When an argument carries the face of truth with it, and yet leads us into miltake, it is a sophism: and there is fome need of a particular defcription of these fallacious arguments, that we may with more ease and readiness detect and folve them.

SECT. I.

Of feveral Kinds of Sophifms and their Solution.

S the rules of right judgment and of good ratiocination often coincide with each other, fo the doctrine of prejudices, which was treated of in the fecond part of logic, has anticipated a great deal of what might be faid on the fubject of fophifms: yet I fhall mention the most remarkable fprings of falfe argumentation, which are reduced by logicians to fome of the following heads.

I. The first fort of fophifm is called ignoratio elenchi, or a mistake of the question; that is, when fomething elfe is proved which has neither any neceflary connection or inconfiftency with the thing inquired, and confequently gives no determination to the inquiry tho' it may feem at first fight to determine the question; as, if any should conclude that St Paul was not a native Jew, by proving that he was born a Roman; or if they fhould pretend to determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving that he was born at Tarfus in Cilicia; thefe fophifms are refuted by fhewing that thefe three may be true; for he was born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarfus, and by fome peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his native city, he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there is neither of these three characters of the apoftle inconfiftent with each other, and therefore the proving one of them true does not refute the other.

Or if the queftion be propofed, whether excefs of wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the soZ

phifter fhould prove that it revives his fpirit, it exhilarates his foul, it gives a man courage, and makes him ftrong and active, and then he takes it for granted that he has proved his point.

But the refpondent, may eafily fhew, that though wine may do all this, yet it may be finally hurtful both to the foul and body of him that drinks it to excess.

Difputers when they grow warm are ready to run into this fallacy; they drefs up the opinion of their adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe fentiments to him which he doth not acknowledge, and when they have with a great deal of pomp attacked and confounded thefe images of straw of their own making, they triumph over their adverfary, as though they had utterly confounded his opinion.

It is a fallacy of the fame kind which a difputant is guilty of, when he finds that his adverfary is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly prove the question firft propofed, he then with flynefs and fubtlety turns the difcourfe afide to fome other kindred point which he can prove, and exults in that new argument wherein this opponent never contradicted him.

The way to prevent this fallacy is by keeping the eye fixed on the precife point of difpute, and neither wandering from it ourfelves, nor fuffering our antagonist to wander from it, or fubftitute any thing else in its

room.

II. The next fophifm is called petitio principii, or a fuppofition of what is not granted; that is, when any propofition is proved by the fame propofition in other words, or by fomething that is equally uncertain and difputed as if any one undertake to prove that the human foul is extended through all the parts of the body, because it refides in every member, which is but the fame thing in other words. Or, if a Papift fhould pretend to prove that his religion is the only Catholic religion, and is derived from Chrift and his apoftles, becaufe it agrees with the doctrine of all the fathers of the Church, all the holy Martyrs, and all the Chriftian world throughout all ages: whereas this is a great point in conteft, whether their religion does agree with

that of all the ancients, and the primitive chriftians

or no.

III. That fort of fallacy which is called a Circle is very near a-kin to the petitio principii, as, when one of the premises in a fyllogifm is questioned and oppofed, and we intend to prove it by the conclufion: or, when in a train of fyllogifms we prove the last by recurring to what was the conclufion of the firft. The Papifts are famous at this fort of fallacy, when they prove the fcripture to be the word of God by the authority or infalliole teftimony of their church, and when they are called to thew the infallible authority of their church, they pretend to prove it by the fcripture.

IV. The next kind of fophifm is called non caufa pro caufa, or the affignation of a falfe caufe. This the Peripateticphilofophers were guilty of continually, when they told us that certain being, which they called fubftantial forms, were the fprings of colour, motion, vegetation, and the various operations of natural beings in the animate and inanimate world; when they informed us that nature was terribly afraid of a vacuum, and that it was the caufe why the water would not fall out of a Jong tube if it was turned upfide down: the moderns as well as the ancients fall often into this fallacy, when they positively affign the reafons of natural appearances, without fufficient experiments to prove them.

Aftrologers are over-run with this fort of fallacies, and they cheat the people grofly by pretending to tell fortunes, and to deduce the caufe of the various occurrences in the lives of men from the various pofitions of the stars and planets, which they call Afpects.

When comets and eclipfes of the fun and moon are conftrued to fignify the fate of princes, the revolution of ftates, famine, wars, and calamities of all kinds, it is a fallacy that belongs to this rank of fophifms.

There is scarce any thing more common in human life than this fort of deceitful argument. If any two accidental events happen to concur, one is presently made the caufe of the other. If Titius wronged his neighbour of a guinea, and in fix months after he fell down and broke his leg, weak men will impute it to the divine vengeance on Titius for his former injuftice.

This fophifm was found alfo in the early days of the world for when holy Job was furrounded with uncommon miferies, his own friends inferred, that he was a moft heinous criminal, and charged him with aggra vated guilt as the caufe of his calamities; though God himself by a voice from heaven folved this uncharitable fophifm, and cleared his fervant Job of that charge. How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to wrong perfons? We too often charge that upon the wicked contrivance and premeditated malice of a neigh, bour, which arose merely from ignorance, or from unguarded temper. And on the other hand, when we have a mind to excuse ourselves, we practise the same fophifm, and charge that upon our inadvertance or our ignorance, which perhaps was defigned wickedness. What is really done by a neceflity of circumstances, we fometimes impute to choice. And again, we charge that upon neceffity, which was really defired and chofen.

Sometimes a perfon acts out of judgment in oppofi. tion to his inclination; another perfon perhaps acts the fame thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is hard for us to determine with affurance what are the inward springs and fecret caufes of every man's conduct: and therefore we fhould be cautious and flow in paffing a judgment, where the cafe is not exceeding evident and if we should mistake, let it rather be on the charitable than on the cenforious fide.

It is the fame fophifm that charges mathematical learning with leading the minds of men to fcepticism and infidelity, and as unjustly accuses the new philofophy of paving the way to herefy and fchifm. Thus the reformation from Popery has been charged with the murder and blood of millions, which in truth is to be imputed to the tyranny of the princes and the priests, who would not fuffer the people to reform their fentiments and their practice according to the word of God. Thus Christianity in the primitive ages was charged by the Heathens with all the calamities which befel the Roman empire, because the chriftians renounced the Heathen gods and idols.

y The way to relieve ourselves from thofe fophifms,

and to secure ourselves from the danger of falling into them, is an honest and diligent inquiry into the realnature and caufes of things, with a conftant watchfulnefs against all thofe prejudices that might warp the judgment alide from truth in that inquiry.

V. The next is called fallacia accidentis, or a fophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and ef fential properties of any fubject according to fomething. which is merely accidental to it. This is a-kin to the former, and is alfo very frequent in human life. So if opium or the Peruvian bark has been ufed imprudently or unsuccessfully, whereby the patient has received in-jury, fome weaker people abfolutely pronounce againft. the use of the bark or opium upon all occafions whatfoever, and are ready to call them Poifon. So wine has been the accidental occafion of drunkenness and quar-rels; learning and printing may have been the accidental cause of sedition in a ftate; the reading of the bible: by accident has been abused to promote herefies or deftructive errors; and for these reasons they have been aili pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbad his followers the use of wine; the Turks difcourage learning in their dominions; and the Papifts forbid the fcripture to be read by the laity. But how very unreasonable are these inferences, and these prohibitions which are built upon them.

VI. The next fophifm borders upon the former ; and that is, when we argue from that which is true in particular circumftances to prove the fame thing true abfolutely, fimply, and abftracted from all circum-ftances; this is called in the fchools a fophifm a dicto fecundum quid ad dictum fimpliciter; as, that which is brought in the fhambles is eaten for dinner; raw meat is brought in the fhambles: therefore raw meats is eaten for dinner. Or thus, Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he defcribes prodigies and omens;: therefore Livy's Roman history is never to be believed in any thing Or thus, there may be fome mistake of: tranfcribers in fome part of fcripture: therefore fcripture alone is not a safe guide for our faith.

This fort of fophifm has its reverfe alfo ; as when we argue from that which is true simply and absolutelyy