Among fubftances, fome are called fimple, fome are compound, whether the words be taken in a philofophical or a vulgar fenfe.

Simple fubftances, in a philofophical fenfe, are either fpirits which have no manner of compofition in them, and in this fenfe God is called a fimple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are ufually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded elements are fuch fubftances as cannot be refolved or reduced into two or more fubftances of different kinds.

The various fects of philofophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The Peripa teticks, or followers of Ariftotle, made fire, air, earth, and water, to be the four elements of which all earthly things were compounded; and they fuppofed the hea vens to be a quinteffence, or a fifth fort of body, diftinct from all thefe; but fince experimental philofophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemifts make spirit, falt, fulphur, water, and earth, to be their five elements, becaufe they can reduce all terreftrial things to thefe five. This feems to come nearer the truth, though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In fhort, our modern philofophers gener

eafy to be admitted; but if we proceed to fupport a fort of real, fubstantial, distinct being, different from folid quantity or extenfion in bodies, and different from a power of thinking in fpirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needlefs, fcholastical notion into the real nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence.

Mr Locke, in his Effay, of Human Understanding, Book II. chap. 22. § 2. Seems to ridicule this common idea of fubstance, which men have generally supposed to be a fort of fubstratum, distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. chap. 3. § 6. He feems to fuppofe there may be fome fuch unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the proper ties both of matter and of mind, viz. extenfion, folidity, and cogitation; for he fuppofes it poffible for God to add cogitation to that fubstance which is corporeal, and thus to caufe matter to think. If this be true, then spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal beings or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the foul. But I leave thefe debates to the philofophers of the age, and will not be too pofitive in my opinion of this abstrufe fubject. See more of this argument in Philofophical Effays, before cited, Effay 2d.

C

ally fuppofe matter or body to be one fimple principle or folid extenfion, which being diverfified by its various fhapes, quantities, motions, and fituations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe, and therefore they make little use of the word element.

Compound fubftances are made up of two or more fimple fubftances; fo every thing in this whole material creation that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more different principles or fubftances, is a compound body in the philofophical fenfe.

But if we take the words fimple and compound in a vulgar fenfe, then all thofe are fimple fubftances which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures. So every herb is called a fimple; and every metal and mineral, though the chemift perhaps may find all his feveral elements in each of them. So a needle is a fimple body, being only made of fteel; but a fword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or handle is made of materials different from the blade. So the bark of Peru, or the juice of forrel, is a fimple medicine; but when the apothecary's art has mingled feveral fimples together, it becomes a compound, as diafcordium or mithradite.

The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are much akin to fimple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any alloy or bafer metal; but if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixed substance or body.

Substances are alfo divided into animate and inanimate. Animate fubftances are either animal or vegetable*.

Some of the animated substances have various organical or inftrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a fpring of life within themselves, as beafts, birds, fishes, and infects; these are called animals. Other animated fubftances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the

*Vegetables as well as animals have gotten the name of animated fubstances, because some of the ancients fuppofed herbs and plants, beasts and birds, &c. to have a fort of fouls distinct from matter or body.

principles of another fort of life and growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers, and fruit, fuch as we fee in plants, herbs, and trees.

And there are other fubftances, which are called inanimate, because they have no fort of life in them, as earth, ftone, air, water, &c.

There is alfo one fort of fubftance or being, which is compounded of body and mind, or a rational fpirit united to an animal; fuch is mankind. Angels, or any other beings of the fpiritual and invifible world, who have affumed vifible fhapes for a feafon, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings; because they drop their bodies, and diveft themselves of those visible shapes, when their particular meffage is performed, and thereby fhew that thefe bodies do not belong to their natures.

SECT. III.

Of Modes, and their various Kinds, and first of effential

THE

ing*.

and accidental Modes.

HE next fort of objects which are reprefented in our ideas, are called modes, or manners of be

A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always efteemed as belonging to, and fubfifting by, the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its fubject. A mode muft depend on that fubftance for its very existence and being; and that not as a being depends on its caufe, (for fo fubftances themfelves depend on God their creator), but the very being

* The term Mode is by fome authors applied chiefly to the relations or relative manners of being; but, in logical treatifes, it is often ufed in a larger fenfe,, aud extends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the most effential and inward properties, as well as outward refpects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves, as well as manners of action.

of a mode depends on fome fubstance for its subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs; fo motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot fubfift without body, and the other cannot fubfift without mind.

Modes have their feveral divifions, as well as subftances.

I. MODES are either effential or accidental.

An effential mode or attribute is that which belongs to the very nature or effence of the fubject wherein it is; and the fubject can never have the fame nature without it. Such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a ftone, foftnefs in water, vital motion in an animal, foHidity in matter, thinking in a fpirit; for though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made fquare, yet if roundnefs be taken away it is no longer a bowl; fo that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal but a carcafe; fo if a body or matter be divested of folidity, it is a mere void space or nothing; and if fpirit be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore fo far as I am able to judge, confcioufnefs must be its effential attribute* thus all the perfections of God are called his attributes, for he cannot be without them.

An effential mode is either primary or fecondary.

A primary effential mode is the first or chief thing that conftitutes any being in its particular effence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and diftinguishes it from all other beings; that is called the difference in the definition of things, of which here after; fo roundness is the primary effential mode or

* When I call folid extenfion an effential mode or attribute of matter, and a power of thinking an effential mode or attribute of a fpirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech, but perhaps in reality thefe are the very effences or fubstances themleves, and the most fubstantial ideas that we can frame of body and fpirit, and have no need of any (we know not what) fubstratum or unintelligible fubstance to fupport them in their existence or being.

difference of a bowl: the meeting of two lines is the primary effential mode, or the difference of an angle: the perpendicularity of these lines to each other is the difference of a right angle: folid extenfion is the primary attribute or difference of matter; consciousness, or at least a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a fpirit*: and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man.

A fecondary effential mode is any other attribute of a thing, which is not of primary confideration; this is called a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the effence, especially of a complex being, fo far as we are acquainted with it: fometimes it depends upon, and follows from, the effence of it; fo volubility, or aptnefs to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundnefs. Mobility and figure or fhape are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour.

An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not neceflary to the being of a thing, for the fubject may be without it, and yet remain of the fame nature that it was before; or it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its fubject; fo fmoothnefs or roughness, blackness or whitenefs, motion or reft, are the accidents of a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl ftill. Learning, juftice, folly, sickness, health, are the accidents of a man; motion, fquareness, or any particular shape or fize, are the accidents of a body; yet fhape and fize in general are effential modes of it; for a body must have fome fize and fhape, nor can it be without them; fo hope, fear, withing, affenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind, though thinking in general seems to be essential to it.

Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick philofophers to all modes, whether effential or accidental; but the moderns confine this word accident to the fense in which I have defcribed it.

Here it should be noted alfo, that though the word

* See the preceding note.