Page images
PDF
EPUB

fitly exercised about their proper objects, with the just affiftance of reafon, they give us fufficient evidence of truth.

This may be proved from an argument drawn from the wisdom, goodness, and faithfulness of God our creator. It was he gave us our fenfes, and he would not make us of fuch a conftitution as to be liable to perpetual deception and unavoidable error in using these faculties of fenfe in the best manner we are capable of, about these very things which are the proper objects of them.

This may be proved also by the ill confequences that would follow from the fuppofition of the contrary. If we could have no certainty of the dictates of our senses, we could never be fure of any of the common affairs and occurrences of life. Men could not transact any of their civil or moral concerns with any certainty or juftice nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move with fafety. Our fenfes direct us in all these.

Again, the matters of religion depend in fome measure upon the certainty of the dictates of fense; for faith comes by hearing; and it is to our senses that God appeals in working miracles to prove his own revelation. Now, if when our eyes and ears, and other organs of fenfe are rightly difpofed and exercised about their proper objects, they were always liable to be deceived, there could be no knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revelation by vifions, voices or miracles.

Our fenfes will difcover things near us and round about us, which are neceflary for our present state, with fufficient exactnefs, and things distant also, as far as they relate to our neceflary use of them.

Nor is there need of any more accurate rules for the ufe of our fenfes in the judgment of all the common affairs of life, or even of miraculous and divine operations, than the vulgar part of mankind are sufficiently acquainted with by nature, and by their own daily obfervations.

But if we would exprefs these rules in a more exact manner, how to judge by the dictates of our senses, they fhould be reprefented thus:

1. We must take care that the organs of our sense be rightly difpofed, and not under the power of any diftemper or confiderable decay; as for inftance, that our eyes are not tinctured with the jaundice, when we would judge of colours, left we pronounce them all yellow that our hands are not burning in a fever, or benumbed with froft or the palfy, when we would judge of the heat or coldness of any object; that our palate be not vitiated by any difeafe, or by fome other improper tafte, when we would judge of the true taste of any folid or liquid. This direction relates to all our fenfes, but the following rules chiefly refer to our fight.

2. We must obferve whether the object be at a proper distance, for if it be too near or too far off, our eyes will not fufficiently distinguish many things which are properly the objects of fight; and therefore (if poffible) we must make nearer approaches to the object, or remove, farther from it, till we have obtained that due diftance which gives us the cleareft perception.

3. We must not employ our fight to take a full furvey at once of objects that are too large for it, but we muft view them by parts, and then judge of the whole; Nor must our fenfes judge of objects too fmall; for fome things which appear through glaffes to be really and diftinctly exiftent, are either utterly invifible, or greatly confused, when we would judge of them by the naked eye.

4. We must place ourselves in fuch a position toward the object, or place the object in fuch a pofition toward our eye, as may give us the cleareft representation of it: for a different pofition greatly alters the appearance of the shape of bodies. And for this reafon we fhould change the pofition both of the eye and the object in forme cafes, that by viewing the object in feveral appearances, we may pafs a more complete and certain judgment concerning it.

5. We must confider what the medium is by which objects are represented to our fenfes; whether it be thinner or thicker; whether it be air or vapour, or water, or glass, &c. whether it be duly enlightened or dufky; whether it reflect or refract, or only transmit the appearance of the object; and whether it be tinc

tured with any particular colour : whether it be moving or at reft.

6. We must sometimes use other helps to affift our senses; and if we make use of glaffes, we muit make all just allowances for the thickness or thinnefs of them, for the clearness or dulnefs, for the fmoothness or roughness, for the plainness, the convexity or concavity of them, and for the distance at which thefe glaffes are placed from the eye, or from the object, (or from one another, if there be two or more claffes ufed) and all this according to the rules of art. The fame fort of caution fhould be used alfo in mediums which affift the hearing, fuch as fpeaking trumpets, hearing-trumpets, &c.

7. If the object may be propofed to more fenfes than one, let us call in the affiftance of fome other fenfes to examine it, and this will increafe the evidence of what one fenfe dictates. For example; our ear may aflift our eye in judging of the diftance of bodies, which are both visible and fonorous, as an exploded canon, or a cloud charged with thunder. Our feeling may aflift our fight in judging of the kind, the fhape, fituation, or diftance of bodies that are nearer at hand, as whether a garment be filk or stuff, &c. So if I both fee, hear, and embrace my friend, I am fure he is prefent.

8. We should also make several trials, at fome diftant times, and in different circumftances, comparing former experiments with later, and our own obfervations with thofe of other perfons.

It is by fuch methods as these that modern philofophy has been fo greatly improved by the ufe of fenfible experiments.

SECT. II.

Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of Reason and Speculation.

T is by reafon we judge both in matters of fpecula

[ocr errors]

tion and practice; there are peculiar rules which relate to things practical, whether they be matters of reT

ligion, morality, or prudence, yet many things in this fection may be applied to practical inquiries and matters of faith, though it chiefly relates to knowledge or speculations of reason.

1. Whatfoever clear ideas we can join together without inconfiftency, and to be counted poffible, because almighty power can make whatsoever we can conceive.

2. From the mere poffibility of a thing we cannot infer its actual existence; nor from the non-existence of it can we infer its impoffibility.

Note, The idea of God seems to claim an exemption from this general rule; for if he be poffible, he certainly exifts, because the very idea includes eternity, and he cannot begin to be: if he exift not, he is impoffible, for the very fame reason.

2. Whatfover is evidently contained in the idea of any thing, may be affirmed of that thing with certainty. Reafon is contained in the idea of a man; and existence is contained in the idea of God; and therefore we may affirm God exifts, and man is reasonable.

4. It is impoffible that the fame thing fhould be, and not be at the fame time, and in the fame respect. Thence it follows, that two contradictory ideas cannot be joined in the fame part of the same subject, at the fame time, and in the fame refpects; or, that two contradictory propofitions can never be both true.

5. The more we converfe with any subject in its various properties, the better knowledge of it we are likely to attain ; and by frequent and repeated inquiries and experiments, reasonings and conversations about it, we confirm our true judgments of that thing, and correct our former mistakes.

6. Yet after our utmost inquiries, we can never be affured by reafon, that we know all the powers and properties of any finite being.,

7. If finite beings are not adequately known by us, much lefs the things which are infinite: for it is of the nature of a finite mind not to be able to comprehend what is infinite.

8. We may judge and argue very juftly and certain. ly concerning infinites, in fome parts of them, or fo far as our ideas reach, though the infinity of them hath

fomething incomprehenfible in it. on the general rule following, viz.

And this is built

9. Whatfoever is fufficiently clear and evident ought not to be denied, though there are other things belonging to the same subject, which cannot be comprehended. I may affirm many things with certainty concerning human fouls, their union with bodies, concerning the divifibility of matter, and the attributes of God, though many things relating to them are darkness to us.

10. If any opinion propofed has either no arguments, or equal arguments for and against it, we must remain in perfect fufpenfe about it, till convincing evidence ap

pear on one fide.

11. Where prefent neceffity of action does not conftrain us to determine, we fhould not immediately yield up our affent to mere probable arguments, without a due reserve, if we have any reasonable hope of obtaining greater light and evidence on one fide or the other: for when the balance of the judgment once refigns its equilibrium or neutrality to a mere probable argument, it is too ready to fettle itself on that fide, fo that the mind will not eafily change that judgment, though bright and strong evidence appear afterwards on the other fide.

12. Of two opinions, if one has unanswerable difficulties attending it, we muft not reject it immediately, till we examine whether the contrary opinion has not difficulties as unanswerable.

13. If each opinion has objections against it, which we cannot answer, or reconcile, we fhould rather embrace that which has the leaft difficulties in it, and which has the best arguments to fupport it: and let our affent bear proportion to the fuperior evidence.

14. If any doctrine hath very ftrong and fufficient light and evidence to command our affent, we should not reject it because there is an objection or two against it, which we are not able to answer; for upon this foot a common Christian would be baffled out of every article of his faith, and must renounce even the dictates of his reafon and his fenfes; and the most learned man perhaps would hold but very few of them faft; for fome objections which attend the facred doctrine of the

« PreviousContinue »