ill name to it, that they may convey thereby a hateful idea of it though the nature of the thing still abides the fame. So the papifts call the proteftants heretics: a prophane perfon calls a man of piety a precifian: and in the times of the civil war in the laft century, the royalifts called the parliamentarians, fanatics, roundheads, and fetaries. And they in requital called the royalists, malignants: but the partizans on each fide were really neither better nor worfe for thefe names.

It has also been a frequent practice on the other hand, to put new favourable names upon ill ideas, on purpose to take off the odium of them. But notwithstanding all these flattering names and titles a man of profufe generofity is but a fpendthrift; a natural fon is a bastard ftill; a gallant is an adulterer, and a lady of pleasure is a whore.

Direct. III. Take heed of believing the nature and effence of two or more things to be certainly the fame, because they may have the fame name given them. This has been an unhappy and fatal occafion of a thousand mistakes in the natural, in the civil, and in the religious affairs of life both amongst the vulgar and the learned. I fhall give two or three inftances chiefly in the matters of natural philofophy, having hinted feveral dangers of this kind relating to theology in the foregoing difcourfe concerning equivocal words.

Our elder philofophers have generally made use of the word foul to fignify that principle whereby a plant grows, and they called it the vegetative foul: the principle of animal motion of a brute has been likewife called a foul, and we have been taught to name it the fenfitive

foul they have alfo given the name of foul to that fu perior principle in man, whereby he thinks, judges, reafons, &c. And though they diftinguifhed this by the honourable title of the rational foul, yet in common. difcourfe and writing we leave out the words vegetative, sensitive, and rational; and make the word foul ferve for all these principles: thence we are led early into this imagination, that there is a fort of fpiritual being in plants, and in brutes, like that in men. Whereas if we did but abftract and feparate these things from words, and compare the caufe of growth in a plant, with the cause of reasoning in man (without the word foul) we fhall never think that these two principles were at all like one another; nor fhould we perhaps fo eafily and peremptorily conclude, that brutes need an intelligent mind to perform their animal actions.

Another inftance may be the word life, which being attributed to plants, to brutes, and to men, and in each of them afcribed to the foul, has very easily betrayed us from our infancy into this mistake, that the spirit or mind or thinking principle, in man, is the fpring of vegetative and animal life to his body: whereas it is evident, that if the fpirit or thinking principle of man gave life to his animal nature, the way to fave men from dying would not be to ufe medicines, but to perfuade the spirit to abide in the body..

I might derive a third inftance from the word heat y which is used to fignify the fenfation we have when we are near the fire, as well as cause of that fenfation which is in the fire itfelf; and thence we conclude from our infancy, that there is a fort of heat in the fire refembling our own fenfation, or the heat which we feel; whereas in the fire there is nothing but little particles. of matter of fuch particular thapes, fizes, fituations and motions as are fitted to imprefs fuch motions on our flesh or nerves as excite the fenfe of heat. Now if this cause of our fenfation in the fire had been always called by a diftinct name, perhaps we had not been fo rooted in this mistake, that the fire is hot with the fame fort of heat that we feel. This will appear with more evidence, when we confider that we are secure from the fame mistake when there have been two