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SECT. V.

Of the ten Categories. Of Subftances modified.

WE

E have thus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, viz. Subftances and modes, and their various kinds; and in these last fections, we have briefly comprized the greatest part of what is neceffary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments or categories of Ariftotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by feveral of his followers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the names are thefe: Subftance, quantity, quality, relation, action, paffion, where, when, fituation, and cloathing. It would be mere lofs of time to fhew how loofe, how injudicious, and even ridiculous is this ten-fold divifion of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve ufeful knowledge, fhould be fought in ontology, and in other sciences.

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us confider the fubftance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be faid on this fubject than this, viz. There is fome difference between a fubftance when it is confidered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is diftinguifhed from them, and confidered naked without them.

As

thefe.

SECT. VI.

Of Not-Being.

S being is divided into fubftance and mode, fo we may confider not-being with regard to both

I. NOT-BEING is confidered as excluding all fubftance, and then all modes are alfo neceffarily excluded, and this we call pure nullity, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philofophical fenfe; fo we fay there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar fenfe, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot fay there is nothing in the cup, in a ftrict philofophical fenfe, while there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.

H. NOT-BEING, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be confidered either as a mere negation, or as a privation.

A negation is the abfence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or neceffity to be prefent with it; as when we fay a ftone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life, nor fight, nor hearing; nor when we fay a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, thefe are mere negations.

But a privation is the abfence of what does naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which ought to be present with it, as when a man or a horse is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a phyfician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations; fo the finfulness of any human action is faid to be a privation; for fin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man.

Note. THERE are fome writers who make all fort of relative modes or relations, as well as all external de nominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis, and then they rank them also under the general head of not-beings; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations, which feem to have something lefs of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations which ought not to be reduced to fo low a clafs; such are the fituation of bodies, their mutual diftances, their particular proportions and measures, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, fonfhip, &c. all which are relative ideas. The

very effence of virtue or holinefs confifts in the conformity of our actions to the rule of right reason, or the law of God; the nature and effence of fincerity is the conformity of our words and actions to our thoughts, all which are but mere relations; and I think we must not reduce such pofitive beings as piety, virtue, and truth, to the rank of non-entities, which have nothing real in them, though fin (or rather the finfulness of an action) may be properly called a not-being, for it is a want of piety and virtue. This is the most usual, and perhaps the jufteft, way of reprefenting thefe matters.

CHAP. III.

OF THE SEVERAL SORTS OF PERCEPTIONS OR IDEAS.

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DEAS may be divided with regard to their original, their nature, their objects, and their qualities.

SECT. I.

Of fenfible, fpiritual, and abftracted Ideas.

HERE has been a great controverfy about the

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origin of ideas, viz. Whether any of our ideas are innate or no, that is, born with us, and naturally belonging to our minds? Mr Locke utterly denies it; others as pofitively affirm it: Now, though this controverfy may be compromifed, by allowing that there is a fenfe, wherein our firft ideas of fome things may be faid to be innate, (as I have fhewn in fome remarks on Mr Locke's effay, which have lain long by me), yet it does not belong to this place and bufinefs to have that point debated at large, nor will it hinder our pursuit of the prefent work to pafs it over in filence.

D

There is fufficient ground to fay, that all our ideas, with regard to their original, may be divided into three forts, viz. Senfible, fpiritual, and abftracted ideas.

I. SENSIBLE or corporeal ideas are derived originally from our fenfes, and from the communication which the foul has with the animal body in this present state; fuch are the notions we frame of all colours, founds, tastes, figures, or fhapes and motions: for our fenses being converfant about particular fenfible objects become the occafions of feveral diftinct conceptions in the mind; and thus we come by the ideas of yellow, white, heat, cold, foft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call fenfible qualities. All the ideas which we have of body, and the fensible modes and properties that belong to it, feem to be derived from fenfation.

And howfoever thefe may be treafured up in the memory, and by the work of fancy may be increased, diminished, compounded, divided, and diverfified, (which we are ready to call our invention), yet they all derive their firft nature and being from fomething that has been let into our minds by one or other of our fenfes If I think of a golden mountain, or a fea of liquid fire, yet the single ideas of fea, fire, mountain, and gold came into my thoughts at firft by sensation; the mind has only compounded them.

II. *SPIRITUAL or intellectual ideas are those which we gain by reflecting on the nature and actions of our own fouls, and turning our thoughts within ourselves, and obferving what is tranfacted in our own minds. Such are the ideas we have of thought, affent, diffent, judging, reason, knowledge, understanding, will, love, fear, hope.

By fenfation the foul contemplates things (as it were) out of itself, and gains corporeal reprefentations or fenfible ideas; by reflection the foul contemplates itself, and things within itself, and by this means it gains fpiritual ideas, or representations of things intellectual.

Here it may be noted, though the first original of

*Here the word Spiritual is used in a mere natural, and not in a religious fenfe.

thefe two forts of ideas, viz. Senfible and fpiritual, may be entirely owing to thefe two principles, fenfation and reflection, yet the recollection and fresh excitation of then may be owning to a thousand other occafions and Occurrences of life. We could never inform a man who was born blind or deaf what we mean by the words yellow, blue, red, or by the words loud or thrill, nor convey any just ideas of these things to his mind, by all the powers of language, unless he has experienced thofe fenfations of found and colour; nor could we ever gain the ideas of thought, judgment, reason, doubting, hoping, &c. by all the words that man could invent, without turning our thoughts inward upon the actions of our own fouls. Yet when we once have attained these ideas by fenfation and reflection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, words, figns, or by any thing elfe that has been connected with them in our thoughts; for when two or more ideas have been affociated together, whether it be by custom, or accident, or defign, the one prefently brings the other to mind..

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III. BESIDES these two which we have named, there is a third fort of ideas, which are commonly called abftracted ideas, because though the original ground or occafion of them may be fenfation, or reflection, or both, yet thefe ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we ufually call abstraction. Now the word abftraction fignifies a withdrawing fome parts of an idea from other parts of it, by which means fuch abstracted ideas are formed, as neither reprefent any thing corporeal or fpiritual, that is, any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these are of two kinds.

Some of thefe abftracted ideas are the most abfolute general, and univerfal conceptions of things confidered in themfelves, without refpect to others, fuch as entity or being, and not-being, effence, existence, act, power, fubftance, mode, accident, &c.

The other fort of abstracted ideas is relative, as when we compare feveral things together, and confider merely the relations of one thing to another, entirely drop

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