which we pafs upon things are generally built on fome fecret reafoning or argument by which the proposition is fuppofed to be proved. But there may be yet fome farther. affittances given to our reafoning powers in their fearch after truth, and an obfervation of the following rules will be of great importance for that end,

1. Kule. Accuftom yourfelves to clear and diftinct ideas, to evident propofitions, to ftrong and convincing arguments. Converse much with those friends, and thofe books and thofe parts of learning where you meet with the greatest clearness of thought and force of reafoning. The mathematical sciences, and particularly arithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with thefe advantages: and. if there were nothing valuable in them for the uses of human life; yet the very fpeculative parts of this fort of learning are well worth our ftudy; for by perpetual examples they teach us to conceive with clearness, to connect our ideas and propofitions in train of dependence, to reason with ftrength and demonftration, and to diftinguish between truth and falfehood. Something of thefe fciences fhould be ftudied by every man who pretends to learning, and that (as Mr Locke expreffes it) not fo much to make us mathematicians, as to make us reasonable creatures.

We should gain fuch a familiarity with evidence of perception and force of reafoning, and get fuch a ha-1 bit of difcerning clear truth, that the mind may be foon offended with obfcurity and confufion: then we fhall (as it were) naturally and with ease restrain our minds from rafh judgment, before we attain juft evidence of the propofition which is offered to us; and we fhall with the fame eafe, and (as it were) naturally feize and embrace every truth that is proposed with juft evidence.

This habit of conceiving clearly, of judging juftly, and of reafoning well, is not to be attained merely by the happiness of constitution, the brightness of genius, the best natural parts, or the beft collection of logical precepts. It is cuftom and practice that must form and establish this habit. We must apply ourselves to it till we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on rules. A coherent thinker, and a ftrict reafoner is not to be made at once by a fet of rules, any

more than a good painter or musician may be formed extempore by an excellent lecture on mufic or painting. It is of infinite importance therefore in our younger years, to be taught both the value and the practice of conceiving clearly and reafoning right: for when we are grown up to the middle of life, or paft it, it is no wonder that we should not learn good reafoning, any more than that an ignorant clown fhould not be able to learn fine language, dancing, or a courtly behaviour, when his ruftic airs have grown up with him till the age of forty.

For want of this care, fome perfons of rank and education dwell all their days among obfcure ideas; they conceive and judge always in confufion, they take weak arguments for demonftration, they are led away with the difguifes and fhadows of truth. Now if fuch perfons happen to have a bright imagination, a volubility of fpeech, and a copioufnefs of language, they not only impofe many errors upon their own understandings, but they ftamp the image of their own mistakes upon their neighbours alfo, and fpread their errors abroad.

It is a matter of just lamentation and pity, to confider the weaknefs of the common multitude of mankind in this refpect, how they receive any thing into their affent upon the moft trifling grounds. True reafoning hath very little fhare in forming their opinions. They refift the moft convincing arguments by an obftinate adherence to their prejudices, and believe the moft improbable things with the greateft affurance. They talk of the abftrufeft mysteries, and determine upon them with the utmoft confidence, and without juft evidence either from reafon or revelation. A confufed heap of dark and inconfiftent ideas make up a good part of their knowledge in matters of philofophy as well as religion, having never been taught the ufe and value of clear and juft reafoning.

Yet it must be ftill confeffed that there are fome my. fteries, in religion, both natural and revealed, as well as fome abfirufe points in philofophy, wherein the wife as well as the unwife must be content with obfcure ideas. There are feveral things, especially relating to

the invifible world, which are unfearchable in our prefent state, and therefore we must believe what revelation plainly dictates, though the ideas may be obfcure, Reafon itfelf demands this of us; but we fhould seek for the brightest evidence both of ideas, and of the connection of them, wherefoever it is attainable.

Rule II. Enlarge your general acquaintance with things daily, in order to attain a rich furniture of topics, or middle terms, whereby thofe propofitions which occur may be either proved or difproved; but especially meditate and inquire with great diligence and exactneis into the nature, properties, circumftances and relations of the particular fubject about which you judge or argue. Confider its caufes, effects, confequences, adjuncts, oppofites, figns, &c. fo far as is needful to your prefent purpose. You fhould furvey a queftion round about, and on all fides, and extend your views as far as poffible, to every thing that has a connection with it. This practice has many advantages in it; as,

1. It will be a means to fuggeft to your mind proper topics for argument about any proposition that relates to the fame fubject.

2. It will enable you with greater readinefs and juftnefs of thought to give an answer to any fudden queftion upon that fubject, whether it arifes in your own mind, or be proposed by others.

3. This will inftruct you to give a plainer and speedier solution of any difficulties that may attend the theme of your difcourfe, and to refute the objections of thofe who have efpoufed a contrary opinion.

4. By fuch a large furvey of the whole fubject in all its properties and relations, you will be better fecured from inconfiftencies, that is, from afferting or denying any thing in one place, which contradicts what you have afferted or denied in another; and to attain these ends, an extensiveness of understanding and a large memory are of unfpeakable fervice.

One would be ready to wonder fometimes, how eafily great and wife and learned men are led into affertions in fome parts of the fame treatise, which are found to be scarce confiftent with what they have afferted in other places: but the true reafon is the narrownefs of the mind of man, that it cannot take in all the innu

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merable properties and relations, of one fubject with a ingle view; and therefore whilft they are intent on one particular part of their theme, they bend all their force of thought to prove or difprove fome propofition that relates to that part, without a fufficient attention to the confequences which may flow from it, and which may unhappily affect another part of the fame fubject; and by this means they are fometimes led to say things which are inconfiftent. In fuch a cafe the great dealers in difpute and controverfy take pleasure to caft nonfenfe and felf-contradiction on their antagonift with huge and hateful reproaches. For my part, I rather chule to pity human nature, whofe neceffary narrownefs of understanding expofes us all to fome degrees of this frailty. But the most extenfive furvey poflible of our whole fubject is the best remedy against it. It is our judging and arguing upon a partial view of things, that expofes us to mistakes, and pushes us into abfurdities, or at leaft to the very borders of them.

Rule III. In fearching the knowledge of things, always keep the precife point of the prefent question in your eye. Take heed that you add nothing to it while you are arguing, nor omit any part of it. Watch carefully left any new ideas flide in, to mingle themselves either with the fubject or predicate. See that the queftion be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in different fenfes ; nor let any fecret prejudices of your own, or the fophiftical arts of others, cheat your understanding by changing the question, or fhuffling in any thing elfe in its room.

And for this end it is useful to keep the precife matter of inquiry as fimple as may be, and difengaged from a complication of ideas, which do not neceffarily belong to it. By admitting a complication of ideas, and tak ing too many things at once into one question, the mind is fometimes dazzled and bewildered; and the truth is loft in fuch a variety and confufion of ideas; whereas by limiting and narrowing the question, you take a fuller furvey of the whole of it.

By keeping the fingle point of inquiry in our conftant view, we fhall be fecured from fudden, rash, and impertinent refponfes and determinations, which fome have obtruded, inftead of folutions and folid anfwers, before they perfectly know the questions.

Rule IV. When you have exactly confidered the precife points of inquiry, or what is unknown in the queftion, then confider what, and how much you know already of this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it is compofed. It is by a comparison of the known and unknown parts of the question together, that you may find what reference the part known hath unto, or what connection it hath with the thing that is fought: thofe ideas, whereby the known and unknown parts of the question are connected, will furnish you with middle terms or arguments whereby the thing propofed may be proved or difproved.

In this part of your work, (viz.) comparing ideas together, take due time, and be not too hasty to come to a determination, efpecially in points of importance. Some men when they fee a little agreement or difagreement between ideas, they prefume a great deal, and fo jump into the conclufion: this is a fhort way to fancy opinion, and conceit : but a moft unsafe and uncertain way to true knowledge and wisdom.

Rule V. In chufing your middle terms or arguments to prove any question, always take fuch topics as are fureft, and leaft fallible, and which carry the greatest evidence and ftrength with them. Be not fo folicitous. about the number, as the weight of your arguments, especially in proving any propofition which admits of natural certainty, or of compleat demonstration. Many times we do injury to a caufe by dwelling upon trifling arguments. We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by multiplying the number of feeble reasonings, before we mention those which are more fubftantial, conclufive, and convincing. And too often we yield' up our. own affent to mere probable arguments, where certain. proofs may be obtained.

Yet it must be confeffed there are many cafes, wherein the growing number of probable arguments increases the degree of probability, and gives a great and fufficient confirmation to the truth which is fought; as,

(1.) When we are inquiring the true fenfe of any word or phrafe, we are more confirmed in the fignification of it, by finding the fame expreflion fo ufed in feveral authors, or in feveral places of the fame author. (2.) When we are fearching out the true meaning