prehenfion, when we speak of our knowledge of God, who can never be comprehended by his creatures.

Note 2. Though there are a multitude of ideas which may be called perfect or adequate, in a vulgar sense, yet there are fcarce any ideas which are adequate, comprehenfive, and complete in a philofophical fense; for there is fcarce any thing in the world that we know, as to all the parts, and powers, and properties of it, in perfection. Even fo plain an idea as that of a triangle, has perhaps infinite properties belonging to it, of which we know but a few. Who can tell what are the fhapes and pofitions of thofe particles, which caufe all the variety of colours that appear on the furface of things? Who knows what are the figures of the little corpufcles that compofe and diftinguifh different bodies? The ideas of brafs, iron, gold, wood, ftone, hyflop, and rosemary, have an infinite variety of hidden myfteries contained in the fhape, fize, motion, and pofition of the little particles of which they are compofed; and perhaps alfo infinite unknown properties and powers that may be derived from them. And if we arife to the animal world, or the world of fpirits, our knowledge of them must be amazingly imperfect, when there is not the leaft grain of fand, or empty space, but has too many questions and difficulties belonging to it, for the wifeft philofopher upon earth to answer and refolve.

IV. OUR ideas are eithe. true or false; for an idea being the representation of a thing in the mind, it must be either a true or a falfe reprefentation of it. If the idea be conformable to the object or archetype of it, it is a true idea; if not, it is a false one. Sometimes our

ideas are referred to things really exifting without us as their archetypes. If I fee bodies in their propes coburs, I have a true idea; but when a man under the jaundice fees all bodies yellow, he has a false idea of them. So if we fee the fun or moon rifing or fetting, our idea reprefents them bigger than what they are on the meridian; and in this sense it is a false idea, because thofe heavenly bodies are all day and all night of the fame bignefs. Or when I fee a straight staff appear

crooked while it is half under water, I fay the water gives me a false idea of it. Sometimes our ideas refer to the ideas of other men, denoted by fuch a particular word as their archetypes. So when I hear a proteftant ufe the words church and facraments, if I understand by thefe words a congregation of faithful men who profefs chriftianity, and the two ordinances, baptifm and the Lord's fupper, I have a true idea of those words in the common fenfe of proteftants; but if the man who fpeaks of them be a papift, he means the church of Rome and the feven facraments, and then I have a mistaken idea of those words, as fpoken by him, for he has a different fenfe and meaning; and in general, whenfoever I mistake the fenfe of any fpeaker or writer, I may be faid to have a falfe idea of it.

Some think that truth or falfhood properly belongs only to propofitions, which fhall be the fubject of difcourfe in the fecond part of logic; for if we confider ideas as mere impreffions upon the mind, made by outward objects, thofe impreffions will ever be conformable to the laws of nature in fuch a cafe; the water will make a stick appear crooked, and the horizontal air will make the fun and moon appear bigger. And generally, where there is falfhood in ideas, there feems. to be fome fecret or latent propofition, whereby we judge falfely of things. This is more obvious where we take up the words of a writer or speaker in a miftaken femfe; for we join his words to our own ideas, which are different from his. But after all, fince ideas are pictures of things, it can never be very improper to pronounce them to be true or falfe, according to their conformity or non-conformity to their examplars.

E 2

CHAP. IV.

OF WORDS, AND THEIR SEVERAL DIVISIONS, TOGETHER
WITH THE ADVANTAGE AND DANGER OF THEM.

SECT. I.

Of Words in General, and their Ufe.

HOUGH our ideas are first acquired by the perception of objects, or by various fenfations and reflections, yet we convey them to each other by the means of certain founds, or written marks, which we call words; and a great part of our knowledge is both. obtained and communicated by these means, which are called fpeech or language.

But as we are led into the knowledge of things by words, fo we are oftentimes led into error, or mistake, by the ufe or abufe of words also. And in order to guard against fuch mistakes, as well as to promote our improvement in knowledge, it is neceffary to acquaint ourfelves a little with words and terms. We fhall begin with thefe obfervations.

Obferv. 1. WORDS (whether they are spoken or written) have no natural connection with the ideas they are defigned to fignify, nor with the things which are reprefented in thofe ideas. There is no manner of difference between the founds white in English, or black in French, and that colour which we reprefent by that name; nor have the letters of which these words are compofed, any natural aptnefs to signify that colour than red or green. Words and names. therefore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men to communicate their thoughts or ideas to one another.

Obferv. 2. If one single word were appointed to ex

prefs but one simple idea, and nothing elfe, as white, black, faveet, four, fharp, bitter, extenfion, duration, there would be scarce any mistake about them.

But, alas it is a common unhappiness in language, that different simple ideas are fometimes expreffèd by the fame word; fo the words fweet and fharp are applied both to the objects of hearing and tafting, as we ihall fee hereafter; and this, perhaps, may be one cause or foundation of obfcurity and error arising from. words.

Obferv. 3. In communicating our complex ideas to one another, if we could join as many peculiar and appropriated words together in one found, as we join simple ideas to make one complex one, we fhould feldom be in danger of mistaking: When I exprefs the taste of an apple, which we call the bitter fweet, none: can mistake what I mean..

Yet this fort of composition would make all lan-guage a moft tedious and unweildy thing, since most of our ideas are complex, and many of them have eight or ten simple ideas in them; fo that the remedy would be worse than the difeafe; for what is now expreffed in one short word, as month or year, would require two lines to exprefs it. It is neceffary, therefore, that single words be invented to exprefs complex ideas, in order to make language fhort and useful.

But here is our great infelicity, that when singlewords signify complex ideas, one word can never diftinctly manifeft all the parts of a complex idea; and thereby it will often happen, that one man includes more or lefs in his idea, than another does, while he affixes the fame word to it. In this cafe there will be danger of miftake between them, for they do not mean the fame object, though they ufe the fame name. So, if one person or nation, by the word year mean twelve months of thirty days each, that is, three hundred and sixty-five days, another intend a folar year of threehundred and sixty days, and a third mean a lunar year, or twelve lunar months, that is, three hundred and fifty-four days, there will be a great variation andi error in their account of things, unless they are well apprifed of each other's meanings before hand. This

is fuppofed to be the reason why fome ancient hiftories. and prophecies, and accounts of chronology, are fo hard to be adjusted. And this is the true reason of fo furious and endless debates on many points in divinity; the words church, worship, idolatry, repentance, faith, election, merit, grace, and many others which signify very complex ideas, are not applied to include juft the fame simple ideas, and the fame number of them, by the various contending parties: Thence arise confusion and contest.

Obferv. 4. Though a single name does not certainly manifeft to us all the parts of a complex idea, yet it must be acknowledged, that in many of our complex ideas, the single name may point out to us fome chief property which belongs to the thing the word signifies; efpecially when the word or name is traced up to its original, through feveral languages from whence it is borrowed. So an apoftle signifies one that is fent forth.

But this tracing of a word to its original, (which is called etymology), is fometimes a very precarious and uncertain thing; and, after all, we have made but little progrefs towards the attainment of the full meaning of a complex idea, by knowing fome one chief property of it. We know but a fmail part of the notion of an apostle by knowing barely that he is fent forth.

Obferv. 5. Many (if not moft) of our words which are applied to moral and intellectual ideas, when traced up to the original in the learned languages, will be found to fignify fenfible and corporeal things: Thus the words apprehenfion, understanding, abstraction, invention, idea, inference, prudence, religion, church, adoration, &c. have all a corporeal fignification in their original. The name spirit itfelf fignifies breath or air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew: Such is the poverty of all languages, they are forced to use thefe names for incorporeal ideas, which thing has a tendency to error and confufion.

Obferv. 6. The laft thing I fhall mention that leads. us into many a miftake is, the multitude of objects that one name fometimes fignifies: There is almost an infinite variety of things and ideas both fimple and