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· Among fubstances, some are called simple, fome are compound, whether the words be taken in a philolo. phical or a vulgar sense.

Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either spirits which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a fimple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded : elements are such substances as cannot be resolved or reduced into two or more substances of different kinds.

The various sects of philosophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The Peripar teticks, or followers of Aristotle, made fire, air, earth, and water, to be the four elements of which all earthly things were compounded, and they supposed the hea vens to be a quinteffence, or a fifth sort of body, diltinct from all thefe ; but since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemifts make spirit, falt, fulphur, water, and earth, to be their five elements, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to these five. This seems to come nearer the truth, though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philosophers gener


easy to be admitted ; but if we proceed to support a sort of real, sub,
stantial, distinct being, different from solid quantity or extension in bo-
dies, and different from a power of thinking in fpirits, in my opinion
it is the introduction of a needless, scholastical notion into the read
nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence. :
• Mr Locke, in his Efiay, of Human Understanding, Book II. chap.
22. $ 2. S:ems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which men
have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum, distinct from all
properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet,
in Book IV.chap. 3. $ 6. He seems to suppose there may be fome such
unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the proper-
ties both of matter and of mind, viz. extension, folidity, and cogi.
tation ; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation to that
fubstance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If
this be true, then fpirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal beings
or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the morta-
lity of the foul. But I leave thefe debates to the philosophers of the
age, and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject.

See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays, before cited,
Ellay ad.

ally suppose matter or body to be one simple principle or solid extension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe, and there. fore they make little use of the word element.

Compound substances are made up of two or more fimple substances ; so every thing in this whole material creation that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more different principles or substances, is a compound body in the philosophical sense.'

But if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are fimple fubitances which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures. So every herb is called a simple; and every metal and mineral, though the chemist perhaps may find all his feveral elements in each of them. So a needle is a simple body, being only made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or handle is made of materials different from the blade. So the bark of Peru, or the juice of forrel, is a simple medicine ; but when the apothecary's art has mingled several simples together, it becomes a compound, as diafcordium or mithradite.

The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any alloy or baser metal ; but if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixed substance or body.

Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate. Animate substances are either animal or ve. getable*.

Some of the animated substances have various organical or instrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects; these are called animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the principles of another sort of life and growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers, and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs, and trees. '

* Vegetables as well as animals have gotten the name of animated fubstances, because some of the ancients supposed herbs and plants, beasts and birds, &c. to have a sort of souls distinct from matter or body.

And there are other substances, which are called inanimate, because they have no sort of life in them, as earth, stone, air, water, &C. · There is also one sort of substance or being, which is compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit united to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any other beings of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assumed visible shapes for a reason, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings; because they drop their bodies, and diveft themselves of those visible shapes, when their particular meflage is performed, and thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their natures.


Of Modes, and their various Kinds, and first of effential

and accidental Modes.

THE next sort of objects which are represented in

I our ideas, are called modes, or manners of being*

A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and fublifting by, the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its very existence and being; and that not as a being depends on its cause, (for so substances themselves depend on God their creator), but the very being

* The term Mode is by fome authors applied chiefly to the relations or relative manners of being; but, in logical treatises, it is often used in a larger senseo, aud extends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the most effential and inward properties, as well as outward respects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves, as well as manners of action.

of a mode depends on some substance for its subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs; so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot sublilt without body, and the other cannot subfift without mind.

Modes have their several divifions, as well as subftances.

I. Modes are either effential or accidental.

An eilential mode or attribute is that which belongs to the very nature or eflence of the subject wherein it is; and the subject can never have the same nature without it. Such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a. fone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, sofidity in matter, thinking in a spirit; for though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square, yet if roundness be taken away it is no longer a bowl; so that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal but a carcase; fo if a body or matter be divested of folidity, it is a mere void space or nothing; and if spirit be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore so far as I am able to judge, consciousness must be its essential attribute*; thus all the perfections of God are called his attributes; for he cannot be without them.

An essential mode is either primary or secondary.

A primary essential mode is the first or chief thing that constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other beings; that is called the difference in the definition of things, of which here after ; so roundness is the primary essential mode or

* When I call folid extension an essential mode or attribute of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attribute of a fpirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech, but perhaps in reality these are the very essences or substances themseves, and the most substantial ideas that we can frame of body and spirit, and have no need of any (we know not what) substratum or unintelligible substance to support them in their existence or being.

difference of a bowl: the meeting of two lines is the primary essential mode, or the difference of an angle : the perpendicularity of these lines to each other is the difference of a right angle : solid extension is the primary attribute or difference of matter ; consciousness, or at least a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a spirit* : and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man.

A fecondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing, which is not of primary consideration ; this is called a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the essence, especially of a complex being, so far as we are acquainted with it: sometimes it depends upon, and follows from, the effence of it; so volubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure or shape are properties of matter ; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour. · An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing , for the subject may be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it was before; or it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject; so smoothness or roughness, blackness or whiteness, motion or rest, are the accidents of a bowl ; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl still. Learning, justice, folly, fickness, health, are the accidents of a man; motion, squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of a body; yet shape and size in general are essential modes of it; for a body must have fome size and shape, nor can it be without them ; so hope, fear, wishing, afsenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind, though thinking in general seems to be effential to it.

Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick philosophers to all modes, whether effential or accidental; but the moderns confine this word accident to the sense in which I have described it.

Here it should be noted also, that though the word

* See the preceding note.

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