SECT. VII.

Principles and Rules of Judging concerning Things paft, prefent, and to come, by the mere Ufe of Reafon.

TH

HOUGH we attain the greatest affurance of things paft and future by divine faith, and learning many matters of fact, both past and prefent, by human faith, yet reafon alfo may, in a good degree,. affiit us to judge of matters of fact both past, prefent, and to come, by the following principles.

1. There is a fyftem of beings round about us, of which we ourselves are a part, which we call the world; and in this world there is a course of nature, or a fettled. order of caufes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, con fequences, &c. from which the author of nature doth not vary but upon very important occafions.

Where antecedents, concomitants and confequences, caufes and effects, figns and things fignified, fubjects and adjuncts are neceffarily connected with each other, we may infer the caufes from the effects, and the effects. from causes, the antecedents from the confequences, as well as confequences from antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty certain of many things both paft, prefent, and to come. It is by this principle, that aftronomers can tell what day and hour the fun and moon were eclipfed five hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipfes as long as the world fhall ftand. They can tell precifely at what minute the fun rifes or fets this day at Pequin in China, or what attitude the dog-ftar had at midnight or midnoon in Rome, on the day when Julius Caefar was flain. Gardeners, upon the fame principle, can foretel the months, when every plant will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeks of harvest we are fure, if there be a chicken, there was an egg if there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains. not far off: if we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it has naturally a root under ground..

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3. Where there is a neceflary connection between

caufes and effects, antecedents and confequences, signs and things fignified, we know alfo, that like caufes will have like effects, and proportionable caufes will have proportionable effects, contrary caufes will have contrary effects; and obferving men may form many judgments by the rules of fimilitude and proportion, where the causes, effects, &c. are not entirely the fame.

4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain connection between antecedents, concomitants and confequences, we can give but a conjecture, or a probable determination, If the clouds gather, or the weather-glafs finks, we fuppofe it will rain: if a man fpit blood frequently with coughing, we fuppofe his lungs are hurt if very dangerous fymptoms appear, we expect. his death.

5. Where caufes operate freely, with a liberty of indifference to this or the contrary, there we cannot certainly know what the effects will be: for it seems to be contingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only to God. This is the cafe in the greatest part of human actions..

6. Yet wife men by a juft obfervation of human nature, will give very probable conjectures in this matter, alfo concerning things paft, or things future, because human nature in all ages and nations has such a conformity to itself. By a knowledge of the tempers of men and their prefent circumstances, we may be able to give a happy guess what their conduct will be, and what will be the event, by an obfervation of the like cafes in former times. This made the emperor Mar cus Antoninus to fay, "By looking back into history, and confidering the fate and revolutions of govern ments, you will be able to form a guess, and almoft prophecy upon the future. For things paft, prefent; and to come, are ftrangely uniform, and of a colour; and are commonly caft in the fame mould. So that upon the matter, forty years of human life may serve for a fample of ten thoufand." Collier's Antoninus, Book VII. Sect. 50..

7. There are alfo fome other principles of judging concerning the paft actions of men in former ages, be fides books, hiftories and traditions, which are mediums

of conveying human teftimony; as we may infer the fkill and magnificence of the ancients, by fome fragments of their ftatues, and ruins of their buildings. We know what Roman legions came into Great Britain by numbers of bricks dug out of the earth in fome parts of the island, with the marks of fome particular legion upon them, which must have been employed there in brick-making. We rectify fome mistakes in history by ftatues, coins, old altars, utenfils of war, &c. We confirm or difprove fome pretended traditions and hiftorical writings, by medals, images, pictures, urns, &c.

Thus I have gone through all thofe particular objects of our judgment which I first propofed, and have laid down principles and rules by which we may fafely conduct ourselves therein. There is a variety of other objects concerning which we are occafionally called to pafs a judgment, viz. The characters of perfons, the value and worth of things, the fenfe and meaning of particular writers, matters of wit, oratory, poefy, matters of equity in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce between man and man, which would be endless to enumerate. But if the general and fpecial rules of judgment which have been mentioned in these two last chapters are treasured up in the mind, and wrought into the very temper of our fouls in our younger years, they will lay a foundation for juft and regular judgment concerning a thousand fpecial occurrences in the religious, civil and learned life.

THE

THIRD PART

OF

LOGI C
Q

OF REASON AND SYLLOGISM.

S the first work of the mind is perception, where

ment, which joins or disjoins our ideas, and forms a propofition, fo the third operation of the mind is reafon ing, which joins feveral propofitions together; and makes a fyllogifm, that is, an argument whereby we are wont to infer fomethings that is lefs known, from truths which are more evident.

In treating of this fubject, let us confider more particularly.

1. The nature of a fyllogifin, and the parts of which it is compofed.

2. The feveral kinds of fyllogifms, with particular rules relating to them.

3. The doctrine of fyllogifms, of false reasonings, to-gether with the means of avoiding them, and the man-ner of folving or anfwering them.

4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning,

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM, AND THE PARTS OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED.

I

F the mere perception and comparison of two ideas would fhew us whether they agree or difagree; then all rational propofitions would be matters of intelligence, or first principles, and there would be no use of reafoning, or drawing any confequences. It is the narrownels of the human mind which introduces the necellity of reafoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or falfehood of a propofition in an immediate manner, by the mere contemplation of its fubject and predicate, we are thus conftrained to ufe a medium, and to compare each of them with some third idea, that by feeing how far they agree or difagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or difagree among themselves: as, if there are two lines A and B, and I know not whether they are equal or no, I take a third line C, or an inch, and apply it to each of them; if it agree with them both, then I infer that A and B are equal; but if it agree with one and not with the other, then I include A and B are unequal: if it agree with neither of them, there can be no comparifon.

So if the question be, whether God must be worfhipped, we feek a third idea, fuppofe the idea of a Creator, and fay.

Our Creator must be worshipped.

God is our Creator.

Therefore God must be worshipped.

The comparifon of this third idea, with the two dif tinct parts of the queftion, ufually requires two propofitions, which are called the premiffes: the third propofition, which is drawn from them, is the conclufion, wherein the queftion itfelf is anfwered, and the fubject and predicate joined either in the negative or the affirmative.

The foundation of all affirmative conclufions is laid in this general truth, that fo far as two proposed ideas agree to any third idea, they agree alfo among them