eternity and the omniprefence of God, and the philofophical doctrines of light, atoms, space, motion, &c. are hardly folvable to this day.

15. Where two extremes are propofed, either in matters of fpeculation or practice, and neither of them has certain and convincing evidence, it is generally the fafeft to take the middle way. Moderation is more likely to come near the truth than doubtful extremes. This is an excellent rule to judge of the characters and value of the greatest part of perfons and things; for nature feldom deals in fuperlatives. It is a good rule alfo by which to form our judgment in many fpeculative controverfies; a reconciling medium in such cases does often beft fecure truth as well as peace.

16. When two different propofitions have each a very strong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly appear inconfistent, we may believe both of them, though we cannot at prefent fee the way to reconcile them. Reafon, as well as our own confcioufnefs, affures us, that the will of man is free, and that multitudes of human actions are in that refpect contingent; and yet reafon and scripture affures us, that God foreknows them all, and this implies a certain fatality. Now though learned men have not to this day hit on any fo clear and happy method as is defired to reconcile these propofitions; yet fince we do not fee a plain inconfiftency in them, we juftly believe them both, because their evidence is great.

17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine in difficult matters, that two things are utterly inconfiftent for there are many propofitions which may appear inconfiftent at firft, and yet afterwards we find their confiftency, and the way of reconciling them may be made plain and easy: as also, there are other propofitions which may appear consistent at first, but after due examination we find their inconfiftency.

18. For the fame reafon we fhould not call thofe difficulties utterly infolvable, or thofe objections unanfwerable, which we are not prefently able to answer: time and diligence may give farther light.

19. In fhort, if we will fecure ourselves from error, we should not be too frequent or hafty in aflerting the

certain confiftency or inconfiftency, the abfolute univerfality, neceffity, or impoffibility of things, where there is not the brightest evidence. He is but a young and raw philofopher, who, when he fees two particular ideas evidently agree, immediately afferts them to agree univerfally, to agree neceffarily, and that it is impoflible it fhould be otherwife: or when he fees evidently that two particular ideas happen to disagree, he presently afferts their conftant and natural inconfiftency, their utter impoffibility of agreement, and calls every thing contrary to his opinion abfurdity and nonfenfe.

A true

philofopher will affirm or deny with much caution or modefty, unless he has thoroughly examined, and found the evidence of every part of his affertion exceeding plain.

20. Let us have a care of building our affurance of any important point of doctrine upon one fingle argument, if there are more to be obtained. We should not flight and reject all other arguments which fupport. the fame doctrine, left if our favourite argument should be refuted, and fail us we fhould be tempted to abandon that important principle of truth. I think this was a very culpable practice in Defcartes, and fome of his followers, who, when he had found out the argument for the existence of God derived from the idea of a moft perfect and felf-exiftent being, he feemed to defpife and. abandon all other arguments against atheism.

21. If we happen to have our chief arguments for any opinion refuted, we fhould not immediately give up the opinion itfelf; for perhaps it may be a truth itill, and we may find it to be justly supported by other arguments, which we might once think weaker, or perhaps by new arguments which we knew not before.

22. We ought toefteem that to be fufficient evidence. of a propofition, where both the kind and the force of the arguments or proofs are as great as the nature of the thing admits, and as the neceffity or exigencies of the cafe requires. So if we have a credible and certain teftimony that Chrift rofe from the dead, it is enough; we are not to expect mathematical or ocular demonftration for it, at least in our day.

23. Though we fhould feek what proofs may be at-

tained of any propofition, and we fhould receive any number of arguments which are just and evident for the confirmation of the fame truth; yet we must not judge of the truth of any propofition by the number of arguments which are brought to fupport it, but by the ftrength and weight of them: a building will stand firmer and longer on four large pillars of marble, than on ten of fand, or earth, or timber.

24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found or expected, a confiderable number of probable arguments carry great weight with them, even in matters of fpeculation. That is a probable hypothefis in philofophy or in theology, which goes fartheft towards the folution of many difficult queftions arising on any subject.

SECT. III.

Principles and rules of Judgment in Matters of Morality and Religion.

HER

ERE it may be proper, in the first place, to mention a few definitions of words or terms.

By matters of morality and religion I mean those things which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or our fellow-creatures.

Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or temper conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral evil, or vice, or fin, is an action or temper unconformable to the rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it.

Note, The words vice or virtue chiefly imply the relation of our actions to men and this world: fin and holinefs rather imply their relation to God and the other world.

Natural good is that which gives us pleasure or fatisfaction. Natural evil is that which gives us pain or grief.

Happiness confifts in the attainment of the highest

and moft lafting natural good. Mifery confifts in fuffering the highest and most lafting natural evil; that is, in fhort, heaven or hell.

Though this be a juft account of perfect happiness and perfect mifery, yet whatsoever pain overbalances pleasure, there is a degree of mifery; and wherefoever pleasure overbalances pain, there is a degree of happi

nefs.

I proceed now to lay down fome principles and rules of judgment in matters of morality and religion.

1. The will of our Maker, whether difcovered by reafon or revelation, carries the highest authority with it, and is therefore the highest rule of duty to intelligent creatures; a conformity or non-conformity to it determines their actions to be morally good or evil.

2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty towards ourselves, or towards our fellow-creatures, is more remotely a duty to God; and therefore in the practice of it we should have an eye to the will of God as our rule, and to his glory as our end.

3. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely united our duty and our happiness together; and has connected fin, or vice, and punishment; that is, he has ordained that the highest natural good and evil should have a close connection with moral good and evil, and that both in the nature of things, and by his own pofitive appointment.

4. Confcience fhould feek all due information in order to determine what is duty, and what is fin, because happiness and mifery depend upon it.

5. On this account our inclination to prefent temporal good, and our averfion to prefent temporal evil, must be wifely overbalanced by the confideration of future and eternal good or evil, that is, happiness or mifery, And for this reason we should not omit a duty, or commit a fin, to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any temporal evil.

6. Though our natural reason in a state of innocence might be fufficient to find out those duties which were neceffary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in the favour of his Maker, yet in a fallen ftate our natural reafon is by no means fufficient to find out all that is

neceffary to restore a finful creature to the divine fa

your.

7. Therefore God has condefcended in various ages of mankind to reveal to finful men what he requires of them in order to their restoration, and has appointed in his word fome peculiar matters of faith and practice, in order to their falvation. This is called revealed religion, as the things knowable concerning God, and our duty by the light of nature are called natural religion.

8. There are also many parts of morality, and natural religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to ourfelves, and to our neighbours, which would be exceeding difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind to find out and determine by natural reason; therefore it has pleafed God, in this facred book of divine revelation, to exprefs the most neceffary duties of this kind. in a very plain and eafy manner, and make them intelligible to fouls of the loweft capacity; or they may be very easily derived thence by the use of reafon.

9. As they are fome duties much more neceffary and more important than others are, fo ever duty requires our application to understand and practise it in proportion to its neceffity and importance.

ro. Where two duties feem to ftand in oppofition to each other, and we cannot practife both, the less must give way to the greater, and the omiffion of the lefs is not finful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral: God will have mercy and not facrifice.

11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of the different degrees of their neceffity and importance by reafon, according to their greater or more apparent tendency to the honour of God, and the good of men : but in matters of revealed religion, it is only divine revelation can certainly inform us what is moft necessary and most important; yet we may be affifted also in that fearch by the exercises of reafon.

12. In actions wherein there may be fome fcruple about the duty or lawfulness of them, we fhould chufe always the fafeft fide, and abftain as far as we can from the practice of things whofe lawfulness we fufpect.

13. Points of the greatest importance in human life,