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The comprehenfion of an idea regards all the effential modes and properties of it: fo body in its comprehenfion takes in folidity, figure, quantity, mobility, &c. So a bowl in its comprehenfion includes roundnefs, volubility, &c.

The extension of an univerfal idea regards all the particular kinds and fingle beings that are contained under it. So a body in its extenfion includes fun, moon, ftar, wood, iron, plant, animal, &c. which are feveral fpecies, or individuals, under the general name of body. So a bowl, in its extenfion, includes a wooden bowl, a brafs bowl, a white and black bowl, a heavy bowl, &c. and all kinds of bowls, together with all the particular individual bowls in the world.

Note. THE comprehenfion of an idea is fometimes taken in fo large a fenfe, as not only to include the effential attributes, but all the properties, modes, and relations whatsoever, that belong to any being, as will appear, Chap. VI.

This account of genus and species is part of that famous doctrine of univerfals, which is taught in the schools, with divers other formalities belonging to it; for it is in this place that they introduce difference, which is the primary effential mode, and property, or the fecondary effential mode, and accident, or the accidental mode; and thefe they call the five predicables, becaufe every thing that is affirmed concerning any being must be either the genus, the fpecies, the difference, fome property, fome accident; but what farther is neceflary to be faid concerning the fe things will be mentioned when we treat of definition.,

Having finished the doctine of univerfal and particular ideas, I fhould take notice of another divifion of them, which alfo hath refpect to their objects; and that is, they are either real or imaginary.

Real ideas are fuch as have a juft foundation in nature, and have real objects, or examplars, which did, or do, or may actually exift, according to the prefent ftate and nature of things; fuch are all our ideas of long, broad, fwift, flow, wood, iron, men, horses, thoughts,

fpirits, a cruel mafter, a proud beggar, a man seven feet high.

Imaginary ideas, which are alfo called fantaftical, or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging, diminishing, uniting, dividing real ideas in the mind, in fuch a manner as no objects or exemplars did or ever will exift, according to the prefent course of nature, though the feveral parts of these ideas are borrowed from real objects; fuch are thefe conceptions we have of a centaur, a fatyr, a golden mountain, a flying horse, a dog without a head, a bull lefs than a moule, or a moufe as big as a bull, and a man twenty feet high.

Some of these fantastical ideas are poffible, that is they are not utterly inconfiftent in the nature of things, and therefore it is within the reach of divine power to make fuch objects; fuch are most of the inftances already given; but impoffibles carry an utter inconsist ence in the ideas which are joined: fuch are self-active matter, and infinite or eternal men, a pious man without honefty, or heaven without holinefs.

SECT. IV.

The Divifion of Ideas, with regard to their Qualities:

IDEAS

DEAS, with regard to their qualities, afford us thefe feveral divifions of them. 1. They are ei ther clear and diftinct, or obfcure and confufed. 21 They are vulgar or learned. 3. They are perfect or imperfect. 4. They are true or falfe.

I. OUR ideas are either clear and diftinet, or obfcure and confused.

Several writers have diftinguished the clear ideas from thofe that are diftinct; and the confufed ideas from those that are obfcure; and it must be acknowledged, there may be fome difference between them; for it is the clearness of ideas for the most part makes

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them distinct; and the obfcurity of ideas is one thing that will always bring a fort of confusion into them. Yet when these writers come to talk largely upon this fubject, and to explain and adjuft their meaning with great nicety, I have generally found that they did not keep up the diftinction they first defigned, but they confound the one with the other. I fhall therefore treat of clear or distinct ideas, as one and the fame fort, and obfcure or confufed ideas, as another.

A clear and diftinct idea is that which reprefents the object of the mind with full evidence and ftrength, and plainly distinguishes it from all other objects whatfoever.

An obfcure and confufed idea reprefents the object either fo faintly, fo imperfectly, or fo mingled with. qther ideas, that the object of it doth not appear plain to the mind, not purely in its own nature, nor fufficiently diftinguished from other things.

When we fee the fea and fky nearer at hand, we have a clear and diftinct idea of each; but when we look far toward the horizon, efpecially in a mifty day, our ideas of both are but obfcure and confused; for we know not which is fea and which is fky. So when we look at the colours of the rainbow, we have a clear idea of the red, the blue, the green in the middle of their feveral arches; and a distinct idea too, while the eye fixes there; but when we confider the border of thofe colours, they fo run into one another, that it renders their ideas confufed and obfcure. So the idea which we have of our brother, or our friend, whom we fee daily, is clear and distinct; but when the abfence of many years has injured the idea, it becomes obfcure and confufed.

Note here, that fome of our ideas may be very clear and diftinct in one respect, and very obfcure and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a chiliagonum, or a figure of a thousand angles, we may have a clear and diftinct rational idea of the number one thousand angles; for we can demonftrate various properties concerning it by reafon; but the image, or fenfible idea, which we have of the figure is but confufed and obfcure; for we cannot precifely diftinguifh it by fancy

from the image of a figure that has nine hundred angles, or nine hundred and ninety. So when we fpeak of the infinite divifibility of matter, we always keep in our minds a very clear and diftinct idea of divifion and divifibility. But after we have made a little progrefs in dividing, and come to parts that are far too fmall for the reach of our fenfes, then our ideas, or fenfible images of thefe little bodies, become obscure and indiftinct, and the idea of infinite is very obfcure, imperfect, and confused.

II. IDEAS are either vulgar or learned. A vulgar idea represents to us the most obvious and fenfible appearances that are contained in the object of them; but a learned idea penetrates farther into the nature, properties, reafons, caufes and effects of things. This is beft illuftrated by fome examples.

It is a vulgar idea that we have of a rainbow, when we conceive a large arch in the clouds, made up of various colours parallel to each other; but it is learned idea which a philofopher has when he confiders it as the various reflections and refractions of fun-beams in drops of falling rain. So it is a vulgar idea which we have of the colours of folid bodies, when we perceive them to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green tincture of the furface of those bodies; but it is a philofophical idea when we confider the various colours to be nothing else but different fenfations excited in us by the varioufly refracted rays of light reflected on our eyes in a different manner, according to the different fize, or fhape, or fituation of the particles of which the furfaces of thofe bodies are compofed. It is a vulgar idea, which we have of a watch or clock, when we conceive of it as a pretty inftrument made to fhew us the hour of the day; but it is a learned idea which the watchmaker has of it, who knows all the feveral parts of it, the fpring, the balance, the chain, the wheels, their axles, &c. together with the various connections and adjustments of each part, whence the exact and uniform motion of the index is derived, which points. to the minute or the hour. So when a common understanding reads Virgil's Eneid, he has but a vulgar

idea of that poem; yet his mind is naturally entertained with the ftory, and his ears with the verse; but when a critic, or a man who has skill in poefy, reads it, he has a learned idea of its peculiar beauties; he tastes and relishes a fuperior pleasure; he admires the Roman poet, and wishes he had known the chriftian theology, which would have furnished him with nobler materials and machines than all the heathen idols.

It is with a vulgar idea that the world beholds the cartoons of Raphael at Hampton-court, and every one feels his fhare of pleasure and entertainment; but a painter contemplates the wonders of that Italian pencil, and fees a thousand beauties in them which the vulgar eye neglected his learned ideas give him a tranfcendent delight, and yet, at the fame time, difcover the blemishes which the common gazer never observed.

III. IDEAS are either perfect or imperfect, which are otherwife called adequate or inadequate.

Thofe are adequate ideas which perfectly represent their archetypes or objects. Inadequate ideas are but a partial or incomplete reprefentation of thofe archetypes to which they are referred.

All our fimple ideas are in fome fenfe adequate or perfect; becaufe fimple ideas, confidered merely as our firft perceptions, have no parts in them; fo we may be faid to have a perfect idea of white, black, sweet, four, length, light, motion, reft, &c. We have also a perfect idea of various figures, as a triangle, a fquare, a cylinder, a cube, a fphere, which are complex ideas; but our idea or image of a figure of a thousand fides, our idea of the city of London, or the powers of a Joadftone, are very imperfect, as well as all our ideas of infinite length or breadth, infinite power, wisdom, or duration; for the idea of infinite is endless and ever growing, and can never be completed.

Note 1. WHEN we have a perfect idea of any thing in all its parts, it is called a complete idea; when in all its properties, it is called comprehenfive. But when we have but an inadequate and imperfect idea, we are only said to apprehend it; therefore ufe the term ar

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